US Army War College

USAWC Press
Monographs, Books, and Publications
5-1-1999

Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying
Havoc?
Anthony H. Cordesman Prof.

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs

Recommended Citation
Cordesman, Anthony H. Prof., "Transnational Threats from the Middle East: Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc?"
(1999). Monographs, Books, and Publications. 847.
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/847

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Monographs, Books, and Publications by an authorized administrator of USAWC Press.

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS
FROM THE MIDDLE EAST:
CRYING WOLF OR CRYING HAVOC?

Anthony H. Cordesman

May 31, 1999

*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the
Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report
is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be
forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report
may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling
commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at
rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

*****
Selected 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)
monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic
dissemination. SSI’s Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army.
mil/usassi/welcome.htm

*****
The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail
newsletter to update the national security community on the research of
our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming
conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a
strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are
interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at
outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

*****
ISBN 1-58487-001-X

ii

CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1. Real and Potential Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The Dangers of Region-wide
Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Narcotics and Organized Crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Immigration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5. “Conventional” Terrorism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix A. Major Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups . . . . . . . 83
6. Proliferation and Long-range
Missile Strikes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix B. The Threat Posed by Proliferation
in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Appendix C. Iraqi Break Out Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
7. Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . 171
Appendix D. The Challenge Terrorism
and Unconventional Warfare Pose to the West . . . . . . . . 211
Appendix E. Attack Scenarios: “Dr. Ben No” and
“Professor Abu Moriarity” at Work in the Middle East . . 213
Appendix F. Counterproliferation Policy Options . . . . . . . . . 217
Appendix G. Possible Force Improvements Affecting
Counterproliferation Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
8. Energy Dependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

iii

TABLES

Table 1. Patterns in Global Drug Seizures
by Area, 1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Table 2. Foreign Labor and Population in the West . . . . . . . . 36
Table 3. Ethnic and Religious Composition
of Western States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Table 4. Foreign and Middle Eastern Population
in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 5. Patterns of Global International Terrorism
by Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Table 6. Information Warfare in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . 73
Table 7. Comparative Effects of Biological, Chemical,
and Nuclear Weapons Delivered Against a Typical
Urban Target. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Table 8. Proven Middle East Oil Reserves
by Country (in Billions of Barrels). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Table 9. Estimated Middle East Oil Production
Capacity (EIA Reference Gas in MMBD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Table 10. Estimated Trends in Middle Eastern
Petroleum Exports by Supplier and Destination
(Millions of Barrels Per Day) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

iv

FOREWORD

There is no doubt that the Middle East can present
significant potential threats to the West. The author of this
monograph examines these threats in order to put them into
perspective—to distinguish between “crying wolf” and
“crying havoc.” After thorough analysis, he contends that
the problems caused by narcotics and organized crime,
immigration, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction
do not as yet require draconian action by the Western
nations. However, he asserts that if the threats of Middle
Eastern terrorism and proliferation were to be combined
into super-terrorism, the result would create a new form of
asymmetric warfare for which the West is singularly
ill-prepared.
Professor Anthony H. Cordesman, an internationally
recognized expert of long-standing on these issues, has
provided this comprehensive assessment. Presented
originally at the U.S. Army War College – Pepperdine
University cosponsored conference on Mediterranean
Security into the Coming Millennium, held October
26-27,1998, in Florence, Italy, his appraisal is a valuable
reference for analysts who are studying the potential
consequences of these threats to U.S. security. The
Strategic Studies Institute welcomes the opportunity to
make his findings available to a wider audience, as well as to
contribute to this vital debate on our military strategy.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
REAL AND POTENTIAL THREATS

The boy cried, “wolf, wolf,” and the villagers came out to help
him.
Aesop
The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf
Cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war!
Shakespeare
Julius Caesar, Act III

There is no doubt that the Middle East can present
significant potential threats to the West. The Arab-Israeli
conflict helped trigger an oil embargo in 1973, and has been
a source of consistent political tension. The Iran-Iraq War
and the Gulf War have both led to recent Western power
projection in the region. Terrorist attacks have occurred in
both Europe and the United States, and against Western
citizens living and working in the Middle East. The military
build-up in the region, and the steady process of creeping
proliferation create new threats to a primary source of
energy exports, as well as the growing risk of missile attacks
on Western states or terrorist attacks using weapons of
mass destruction.
The Middle East has also long been a source of
transnational threats like narcotics. The failure of most
regional states to develop stable political and economic
systems, coupled to high birth rates, has created threats in
terms of growing legal and illegal immigration to the West.
At the same time, the political, social, and economic failures
of secular regimes have helped trigger the rise of numerous
Islamic extremist groups. Most target their own governments, but some have also targeted the West and Western
interests.
1

Seen from this perspective, there is a long shopping list
of “threats” that various Middle Eastern states and political
interests might pose to the West. These include:

•

New conflicts in the Gulf that threaten oil and gas
exports, particularly the risk of some new conflict
involving Iraq.

•

Energy interruptions, or sudden sharp reductions in
total export volume as a result of regional conflicts or
internal civil war, and rises in price. This may involve
the use of weapons of mass destruction against key oil
exporting states and/or energy production facilities.

•

Terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists on the West,
or on Western citizens and interests in the Middle
East. This can include the support of violent, radical
immigrant groups.

•

The breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process and
the risk of a rise in terrorism and/or new efforts to use
oil embargoes or military threats to pressure Western
states.

•

Creeping proliferation in a long list of Middle East
states, including such potentially threatening states
as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Efforts to acquire
biological and nuclear weapons are often coupled to
efforts to acquire long-range missiles capable of
hitting targets in the West.

•

Increased flows of narcotics as failed economies seek
any way of increasing exports.

•

Terrorist or low-level state-sponsored attacks on lines
of communication through the Mediterranean and
Red Sea, and on the flow of energy exports by ship or
pipeline.
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•

New forms of terrorism using methods like advanced
conventional weapons, extremely large-scale
conventional devices, attacks on critical energy and
economic facilities, the use of weapons of mass
destruction, and the use of information warfare.

•

The collapse of secular regimes in states like Algeria,
which could trigger a massive wave of immigration to
nations in Southern Europe.

There are other “threats” that are more subtle, but which
may prove equally or more serious. One is that the
political-economic-social problems in the Middle East, and
low oil and gas prices, will lead to underinvestment in
energy exports and that prices will rise in ways which limit
Western and global economic growth. Another is that the
slow deterioration of Middle Eastern states will slowly and
steadily increase the pressure to immigrate at rates that
Western states cannot absorb. This may lead to serious
social unrest.
Military Instability and Conventional Conflicts.
The Middle East has a long history of intraregional
violence and conflict. The Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1956,
1967, 1970, 1973, 1982, and the Intifada are cases in point.
So are the Iran-Iraq War and Gulf War. While Iran may be
becoming more moderate, there is still a serious risk of
internal clashes between its “moderates” and “traditionalists.” Iraq remains a serious potential threat, and the
Arab-Israeli peace process is on the edge of collapse.
Morocco remains at war with the Polisario, and there are a
host of border quarrels that sometimes lead to conflict. The
recent clash between Yemen and Saudi Arabia is a case in
point.
There has been a sharp decline in regional military
expenditures and arms imports since the end of the Cold
War. Middle Eastern military expenditures dropped from
$93.0 billion in 1985 to $48.6 billion in 1995, measured in
3

constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Middle Eastern arms imports
dropped from $27.9 billion in 1985 to $48.6 billion. North
African military expenditures dropped from $8.3 billion in
1985 to $13.8 billion in 1995. North African arms imports
dropped from $3.5 billion in 1985 to $320 million in 1995.1
The Middle East is so heavily armed, however, that the
drop in arms imports has little substantive impact on warfighting capability. The region still spends nearly 8 percent
of its GNP on military expenditures, which compares with
an average of 2.8 percent for both the developed and
developing world.2 The decline in military effort has also not
been a matter of choice. It has been enforced by the end to
concessionary arms transfers by the former Soviet Union
(FSU), growing economic problems, and by a range of
sanctions on key states like Iran, Iraq, and Libya. The end
result has often been a shift of resources away from large
conventional forces to the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction, long-range delivery systems, and carefully
selected advanced conventional weapons.
Proliferation is both a threat to the region and to nations
outside the Middle East. It creates a growing risk that
Middle Eastern states will be able to target Europe and even
North America with missiles armed with chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons. This threat is not only
“transnational,” it is “transregional.”
Transnational Threats.
Overt military conflict, however, is only one kind of
threat the West must deal with. The Middle East has long
been a source of transnational threats like terrorism, and
forces are at work which could make these transnational
threats much worse.
Some of these forces are political. Most Middle Eastern
states have repressive regimes with a high degree of
authoritarianism—regardless of whether the ruler is called
a King, Shiekh, Sultan, President, General, or Ayatollah.
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Recent U.S. State Department country reports on human
rights have found some degree of government repression in
virtually every country in the Middle East, and significant
degrees of state-sponsored and opposition terrorism. Many
states suffer from internal conflicts that have already led to
terrorist attacks on Westerners or other targets in the West.
The civil war in the Sudan seems to be emerging as the
longest and bloodiest conflict in modern times, but civil
conflict, border clashes, and low intensity combat affect
many Middle Eastern states. These states include Algeria,
Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen. Many of these
conflicts and tensions have triggered the creation of
extremist groups, many of them violent and terrorist in
character.
These political forces interact with growing economic
and demographic problems. Many states suffer from weak
or failed economic development, and high rates of
population growth. The region experienced negative real
economic growth during much of the 1980s, and economic
growth only averaged about one-third of population growth
during the 1990s—before the collapse of oil prices in 1997.
Population growth averaged 2.7 percent during 1995-1996,
and exceeded 3.4 percent during the period from the late
1960s to 1990. As a result, real per capita income has
dropped or remained nearly static for a generation. The
situation has not improved since that time. The region’s
average per capita income dropped by 1.8 percent during
1995-1996, before the collapse of oil prices.3
The Middle East is undergoing a virtual “youth
explosion.” Roughly 40 percent of the region’s population is
now under 17 years of age. The region’s educational system
is under extreme stress, and real and disguised
unemployment for males between 18 and 25 years probably
averages over 20 percent.4 The average per capita income of
the Middle East is now about $2,100 using the World Bank
method, and compares with $23,800 for high income states.5
Urbanization without development, and proper infra5

structure and housing, has often compounded the region’s
problems. The percent of urbanization in the total
population rose from 37 percent in 1970 to 57 percent in
1996.6
This combination of low oil prices, high population
growth rates, and a failure to modernize and diversify the
overall economy threatens to turn even oil wealth into oil
poverty. The Southern Gulf states have only about 40
percent of the real per capita income they had at the peak of
the oil boom in the early 1980s, and few prospects for
anything other than a slow decline. Kuwait, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) preserve high per capita
incomes, but Saudi Arabia is becoming increasingly
marginal. Iran has a per capita income of well under $5,000,
Algeria has $1,520, and Iraq’s per capita income is unlikely
to be higher.7
It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that many Middle
East states suffer from growing internal tensions that have
forced them to greatly expand their internal security efforts,
and which create new risks of regional instability and
terrorism. At the same time, these political, economic, and
demographic problems are powerful forces driving the
production and export of narcotics and increasing the flow of
legal and illegal immigration.
CHAPTER 1 - ENDNOTES
1. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1997, Tables I and II.
2. Ibid.
3. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998, Washington:
World Bank, pp. 28-29.
4. There are considerable uncertainties in this estimate. The figures
shown are the author’s estimate, based on various editions of the CIA,
World Factbook; World Bank, World Development Indicators; IISS,
Military Balance; and IMF, World Economic Outlook.
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5. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998, Washington:
World Bank, p. 14.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DANGERS OF REGION-WIDE
GENERALIZATIONS

At the same time, generalizations are dangerous at
many different levels. The Middle East is a highly diverse
area that includes 21 nations in an arc that ranges from
North Africa to the edge of Central Asia and the Red Sea.
These states have a total population of some 276 million and
a gross national product (GNP) of some $572 billion.1 Most
of these states are Arab and Islamic, but they often share
little in political and economic terms. Decades of Pan-Arab
rhetoric and failed efforts at regional cooperation cannot
disguise the fact that the major trading partners of every
Middle East state are states outside the region.
The nations in the Middle East divide into four
sub-regions whose nations often have different interests
and present different risks. These four sub-region regions
include the:

•

Maghreb, with Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya,
and Tunisia.

•

Levant and the Arab-Israeli confrontation states, with
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

•

Gulf, with Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, and Oman, and

•

Red Sea, Yemen, the Sudan, and Somalia.

These lists include states that have been the source of
terrorism or conflict, but they also include many states with
a long history of friendship to the West.
The Middle East is further divided into energy exporters
and nonexporters. This gives the Middle East great
9

importance to the West and the global economy because the
region has more than 65 percent of the world’s proven oil
reserves and 40 percent of its gas reserves. At the same
time, each exporting state within the Middle East has a
different regime and different set of interests. Iran, Iraq,
and Libya are sometimes seen as radical or threatening
states—but they have little in common. Similarly, Saudi
Arabia is a conservative and relatively stable Islamic
monarchy that has little in common with an Algeria that is
in the midst of a bloody civil conflict.
The resulting problems in risk analysis are compounded
by the fact that the “West” has no unity of interest in dealing
with the region. The United States, for example, is Israel’s
most important ally, while every other Western state has
attempted to strike a balance between Israel and its Arab
neighbors to different degrees. The United States, Britain,
and France are the only three Western states with
significant power projection capabilities, but their views
and interests are only rarely in concert. The Southern
European states are far more sensitive to issues in the
Maghreb than the rest of Europe, while states like Germany
may be more concerned with issues like immigration from
Turkey.
“Crying Wolf” or “Crying Havoc.”
Terrorism is a real and growing problem, but it must be
kept in perspective. Before the West “cries havoc and
unleashes the dogs of war,” it needs to consider whether it is
“crying wolf” and turning uncertain possibilities into urgent
probabilities. Complex, modern societies are always at risk,
and have many vulnerabilities. Worst-case studies can lead
to greatly exaggerated fears and scenarios. For example,
similar concerns led to major efforts to study the risk of
Spetznaz attacks on key Western communications,
transport, and energy systems during the Cold War—a
“terrorist” threat that never materialized.
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Proliferation and the acquisition of long-range missiles
also are real threats, but there is no question that the risks
are often exaggerated by those who wish to see immediate,
massive investments in missile defense. Similarly, there
are a number of nations and opposition groups in the Middle
East who see charges about proliferation by their opponents
as a tool they can use in mobilizing the West to serve their
own interests.
Regional and internal conflicts can lead to reductions or
interruptions in energy exports, but it is easy to exaggerate
such risks. The panic that followed the announcement of the
Arab oil embargo in 1973 disguised the fact that the world
market responded quickly and that more oil actually
reached the world oil market in the months immediately
after the announcement of the embargo than in the months
before. While a similar panic followed the fall of the Shah in
1979, improvements in tracking world supply reduced the
price and supply impact of the Iran-Iraq War to acceptable
limits, and the Gulf War had only a limited impact on the
world economy.
At the same time, it is all too easy to “cry wolf.” Virtually
every trend and potential risk becomes a “threat” when it is
carried to logical extremes. Most potential threats do not
materialize, particularly in the draconian form often used
by strategic analysts. It is also all too easy to transform
low-level risks into broad indictments of all Arabs, all
Persians, or all of Islam. These kind of indictments are little
more than racism. They ignore the fact that the
overwhelming majority of the people in the region have no
interest in violence or crime, and that Islam is a powerful
force for both morality and stability.
Islam is no more a threat to the West than Christianity
or Judaism. (Historically, the major threat to Christians
has always been Christians.) All religions have their
extremists, but it is important to note that Islam is a
powerful stabilizing force in most of the Middle East, and
that roughly half of the groups on the U.S. State
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Department list of Middle Eastern terrorist groups are
secular in character. The West has ample reason to
remember the warning of a Syrian Muslim poet who wrote
during the time of the Crusades: “Most people feel the world
is divided into Muslims, Christians, and Jews. It is not. It is
divided into those who believe and those who think!”
Who is the Transnational Threat to Whom?
Any analysis of transnational threats from the Middle
East must also consider the faults of the West. Some
“threats” raise serious questions as to whether the Middle
East is a “threat” to the West, or the West is a “threat” to the
Middle East. Narcotics are demand-driven, not supplydriven. Western states that cannot control the demands of
their own addicts have long tended to blame the problem on
supplier states. From a supplier state perspective, however,
the corrupting impact of Western demand for narcotics can
be a major threat to political stability, economic
development and reform, and law enforcement. Certainly,
the history of narcotics is the history of supply responding to
demand, and not demand responding to supply.
Western nations that exploit the immigration issue to
obtain low-cost labor—which is often excluded from social
services and citizenship—are in an awkward position in
condemning the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, or any
other part of the developing world. Once again, supply has
responded to demand. The political difficulties Western
democracies have in establishing realistic policies towards
legal and illegal immigrants are scarcely a reason for
raising the fear of the impact of such immigration to near
racist levels.
There is also a vast difference between possibility and
probability. The fact that the Middle East is virtually
certain to be a source of continuing problems for the West is
not a reason to claim that any given wolf is already
attacking the fold or will do so in the future. Worst case
scenarios are great for dramatic impact, but they have a
12

practical defect for contingency planning. In the worst case,
we not only are all already dead, we have never been born. It
is certainly possible to construct plausible scenarios in
which some Middle Eastern nation or terrorist group does
grave damage to the West. In practice, however, there are
few “smoking guns” that translate into a high probability
that any given threat will become so serious.
The problem, therefore, is to put regional threats in the
kind of perspective where it is possible to examine
possibilities without confusing them with probabilities. As a
result, this analysis examines given categories of threat in
ways which attempt to both identify the kinds of cases or
scenarios that might take place, and the current prospect
that such threats will actually materialize.
CHAPTER 2 - ENDNOTES
1. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998, Washington:
World Bank, p. 14.
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CHAPTER 3
NARCOTICS AND ORGANIZED CRIME

Narcotics and organized crime are major problems for
the West, but the Middle East is only one region supplying
drugs. It is all too apparent that drugs are a global
commodity, and that less-developed countries will provide
an adequate supply of narcotics as long as developed
countries pay for them. The American “war on drugs” has
seen a slow, steady decline in the street price of drugs in the
United States for roughly a quarter of a century, and all the
U.S. political posturing, drug seizures, and efforts to put the
blame on exporting countries have so far accomplished
nothing. It is unlikely they ever will accomplish anything
unless the West can come to grips with the issue of demand.
The Role of the Middle East in Production.
There are serious differences between experts over the
scale of narcotics production, export, and use. Some
estimates indicate that the world produced slightly under
5,000 tons of opium in 1997, just over 300,000 tons of coca
leaf, and about 500,000 tons of marijuana and hashish.
Excluding ecstasy, 14.6 tons of amphetamine type
stimulants (ATS) were seized in 1996.
Estimates by the United Nations (U.N.) Drug Control
Program (UNDCP) indicate, however, that the cultivation
of opiates remained constant between 1990 and 1997 at
around 266,000 hectares, and that production has increased
from 3,830 to 4,861 tons. The key producing countries, in
order of production, are Afghanistan, Myanmar, Laos,
Thailand, and Pakistan. Columbia and Mexico rank after
these countries, but are relatively small producers. No
significant producer is located in the Middle East.1 Europe
led the growth in demand. European consumption of heroin,
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the key product of opiate production, rose from token levels
in 1970, to six tons in 1990, and 10 tons in 1997.2
Cocoa production is estimated to have dropped from
around 266,000 hectares to 179,200 (43 percent), but
production only dropped from 363,981 to 302,523 tons (17
percent). Most of the world’s production comes from three
Latin American countries: Peru, Columbia, and Venezuela.
Small plots exist in Brazil, Guyana, and Venezuela.
Production is dropping in Peru and Bolivia, but rising in
Columbia. No production takes place in the Middle East. 3
European demand also increased in spite of this trend.
European consumption of cocaine rose from token levels in
1970, to 14 tons in 1990, and 39 tons in 1997.4
Cannabis production is much better distributed, and
estimates of production are very uncertain. It grows wild on
some 670,000-1,800,000 hectares, and is cultivated on up to
940,000 hectares. No meaningful trend data are available,
but total production seems to be around 500,000 tons. Key
locations where cannabis grows wild include Russia,
Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries. Morocco,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan are major cultivators. Lebanon
has cultivated hashish, although production has dropped
sharply in recent years. Mexico and Columbia are major
producers of marijuana, followed by Brazil, Jamaica, and
countries in Central America. South Africa, Malawi,
Nigeria, and Ghana are major producers of marijuana in
Africa. Asian producers of cannabis include Thailand, the
Philippines, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, with limited
production in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Western Samoa.
The United States, Australia, Canada, and a number of
European countries are becoming major producers, using
indoor cultivation and advanced hydroponics technology.5
Although Morocco is a major exporter of hashish, it is not a
significant supplier to North America. It exports largely to
Europe, where it ranks as the lead supplier, followed by
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and
Russia.6
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The trafficking in ATS is largely local, although there is
an international trade in precursors. ATS use is growing
sharply, and output has risen from around 1,380 kilograms
in 1990 to 14,566 kilograms in 1997. This is an order of
magnitude rise in only 7 years. Europe seems to account for
about half of the world production and use—virtually all of
it in Western Europe—and is a net exporter to other regions,
including the Middle East. The United States accounts for
around 10 percent. Asia and Australia account for around
44 percent. The Middle East accounts for well under 0.5
percent. The United States and Asia tend to produce
methamphetamines, while Europe produces amphetamines and members of the ecstasy group.7
The drug trade is so profitable that efforts at control and
eradication face almost insuperable barriers. According to
Interpol estimates, the global drug trade has grown to the
point where the total revenues from illicit drugs amount to
approximately $400 billion, or about 8 percent of total global
trade. Once again, any such statistics are highly uncertain
and controversial. However, this volume of trade in drugs is
larger than the volume of global trade in goods iron, motor
vehicles, or steel. It is roughly similar to the world textile
trade. 8 Illegal drugs cost U.S. society around 67 billion U.S.
dollars each year. In the United Kingdom, the annual cost of
dealing with the 100,000-200,000 serious drug abusers
amounts to well over four billion pounds sterling.9
Drugs serve a growing demand-driven market all over
the world. Some 200 million people abuse illicit drugs
regularly or casually, of which 140 million smoke cannabis,
13 million abuse cocaine, 8 million use heroin, and 30
million use ATS.10
Drug trafficking is a key activity of organized crime
groups in many different regions of the world. According to
Interpol, traffickers obtain the vast majority of drug
income—about 90 percent. Farmers make only 6 percent,
and processors and traders of raw materials only receive
about 2 percent apiece. 11 In the United States and the
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United Kingdom, between one-fifth and one-half of illicit
drug use is financed by crime, and current trends in
money-laundering are towards increasing professionalism
and internationalization.12
Drugs are a serious transnational threat. Drug abuse
has risen steadily over the last two decades and increased
sizably since 1990. Significant rises in the number of drug
abusers in the developing world have been recorded over the
last few years. Drugs represent a genuine and serious
threat to Western society and social stability. However, it is
South East Asia, South West Asia, and Latin America
which dominate the supply side of this transnational threat
and not the Middle East.
Table 1 shows the patterns in estimated source drug
seizures of 1996, and provides a very rough indication of the
volume of the drug trade by area. Only in the case of hashish
does the Middle East pose a serious threat to the West with
respect to drug production. Heroin seizures in the Middle
East accounted for less than 3 percent of global seizures in
1996, and 99.8 percent of cocaine seizures occurred in the
Americas and Europe. ATS (amphetamine type stimulants)
seizures in Africa, the Near and Middle East and South
America accounted for only 1 percent of global seizures.13
There also is significant evidence to suggest the Middle
East is improving its efforts to fight against drug production
and traffic. Syria and Lebanon were recently taken off the
list of major drug nations, Iran has strengthened its border
controls to halt traffic from Afghanistan. Egypt has
introduced new measures to deal with its increasing drug
problem at home. The major drug threats come from
Afghanistan, Myanmar, and parts of Latin America. Only
one Middle Eastern country—Iran—is included in the
President’s list of 30 major illicit drug producing and
transiting countries. U.S. experts privately feel this
designation owes more to past political hostility than
current conduct.14
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HEROIN
Europe
South West Asia
Africa and Oceania
Americas
South Asia (India)
Middle East
East and South-East Asia

40 percent
24 percent
1 percent
5 percent
5 percent
3 percent
22 percent

COCAINE
Americas
Europe
Rest of World

89 percent
10 percent
less than 1 percent

CANNABIS
Americas
Europe
Africa (inc. Maghreb)
Asia and Pacific

69 percent
11 percent
13 percent
7 percent

HASHISH
Europe
Americas
Africa
Middle East
Rest of Asia

57 percent
5 percent
11 percent
25 percent
2 percent

AMPHETAMINE-TYPE STIMULANTS
Europe
East and South-East Asia
Australia
North America
Rest of World

56 percent
31 percent
2 percent
10 percent
1 percent

Table 1.
Patterns in Global Drug Seizures by Area, 1996.
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Problems in the Middle East.
Even so, the transnational flow of drugs from and to the
Middle East is still a serious problem. While the United
States obtains only limited quantities of drugs that
originate and transit in the Middle East, Europe’s drug
problem is fuelled in part by narcotics grown in the Middle
East or travelling through the region. Some 75 percent of
Europe’s hashish comes from Morocco, and 75 percent of its
heroin is smuggled or processed through Turkey along the
“Balkan Route.”
While most Middle Eastern governments have pledged
support to international efforts to fight drug trafficking, and
have made efforts to curb the practice in the areas under
their control, there seem to be three main difficulties with
effectively combating the drug problem in the region. These
difficulties include:
• Limited facilities and weak institutions,
• Poverty, and
• Internal instability.
Limited Facilities.
The United Nations International Drug Control
Program (UNDCP) has a variety of projects underway in
the Middle East from Morocco to the Gulf. The emphasis of
most UNDCP projects is on the training and basic
education of both law enforcement officials and the local
populace, and it reflects the fact that Middle Eastern
states lack the resources and legal tools they need to deal
with the problem.
For example, a UNDCP project has been set up in
Algeria to strengthen the training capacities of drug law
enforcement institutions, training three officers from the
Direction Nationale de la Surete Nationale, the Direction
Nationale des Douanes and the Gendarmerie Nationale.
Another project funded by Germany and Italy is aimed at
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launching an integrated rural development program in the
Baalbeck-Hermel region of Lebanon—a part of the country
that suffers from considerable poverty where opium
cultivation became one of the few means of survival. France
has donated some $230,000 to train Tunisian drug law
enforcement agencies and provide them with equipment
such as radios and land vehicles.15
But effective action faces nearly insurmountable
difficulties. One of Egypt’s problems, for example, is
thousands of kilometers of desert borders. Drugs arrive
through the neighboring Sudan and Libya, either by jeep or
donkey. There is little money to combat the problem, and
even government attempts to use radar to detect intruders
have proven only partially successful. Under cover of
darkness, drug traffickers are able to slip into the desert
even if the radar has picked them up.16
Lack of equipment and vast desert borders are also a key
problem in Jordan—a country making a determined effort
to halt the flow of narcotics between its producing and
consuming neighbors. Jordanian special forces, for
example, deal with Iraqi drug smugglers using heavy
weapons and even light armored vehicles. They are fighting
an uphill battle, plagued as it is by lack of sufficient
manpower and equipment, a situation now exacerbated
since foreign assistance has dropped off significantly in
recent years.
The United States has dropped Iran from the list of
countries which tolerate the production of narcotics, but
this does not mean that Iran does not face serious problems.
The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) of 1997 acknowledged Iran’s interdiction programs
are “energetic,” but found they were only partially
successful at stemming the flow of drugs through the region.
Iran has reportedly invested over $250,000,000 in physical
barriers (notably barbed wire and fencing) on the roads and
mountain passes of its eastern frontier, particularly on the
border with Pakistan. It, too, is forced to fight drug
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smugglers with heavy weapons and sometimes with
armored vehicles left over from the Afghan conflict. Iran
states it has made drug seizures of over 190 tons and has
sacrificed the lives of 2,000 members of its law enforcement
forces in trying to combat the problem over the last decade.
Pakistani incapacity and Afghan Taliban unwillingness to
fully cooperate on border control measures, however, have
meant that Iran’s efforts are only very partially effective.
Large shipments of opium continue to transit Iran.
Another major facet of the problem is the ineffectiveness
of many laws that govern drug trafficking and (most notably
in the case of Israel) money-laundering. For example, the
Anti-Narcotics General Administration (AGA), Egypt’s
counternarcotics security apparatus, does not even have
access to basic enforcement authority such as access to the
tarmac at the airport.17 The INCSR, 1996, points the blame
for the repeated failures of the Egyptian government to
effectively tackle its drug problem at the lack of cooperation
between its various law enforcement agencies.
Morocco has similar problems. UCLAD, the government’s coordination unit for the struggle against drugs, was
created in 1996 as part of the Ministry of the Interior to
coordinate antidrug efforts. A vicious circle seems to have
developed: European diplomats have reported the general
inefficiency of the operation, believing it lacks the resources
to fulfill its mandate. Subsequently the EU will continue to
withhold funds until it knows they will be put to
constructive use.18
Ineffective or nonexistent laws relating to moneylaundering, and strict bank secrecy laws as exist in Israel,
are another source of difficulties. There are clear financial
advantages to be gleaned from such regulations but always
at the cost of providing a potential safe haven for criminal
funds. Lebanon, for example, when it acceded to the 1988
U.N. Drug Convention, registered formal reservations
regarding some of the provisions. One of these was bank
secrecy.
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Since then, the U.S. Government, at the request of the
Lebanese government, has been providing technical
expertise to the authorities to strengthen provisions in the
law dealing with money-laundering and bank secrecy.
Israel, neither a significant drug producer nor trafficker,
plays its part in the narcotics trade nevertheless by its strict
bank secrecy regulations and its absence of moneylaundering laws. It is assumed that considerable amounts of
drug money and individuals involved in drug dealing pass
through Israel for these reasons.19 That Israeli citizens were
immune from extradition only compounded the problem.
Poverty.
In the West there is a close connection between the poor
and drug abuse. In the Middle East a connection exists
between the poor and drug production. The Bekaa Valley in
Lebanon and the Bedu-controlled areas of the Sinai are
examples of regions that turned to opium production in the
absence of any viable alternative. For example, Egyptian
police burned hundreds of hectares of poppy fields in the
Sinai Peninsula, where Bedouin tribes operate far from
central authority, in March of 1995. The Anti-Narcotics
General Administration said that the sweep had cost the
Bedu around $US62 million in lost revenue. 20
Poverty of the state clearly has a huge effect on its ability
(or desire) to combat illicit drug trafficking. There is
evidence to suggest that King Hassan’s approach to the
eradication of cannabis plantations in the Rif mountains
and in Northern Morocco has been similar to that of Alberto
Fujimori of Peru. Fujimori refused to destroy the coca leaf
plantations until a productive alternative had been found.
The Geopolitical Drugs Observatory (independent) in
Paris alleges that hashish trafficking is now Morocco’s
biggest single source of export income, providing Europe
with 75 percent of total imports. Morocco’s poor farmers
have little reason to give up farming such a crop and the
Moroccan government already faces serious internal
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political problems. The UNDCP program dealing with the
Bekaa in Lebanon attempts to shift farming away from
drugs, but it is unclear there is any crop of equal value.
Lebanon’s previous lack of money-laundering laws also
provided the country with a much needed way of attracting
money.
Governments in the Middle East have often felt that the
control of narcotic trafficking was less important to the
welfare of the state than other concerns. In the past, the
Islamic Republic of Iran has focused more attention on
illegal alcohol use than on drug consumption. In Israel,
budgetary allocations to fight drugs have been frozen or
falling as the Israeli government tries to reduce its budget
deficit. The Arab Republic of Egypt is forced to expend the
majority of its security resources on combating terrorism
instead of narcotics. Lebanon simply does not have the
military resources to storm the opium ridden areas in the
mountains.
Internal Instability.
Ironically, the Algerian civil war has been so bitter that
it has limited the scale of the nation’s narcotics problem.
Other countries have not been so lucky. The Bekaa Valley,
for example, has long been a Hezbollah stronghold and an
area over which the Lebanese government exercised only
nominal control. It took the military power of Syria to limit
Hezbollah operations in the area. Syria then found,
however, that it could not exercise control over its own
officials—who enjoyed much greater autonomy of action
outside the country and were freer to develop illegal
business ventures. It also soon found that sectarian and
national differences give way to money. Syrian officials
tolerate Maronite Christian dealers working with Shi’ite
growers.21
In other cases, nations may find it desirable to make an
opposition movement the scapegoat. Turkey persistently
reports the involvement of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
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(PKK) in narcotics trafficking through the country. 22 The
PKK, a terrorist, ethnic separatist group based in the
predominantly Kurdish border region between Turkey,
Iran, and Iraq, allegedly uses “taxes” extracted from
narcotics traffickers and refiners to finance its operations. It
may also be directly involved in transporting and marketing
narcotics in Europe. At the same time, a traffic accident in
1996 created the “Susurluk” incident in Turkey, and
exposed the fact that high-level officials in the Turkish
security structure are also in league with drug kingpins.
Middle Eastern Successes.
The West needs to acknowledge that the Middle East has
had some important recent successes in the fight against
drug trafficking. Israel has been steadily more successful in
arresting traffickers, Lebanon and Syria were taken off the
Majors List for drug trafficking or producing countries in
November 1997. Turkey now produces far fewer illicit
drugs. A great deal has been achieved, much through
increased cooperation between neighboring states and
much through greater willingness on the part of Middle
Eastern governments to address the problem of narcotics
trafficking.
Successes can be seen in three areas—reduced
production, reduced transit, and reduced corruption. Some
successes seem to have occurred in nations which the West
sees as a source of other transnational threats. In 1994,
Interior Minister Besharati said that Iran had spent $8
billion on fighting drug-related activities since the 1979
revolution—although Iran later reduced this figure to $2
billion.23 In September 1997, Iran’s President Khatami’s
statement to the Interpol Counter-Drug Conference in
Teheran indicated that Iran was taking a more active role in
regional counternarcotics operations. Iran also reported
that it had recently invested $250,000,000 in physical
barriers on the roads and mountain passes of its eastern
frontier. It stated that its recent interdiction efforts have
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resulted in drug seizures reported to be over 190 tons. It
claimed that it had executed over 10,000 narcotics
traffickers in the last decade.
There is independent evidence to support these Iranian
claims. In 1993, a declassified U.S. Government survey of
Iranian poppy cultivation estimated that 3,500 hectares
were under cultivation in Iran, producing between 35 and
70 metric tons of opium. This year, observers that included
members of the Dublin Group supported Iranian claims
that much of the opium crop had been eradicated. It is Iran’s
lack of any firm bilateral agreements with Pakistan or
Afghanistan which now constricts Iran’s efforts to control
smuggling across the border.
Lebanon was removed from the list of major
drug-producing and drug transit countries in November
1997. The Lebanese government claims that a combination
of Lebanese and Syrian efforts eradicated all but 150 of the
3,400 hectares of opium between 1992 and 1996, Lebanon
may be exaggerating its success, and has certainly met with
less success in combating drug transit and moneylaundering, but it has taken several steps forward.
Turkish law enforcement agencies are increasing their
activity, although there are still problems with internal
corruption. Turkey reports a total of 3,634 drug-related
arrests in 1997. A “Financial Crimes Investigation Board”
was set up by the Ministry of Finance last year to conduct
studies for the prevention of money-laundering. The
creation of this board follows the passage of antimoney-laundering legislation which finally criminalizes the
laundering of proceeds of narcotics trafficking and other
criminal activities, and includes provisions for controlled
delivery and asset seizure.
Syria’s difficulties with corrupt military officials
working in the Bekaa Valley have been reduced. Syria now
cooperates much more closely with Lebanese authorities in
the areas of interdiction, cultivation and production. In
1997, Syria also cooperated with Jordan. The exception was
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cooperation with Turkey, because of problems in other
areas, notably arguments over water consumption from the
Euphrates, the Kurdish question, Antalya, and Turkey’s
mutual aid agreement with Israel. Turkey did, however,
help Syria in the break-up of a major amphetamine
smuggling operation in September and October 1997. This
operation led to the arrests of 27 people and the confiscation
of more than 800,000 pills and 139 kilograms of
amphetamine in powder form.
Jordan has very limited resources, but has improved its
anti-trafficking record by maintaining close links with
neighboring countries—including Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Egypt, and Israel. It is currently attempting to improve
cooperation with Turkey in counternarcotics matters.
Jordan has added 40 officers to its antinarcotics
department, despite a chronic lack of resources. Jordan is
also fighting a low-level war with Iraqi smugglers on its
border with Iraq, some of which attempt to bring in drugs
that have transited through Iraq from Afghanistan and
Turkey and which then generally are smuggled into the
Southern Gulf states.24
Jordan, however, is also a warning that Europe, the
United States, and the U.N. need to continue to help the
Middle East combat its drug problem, and must not ignore
the “balloon effect” that occurs when crop eradication is
performed successfully in one area and cultivation is simply
moved somewhere else. Jordan, for example, faced a serious
resurgence in trafficking when foreign aid to combat
trafficking dropped off after crop eradication in Lebanon. 25
The “problem child” in the region is Morocco, which now
supplies Europe with up to 75 percent of its hashish. The
independent Geopolitical Drugs Observatory in Paris states
that cannabis production in Morocco has increased tenfold
in the last 10 years, and involved some 200,000 workers in
an area covering between 64,000 and 74,000 hectares in
1995. Le Monde published a front-page article before King
Hassan II’s visit to Paris in July 1995, alleging that
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traffickers were protected at all levels of society, ranging
from customs officials to the highest levels of the royal
palace. As a result, King Hassan called off his visit.26
Internal Needs versus Concern for the West.
These Middle Eastern efforts to deal with drug problem
are not motivated by an altruistic concern for transnational
threats to the West, and probably owe little to any fear of
Western publicity and sanctions. The key motivation is the
fact that the flow of drug exports almost inevitably leads to
increased demand at home. A growing proportion of the
drug traffic in the Middle East is intended for consumption
in the area itself.
Middle Eastern countries have always had drug users,
but most Islamic and Arab countries had only moderate
drug use because of the social stigma associated with
substance abuse. Alcohol is forbidden by the Qur’an. While
drugs are not specifically referred to, they, too, have
traditionally been perceived as haram. Even so, drug abuse
has increased dramatically in every Middle Eastern country
(except perhaps Syria) in the last few years.27
Egypt is a good example. It has not been a significant
producer or trafficker on the international scene, but it is
experiencing growing problems and is now a heroin
producing and using country. Traditional opium addiction
has not increased over the last few years, but opium
cultivation has increased considerably in the Sinai. This
opium seems to be going to produce heroin destined for the
home market.
The number of estimated addicts in Israel has grown to
20,000. Drug use is on the rise in Jordan with government
officials estimating there to be approximately 30,000 users.
In 1996, Iran stated that the number of addicts was 500,000.
Unofficial estimates run as high as 2,000,000—more than
the number of “habitual” users in France.
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Ironically, there is also a substantial flow of drugs from
the West to the Middle East. The U.S. State Department’s
annual report on drugs indicates that Turkey is the primary
stopover and consolidation point on the “Balkan Route,” and
is a center of trafficking to the Middle East. Most of the illicit
drugs that transit Jordan originate in Lebanon and Turkey
and enter Jordan from Syria. Once in Jordan, the drugs are
stored before being transported to other areas in the region,
primarily Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. According to the
Jordanian government, traffic to Europe is minimal and to
the United States almost nonexistent.28
Morocco seems to be the only country in the region which
has failed to take serious account of its domestic drug
problem, although estimates of the domestic use of the
cannabis crop range from 15 to 40 percent of the Moroccan
crop. Once again, however, the Moroccan government gains
from turning a blind eye. A substantial part of this domestic
use is smoked by foreigners who go to Morocco specifically
for that purpose. This boosts tourism and hard currency
income, and cannabis abuse is seen as a traditional and
relatively harmless affair.
Transnational Cooperation between Middle
Eastern and Western Criminals.
Middle Eastern and Western criminals cooperate to
create a transnational threat to both regions. Most Middle
Eastern countries are party to most U.N. anti-narcotic
conventions, including the 1988 U.N. Convention, the 1961
U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972
Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic
Substances. However, regional legal systems still differ
sharply, and smuggling across borders remains difficult to
control.
For example, differences in law can make legal
snakepits out of capture or extradition. Drug traffickers
exploit such loopholes as the differences between national
financial legislation in matters of money-laundering. Israel,
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where extradition of a citizen has been illegal since 1978, is
a case in point. Though some provisions for crimes
committed by an Israeli national abroad do exist,
extradition legislation is vital to ensure that drug
traffickers be duly punished. Such a law should soon come
into effect. Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the UNDCP
has warned that, “Drug traffickers are thinking
globally—so should we.”29
It is generally the Western criminals that end up with
most of the money. According to Interpol, the key traffickers
worldwide are organizations like the Cosa Nostra based in
Sicily and New York, new Mafia groups based in Russia and
other Eastern European countries, some far Eastern groups
like the Triads and the Yakuza, and the cocaine cartels of
Mexico and Colombia. As yet, no important Arab or Islamic
Mafia group has been discovered. European criminals
dominate the drug trade with the Middle East and get most
of the money. The greatest traffickers in Europe are
purportedly Eastern Europeans, with Turks heading the
list along with ex-Yugoslavians, Slovaks, Romanians,
Bulgarians, and Albanians. Spain receives the greatest
shipments of cocaine destined for Europe, in quantities
considerably bigger than any Middle Eastern country.
In any case, drug imports are only part of the West’s
problem. While the number of heroin addicts in Europe does
remain frighteningly high (100,000 addicts estimated in
Britain alone), there is a growing interest, especially
amongst the young, in locally-made designer drugs such as
ecstasy.30 Up to 30 million people regularly or casually
abuse ATS, compared to only 13 million abusers of cocaine
and 8 million of heroin.31 ATS is the fastest growing drug in
Europe, but no ATS are manufactured in the Middle East.
The production process is simply too complicated. European
countries—Germany, the Netherlands, and Great
Britain—produce ATS.
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Cooperation, Not Conflict.
The Middle East is not the source of the West’s supply
problem, and only reductions in demand can really end the
drug problem. There is, however, a clear case for
cooperation, and both the West and Middle East have a
clear motive. From a Western viewpoint, there is far more to
be gained from patient legal efforts, cooperation between
enforcement agencies, and aid to Middle Eastern
enforcement efforts than from finger pointing, or Western
attempts to blame the problem on someone else.
At the same time, there is no room for illusions. Drug
demand is so high, and the financial rewards are so great,
that drug trafficking has defeated virtually every effort at
enforcement. Massive seizures and arrests have almost no
impact on the market. Law enforcement reporting that
quotes the street value of drugs is little more than a
dishonest exercise in publicity-seeking and selfjustification. Producers and distributors do not pay street
prices and major traffickers see losses due to law
enforcement as a normal and easily affordable business
risk. The U.S. “War on Drugs,” for example, borders on
farce. It shifted the pattern of production and distribution in
Latin America, but had no impact on the realities of the
market. Retail and wholesale prices in constant dollars
continue to drop, and the scale of international distribution
and availability continues to increase.
The issue of which region corrupts which other region is
virtually moot; drugs are a global commodity. Eradication
and production control programs cannot have lasting
success unless nations experience sustained economic
growth and drug production ceases to be competitive with
other groups. Even if this happens in one area or country,
the end result may simply be to shift production to other
countries or regions. The marginal cost of producing
artificial drugs is low, and improved cultivation techniques
are shifting the “agriculture” of drugs like marijuana to
industrialized states like Canada and the United States.
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Supply side controls and law enforcement can only act as
deterrents, and place very uncertain limits on this
transnational threat. It ultimately can only be solved by
social measures that affect demand, and no Western society
has yet demonstrated that such measures can either
eliminate a large core of addicts or remove drug-related
crime.
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CHAPTER 4
IMMIGRATION

Immigration is a fact of modern economic life. Although
it may create political and economic problems for the labor
importing state, the flow of labor migration also serves the
needs of the host economy and is not a “transnational”
threat. The overall process of immigration is also driven as
much by demand as by supply. If Western governments
truly wanted to block immigration and deport illegal
immigrants, they could do so. Similarly, most of the social
problems that result from immigration seem to be failures
on the part of individual Western nations to deal with the
economic realities of their dependence on immigration and
to establish sound labor and immigration policies on their
own soil.
The overall patterns in immigration to the West are
shown in Table 2. These data do not support meaningful
assessments of the number of immigrants coming from the
Middle East and North Africa. The supporting data
indicate, however, that most Western countries absorb
immigrants from a diverse mix of regions, and that the
Balkans, Southern Europe, South Asia, and Turkey are as
important a factor as the Middle East. The foreign
population of the Netherlands, for example, is 19.8 percent
from the richest OECD countries, 15.4 percent from Turkey,
14.6 percent from Surinam, 12.8 from the former Dutch
East Indies, 12.7 percent from Morocco, 4 percent from the
Antilles and Aruba, and 20.7 percent other. The exceptions
are France and Italy, which have a major flow of
immigration from North Africa.1
The CIA estimates of religious and ethnic composition by
country shown in Table 3 also do not raise major concerns
about the impact of immigration on the West in gross
demographic terms. To date, the net impact of immigration
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Country

Foreign Population
1990
No
(1,000s)

Australia
Austria

Labor Force
as%
of Total

1995

.% Total No. % Total
Pop (1,000s) Pop

1990

1995

1990

121

99

4

5

-

-

23

6

51

53

13

12

214 212

37

26

5

5

4,125*

22.7

-

-

25.8*

24.0*

456

5.9

724

9.0

-

10.2

Belgium

905

9.1

910

9.0

7.5

8.1

Canada

4,343*

15.6

-

-

18.4*

18.5*

161

3.1

223

4.2

2.0

2.8

26

Denmark
Finland

Total
Asylum
Foreign Seekers
Inflow
(1,000s) (1,000s)

15

1995 1990 1995

16

0.5

69

1.3

-

-

7

7

3

1

France

3,597

6.3

-

-

6.4

6.2

102

57

47

20

Germany

5,343

8.4

7,174

8.8

8.4

7.4

842 788

80

2.3

96

2.7

2.6

3.0

Italy

781

1.4

991

1.7

-

1.9

Japan

1,075

0.9

1,362

1.1

-

0.9

Ireland

193 128

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

2

224 210

-

-

Luxembourg

113

29.4

138

33.4

33.4

56.2

9

10

-

-

Netherlands

692

4.6

728

5.0

3.7

4.0

81

67

21

29

Norway

143

3.4

161

3.7

-

4.5

16

17

4

2

Portugal

108

1.1

168

1.7

-

1.7

-

-

0

1

Spain

279

0.7

500

1.2

-

0.6

-

-

9

6

Sweden

484

5.6

532

5.2

5.6

5.1

53

36

29

9

Switzerland 1,100

16.3

1,331

18.9

-

19.4

101

88

36

17

UK

1,723

3.2

2,060

3.4

3.5

3.6

52

56

38

55

US

19,767*

7.9

24,557

9.3

9.4*

9.3* 1,537 721

74 149

* Foreign born
Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998,
Washington, World Bank, 1998, pp. 345-355.

Table 2.
Foreign Labor and Population in the West.
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Austria
Ethnic groups: German 99.4%, Croatian 0.3%, Slovene 0.2%, other 0.1%
Religions: Roman Catholic 85%, Protestant 6%, other 9%

Belgium
Ethnic groups: Fleming 55%, Walloon 33%, mixed or other 12%
Religions: Roman Catholic 75%, Protestant or other 25%
Languages: Flemish 56%, French 32%, German 1%, legally bilingual 11%

Canada
Ethnic groups: British Isles origin 40%, French origin 27%, other European
20%, Amerindian 1.5%, other, mostly Asian 11.5%
Religions: Roman Catholic 45%, United Church 12%, Anglican 8%, other 35%

Denmark
Ethnic groups: Scandinavian, Eskimo, Faroese, German
Religions: Evangelical Lutheran 91%, other Protestant and Roman Catholic
2%, other 7% (1988)
Languages: Danish, Faroese, Greenlandic (an Eskimo dialect), German (small
minority)

France
Ethnic groups: Celtic and Latin with Teutonic, Slavic, North African,
Indochinese, Basque minorities
Religions: Roman Catholic 90%, Protestant 2%, Jewish 1%, Muslim (North
African workers) 1%, unaffiliated 6%
Languages: French 100%, rapidly declining regional dialects and languages
(Provencal, Breton, Alsatian, Corsican, Catalan, Basque, Flemish)

Germany
Ethnic groups: German 91.5%, Turkish 2.4%, Italians 0.7%, Greeks 0.4%,
Poles 0.4%, other 4.6% (made up largely of people fleeing the war in the former
Yugoslavia)
Religions: Protestant 38%, Roman Catholic 34%, Muslim 1.7%, unaffiliated or
other 26.3%
Languages: German

Greece
Ethnic groups: Greek 98%, other 2%; note: the Greek Government states there
are no ethnic divisions in Greece
Religions: Greek Orthodox 98%, Muslim 1.3%, other 0.7%
Languages: Greek (official), English, French

Table 3.
Ethnic and Religious Composition of Western
States.
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Ireland
Ethnic groups: Celtic, English
Religions: Roman Catholic 93%, Anglican 3%, none 1%, unknown 2%, other 1%
(1981)
Languages: Irish (Gaelic), spoken mainly in areas located along the western
seaboard, English is the language generally used

Italy
Ethnic groups: Italian (includes small clusters of German-, French-, and
Slovene-Italians in the north and Albanian-Italians and Greek-Italians in the
south)
Religions: Roman Catholic 98%, other 2%
Languages: Italian, German (parts of Trentino-Alto Adige region are
predominantly German speaking), French (small French-speaking minority in
Valle d’Aosta region), Slovene (Slovene-speaking minority in the TriesteGorizia area)

Luxembourg
Ethnic groups: Celtic base (with French and German blend), Portuguese,
Italian, and European (guest and worker residents)
Religions: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant and Jewish 3%
Languages: Luxembourgish, German, French, English

Netherlands
Ethnic groups: Dutch 96%, Moroccans, Turks, and other 4% (1988)
Religions: Roman Catholic 34%, Protestant 25%, Muslim 3%, other 2%,
unaffiliated 36% (1991)
Languages: Dutch

Norway
Ethnic groups: Germanic (Nordic, Alpine, Baltic), Lapps (Sami) 20,000
Religions: Evangelical Lutheran 87.8% (state church), other Protestant and
Roman Catholic 3.8%, none 3.2%, unknown 5.2% (1980)
Languages: Norwegian (official); note: small Lapp- and Finnish-speaking
minorities

Portugal
Ethnic groups: homogeneous Mediterranean stock in mainland, Azores,
Madeira Islands; citizens of black African descent who immigrated to
mainland during decolonization number less than 100,000
Religions: Roman Catholic 97%, Protestant denominations 1%, other 2%
Languages: Portuguese

Table 3.
Ethnic and Religious Composition of Western
States. (Continued)
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Spain
Ethnic groups: composite of Mediterranean and Nordic types
Religions: Roman Catholic 99%, other 1%
Languages: Castilian Spanish 74%, Catalan 17%, Galician 7%, Basque 2%

Sweden
Ethnic groups: white, Lapp (Sami), foreign-born or first-generation
immigrants 12% (Finns, Yugoslavs, Danes, Norwegians, Greeks, Turks)
Religions: Evangelical Lutheran 94%, Roman Catholic 1.5%, Pentecostal 1%,
other 3.5% (1987)
Languages: Swedish; note: small Lapp- and Finnish-speaking minorities

Switzerland
Ethnic groups: total population - German 65%, French 18%, Italian 10%,
Romansch 1%, other 6%; note: Swiss nationals - German 74%, French 20%,
Italian 4%, Romansch 1%, other 1%
Religions: Roman Catholic 46.7%, Protestant 40%, other 5%, no religion 8.3%
(1990)
Languages: German 63.7%, French 19.2%, Italian 7.6%, Romansch 0.6%, other
8.9%

Turkey
Ethnic groups: Turkish 80%, Kurdish 20%
Religions: Muslim 99.8% (mostly Sunni), other 0.2% (Christian and Jews)
Languages: Turkish (official), Kurdish, Arabic

United Kingdom
Ethnic groups: English 81.5%, Scottish 9.6%, Irish 2.4%, Welsh 1.9%, Ulster
1.8%, West Indian, Indian, Pakistani, and other 2.8%
Religions: Anglican 27 million, Roman Catholic 9 million, Muslim 1 million,
Presbyterian 800,000, Methodist 760,000, Sikh 400,000, Hindu 350,000,
Jewish 300,000 (1991 est.); note: the UK does not include a question on religion
in its census
Languages: English, Welsh (about 26% of the population of Wales), Scottish
form of Gaelic (about 60,000 in Scotland)

United States
Ethnic groups: white 83.4%, black 12.4%, Asian 3.3%, Amerindian 0.8%
Religions: Protestant 56%, Roman Catholic 28%, Jewish 2%, other 4%, none
10%
Languages: English, Spanish (spoken by a sizable minority)
Source: CIA, World Factbook, 1997.

Table 3.
Ethnic and Religious Composition of Western
States. (Concluded)
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from the Middle East is also minor by Australian,
Canadian, and U.S. standards. It may create problems in
given cities or areas, but the problem is greater for Europe
than for the Middle East.
Europe and Immigration from the Middle East.
The scale of the problem Europe faces is shown in Table
4. It is clear from Part One of Table 4 that foreigners from
the entire Mediterranean area are still only a small fraction
of the total foreign population in European countries, and
that non-Middle Eastern states like Turkey, Cyprus, and
Malta account for well over half of all the foreign population
from the Mediterranean region. Belgium and France are the
only European countries where there is a large Arab
population, although the Netherlands is beginning to
acquire a relatively large number of Moroccans. There is no
European country where Middle Easterners make up even 3
percent of the population, and no European country in
which they make up even 10 percent of the total foreign
residents. Parts Two and Three of Table 4 also show that
there continues to be a substantial outflow of foreign
residents, although data are lacking on foreign residents
leaving key countries like France.
If these patterns continue, any threat from “immigration” would be more one of perception than reality.
However, perceptions are important. Peoples do not
perceive the impact of immigration in terms of demographic
statistics. They perceive it in terms of the presence of
different cultures, usually with lower incomes, higher crime
rates, and a willingness to work at lower salaries. Social
customs and religion are also important issues. Some
estimates indicate that 5 percent of France’s total
population, or three million people, is Muslim.2 Other
estimates indicate that Moroccans make up the most
important community of foreign residents in both Italy (20.6
percent) and Spain (15.5 percent).3 There are about seven
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million “foreigners” in Germany, including over one million
born in Germany, and around two million are Muslims. 4
This raises a question of definitions. The United States
normally does not include Turkey in the Middle East. It is a
member of NATO, it is not Arab, and its economy is closely
linked to Europe. Some Germans however, do include
Turkey in the Middle East, particularly ordinary German
citizens and Germans who oppose immigration from any
different culture. If Turkey is included in the totals for
foreign residents of Germany, it changes the statistics. Data
from the German statistics office on Germany’s population
in 1998 indicate that there are currently about 7.4 million
foreigners in Germany, out of a total population of 84
million, or about 8.8 percent. About 2,107,000 foreign
residents were Turkish, followed by 721,000 from
Yugoslavia, 608,000 from Italy, 363,000 from Greece,
283,000 from Bosnia, 207,000 from Croatia, 185,000 from
Austria, 132,000 from Portugal, 132,000 from Spain,
114,000 from Iran, 113,000 from the Netherlands, 112,000
from Britain, 110,000 from the United States, 104,000 from
France, 88,000 from Vietnam, 84,000 from Morocco, 66,000
from Afghanistan, 60,000 from Sri Lanka, 56,000 from
Lebanon, and 1,440 from other countries.
Using these numbers, only about 254,000 residents are
Arab, Iranian, or Israeli (0.3 percent). If the Turks were
added, however, the percentage would rise to 2.8 percent.
This highlights the perceptual problem of trying to separate
real immigrants from the Middle East from anyone else
with a different religion, culture, and skin color. This is as
much of a problem in Europe as in the United States, but is
scarcely a “transnational threat.”
If there is a real potential “transnational threat” to
Europe, it consists of sudden new flows of illegal
immigration or of massive flows of people fleeing political
oppression or conflict. Political conflicts can and have
created massive flows of population. The United Nations
estimates that there are currently 22.7 million refugees and
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displaced persons worldwide. 5 This kind of mass
immigration of refugees could present the West with two
kinds difficulties:

•

The first is created by the flow of political refugees or
immigrants who become politically active in their new
host state. Examples include Iranian opposition
members who go to Europe and the United States.
This problem is comparatively minor.

•

The second is a massive flow of refugees fleeing their
home country. This could lead to hugh increases in
both legal and illegal immigration. Once again, the
primary threat is the sudden flow of population from a
Maghreb country like Algeria to Southern Europe.

Table 4 shows that Maghreb, in particular, could present
problems for Europe. Economic progress is limited and
access to Southern Europe is relatively easy. Many
Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians would emigrate to
Europe if given the chance, and one press report indicates
that a survey of young men in Morocco showed that up to 70
percent wanted to immigrate to find better jobs.
A number of European countries already have
significant numbers of political activists who see their
refugee population as a financial burden to them and a
threat to their cultural identity. This is quite clearly the
case in certain parts of France, notably Alsace and the
south, and in Germany, especially in Bavaria. Both
countries have right-wing political leaders who argue that
excessive immigration can threaten the security of the
nation-state itself. As a result, some analysts in nations like
in France, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland feel that the
political collapse of the secular regime in Algeria could
trigger a new flood of refugees that would become a
“transnational threat.”
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The Benefits of Immigration.
There is a certain amount of economic irony to some of
these reactions. Europe has one of the lowest birthrates in
the world, and no major European power could sustain its
current population levels and economy without a
considerable influx of immigrants every year. Governments
across Europe have recognized this and have formulated
their immigration policy accordingly.
Spain and Italy, for example, have the lowest birthrates
in Europe. The Spanish government is all too aware of the
dangers of an increasingly old and increasingly small
population, and is desperate to keep the balance. Spain’s
projected growth rate in 1997 is of 49,336 people or an
increase of 0.13 percent. The areas of significant growth also
are not in the northern, richer parts of Spain such as
Castilla y Leon or the Principado de Asturias, but in the
poorer, southern areas, closer to Morocco such as Andalucia,
Murcia, and the Islas Canarias off the coast of Africa.6
Immigrants are the balancing factor in an otherwise
shrinking and aging population.
The same is true in other parts of Europe. In 1997, Italy’s
population rose by 100,000 to 57.5 million. There were
540,000 births and 564,000 deaths. Only the arrival of
127,000 immigrants offset the negative imbalance. A
French government report released in February 1997
concluded that without immigration, France’s population
would be 47 million today rather than 59 million. About 40
percent of the population increase since 1946 can be
attributed directly or indirectly to immigration. 7 In
addition, Europe is growing older year by year as people live
longer—for example, the average life expectancy in Spain
increased by an entire year between 1991 and 1994.8
Europe reaps the benefits of cheap labor with minimal
social security costs. Foreign labor was essential in helping
France, for example, achieve economic success in the
post-World War II years. The immigrant workforce was
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both numerically strong and inexpensive to employ, thus
allowing French industries to increase production and
profits while satisfying product demand. James F.
Hollifield, in “Searching for the New France,” writes, “ . . .
foreign workers were [in the 50s and 60s] a more attractive
source of labor because, unlike French workers, they were
not covered by expensive and cumbersome social-welfare
protections.”9
The Cost of Immigration.
At the same time, immigration poses economic costs. The
UK issued a White Paper on Immigration and Asylum on
July 27, 1998, that aims to regulate the asylum application
procedure. It indicated that the cost of the asylum system
was around L500 million Sterling in 1997, or L6,500 per
applicant. The Immigration Service Union estimated the
total costs at L2 billion per year.
Immigrants make up a considerable part of the
unemployed in Western Europe. In 1997, according to the
Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (Spain), the unemployment rate for immigrants reached 34.9 percent compared to
20.9 percent of the general population.10 A French census
conducted by the OECD estimated the total immigrant
population to be 3.6 million, or 6.3 percent of the total
population. The same census put the foreign national share
of unemployment at 12.5 percent—almost double their
actual proportion of the population.11 Foreign labor force
totaled 1.6 million in France, roughly a third of whom came
from the Maghreb countries. The other foreign workers
mainly came from European Union countries (630,000),
sub-Saharan countries, Turkey, and former Yugoslavia. By
nationality, Algerians constituted the largest group of job
seekers, followed by Moroccans, Portuguese, Tunisians, and
Turks.12
Dealing with a large population of unemployed
immigrants can have high costs. This often raises questions
as to whether immigrants deserve social security from their
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host nation when they have not made payments to the
system. The fact that the host nation economy has benefited
from the fact immigrants were so cheap because they did not
pay for many social security costs is often forgotten. It is
obvious, for example, that Middle Eastern immigrants were
a major part of the unemployment problem in France, but
did not dominate the problem. Nevertheless, the French far
right label the ‘Beurs’ as responsible and as “parasites.”
There are social costs to immigration. Immigration has
changed the social structure of labor. In the case of France,
introducing an African and Middle Eastern underclass led
many French laborers to refuse to take the low paying jobs.
Being a femme de menage is no longer a job for a Frenchwoman, only Blacks or ‘Beurs’ clean public toilets. The
French economy cannot function without a foreign
underclass, but this does not prevent many Frenchmen
from seeing foreign labor as a threat.
There is a sociological link between poverty and crime.
Since a much greater proportion of immigrants live in
conditions of poverty than in relative comfort, it follows that
a higher proportion of them should be involved in crime. The
Criminal Research Institute of Lower Saxony, for example,
concluded that 62 percent of all juvenile offenders are Turks
or “ethnic Germans.”13 Jean-Marie LePen, the President of
the Front National—France’s extreme right political
party—charges that, while immigrants account for only 7
percent of the total population, they make up 30 percent of
the prison population. While immigration advocates
counter that a quarter of those in prison are only there for
having entered France illegally in the first place, it is not
surprising that the immigrant prison ratio should be high
when immigrant poor live in greater poverty than the
“French” poor.
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The European Response.
Europe is reacting to the current impact of foreign
residents by changing its immigration policies, and national
approaches are mixed:

•

The EU has passed a law that forces refugees to apply
for asylum in the first EU country that they reach—be
it poorer Greece or richer Sweden.

•

Britain recently published a White Paper on Asylum
which concluded that refugee status was being
abused. The paper proposes to give applicants only
one appeal against a rejection of their application. It
promised to offer no amnesty to the rejected, to switch
from cash to in-kind assistance, and to increase
detention for those awaiting decisions.

•

Spain is increasingly using an immigration barrier
approach. Police detained almost 3,300 illegal
immigrants at Madrid airport in 1997, most from
South America. It is estimated that between 2,000
and 5,000 people, mostly from Morocco, try to cross
the Straits of Gibraltar every year. By the end of 1998,
a $35 million, 10-foot high fence will have been built
around Spain’s North African enclave city, Melilla.
The funding has mostly come from the EU.

•

Italian law changed in March 1998 to give the
government the power to detain apprehended
foreigners for 30 days in reception centers and then
remove them from the country. Some 100,000 to
200,000 foreigners ordered to leave Italy are believed
to still be in the country. Italy suffers from illegal
immigration in much the same way as Spain.

•

France’s dealings with sending countries now give
direct preferment to ex-colonies, and the 1993 and
1997 laws aimed at reducing illegal immigration and
increasing deportations established a quota system
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under which entrants from former French colonies
would have priority.14

•

There is a major debate over the various antiimmigration laws implemented under Pasqua, an
Interior Minister in the early 1990s, and the
subsequent bills, which involved polarized debates
between the increasingly strong National Front and
the left wing of French politics. There were demonstrations in February 1997 attacking legislation
proposing to tighten visas and naturalization rules,
and specifically targeting illegal immigration from
former French colonies. One of the provisions of the
bill was proposing to force French hosts to inform on
their foreign guests to ensure that they did not
outstay their visas.

•

Germany advocates a new approach to political
asylum. Germany welcomed several hundred
thousand Bosnians (345,000?) when chaos broke out
in the former Yugoslavia.15 By October 1997, 85,000 of
these had returned home, but this left 260,000 still in
Germany. Germany has since begun deporting
Bosnians in large numbers, but it has also called for
an EU-wide harmonization of benefits for asylum
seekers, and asked that future costs should be equally
shared by members of the EU.

•

The new German Socialist Democratic Party
government has introduced immigration legislation
which would make it relatively easy for immigrants to
become citizens, even if they were not fully legal
residents and could not speak German. The
CDU-CSU-FDP opposition is divided over
immigration. The FDP would like to permit dual
nationality for children born of foreigners in
Germany, and then have them choose which to keep
at age 18. The CSU and CDU is strongly opposed. Fear
of ever increasing Turkish immigration is the main

53

problem. The CDU-CSU election platform in
Germany called for new requirements that would
require foreigners to pass a German test to obtain a
residence permit.
Unless a political-economic collapse takes place in a
major Middle Eastern state, Europe seems to have more
need for legal coordination and reform than for treating
immigration as a “transnational threat.” Europe can almost
certainly limit the problem by routine legal means if
governments have the courage to face the issue. If they do
not, it is unclear that gun boats will help. Some hard choices
also have to be made between the benefits and costs of
immigration.
In the process, Europe must decide whether a given
country needs cultural unity to function as a coherent
political entity. The answers are now varied. Gunter Grass
stirred up a controversy over Germany’s asylum policy and
Germany’s policy of exporting weapons to Turkey in 1997,
when he presented a literary award to a Kurdish author.
Grass said that Germany was at heart unwilling to accept
foreigners as fellow citizens, and talked of “a latent hatred of
foreigners.”16 LePen and the Front National charge that
... French identity is threatened by immigration. Who can
believe that France will remain the same if our country
continues to cover itself in Mosques and our children are
brought up to the sound of Arab or African wailings?17

Jacques Attali, conseiller d’Etat in France, draws a
middle line. He talks of cultural integration; “France is not a
race but a language, a civilization, and a land,” he writes.
It must be open to change if it is to grow. It must give room to
foreign nationals living in France to keep their customs and
adapt to France. The future will belong to multi-appurtenance,
factor of tolerance, and to multi-allegiance, factor of
democracy.18
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A “Flood” from Morocco or Algeria: The Worst Case.
The situation will be very different, however, if
immigration is driven by massive new political and
economic pressures. Such pressures are unlikely to affect
emigration from the Southern Gulf, or from any of the states
in the Levant—barring an unforeseen collapse of the
secular government in Egypt. The situation in North Africa,
however, is different.
Algeria’s corrupt military junta has failed to either win
its war against its Islamists or make any material
improvement in the living standards of its people. Algeria
only has a per capita income of around $1,520, versus over
$25,000 for high income Western states. It also has an
extremely high population growth rate in spite of a decline
in its crude birth rate. Estimates by the World Bank
indicate that the average population growth rate is still 3.5
percent among the population in the age group from 15-64,
and that the population momentum ratio is 1.6, which
means that Algeria’s population will reach at least 33
million after the year 2000, and 37 million by 2010. This
compares with a population of only 19 million in 1980, and of
29 million in 1996.19 Algeria has 11.6 million citizens
between the ages of 13 and 32, and 1.6-3.5 million males of
working age that might seek to immigrate in the face of a
serious economic or political crisis.20
Morocco also presents problems, although its
government is making serious efforts at political and
economic reform. Its average per capita income is only
$1,290, which makes even low-wage jobs in Europe
extremely attractive. Estimates by the World Bank indicate
that the average population growth rate is 2.7 percent
among the population in the age group from 15-64, and that
the population momentum ratio is 1.5, which means that
Morocco’s population will reach at least 25 million after the
year 2000, and could reach 34 million by 2010. This
compares with a population of only 19 million in 1980, and of
27 million in 1996.21 Morocco has 10.8 million citizens
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between the ages of 13 and 32, and 1.5-3.0 million males of
working age in low income jobs that might seek to
immigrate in the face of a serious economic or political
crisis.22
Tunisia has a much smaller population base, and it, too,
is attempting economic and political reform. The per capita
income is $1,930. Estimates by the World Bank indicate
that the average population growth rate is 1.5 percent
among the population in the age group from 15-64, and that
the population momentum ratio is 1.5, which means that
Tunisia’s population will reach at least 7 million after the
year 2000, and could reach 11 million by 2010. This
compares with a population of only six million in 1980, and
of nine million in 1996.23 Tunisia has 3.6 million citizens
between the ages of 13 and 32, and about 600,000-900,000
males of working age in low income jobs that might seek to
immigrate in the face of a serious economic or political
crisis.24
The true “worst case” would be the economic and
political collapse of Egypt, although such a case seems
unlikely. Estimates by the World Bank indicate that the per
capita income is $1,050. They also indicate that the average
population growth rate is 2.6 percent among the population
in the age group from 15-64, but that the population
momentum ratio is 1.5, which means that Egypt’s
population will reach at least 58 million after the year 2000,
and could reach 74 million by 2010. This compares with a
population of only 41 million in 1980, and of 59 million in
1996.25 Egypt has 21.6 million citizens between the ages of
13 and 32, and about 3.5-8.0 million males of working age in
low income jobs that might seek to immigrate in the face of a
serious economic or political crisis.26
There is no way to establish any probabilities for such
worst cases, but it is clear that Europe would almost
certainly be forced to create naval patrols to halt ships
carrying illegal immigrants, adopt forced repatriation,
and/or reject giving refugee status to all but a small cadre of
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truly deserving cases. The EU and individual European
nations can cope with the existing flow of immigrants, but
not with true mass migration. At the same time, the
political, economic, and social disparities between Europe
and North Africa are also an argument for added economic
aid, and for even stronger diplomatic efforts towards
political reform. Even a moat as wide as the Mediterranean
may fail to stop the flames if part of North Africa starts
burning.
The United States and Immigration
from the Middle East.
The United States has long been a nation of “foreigners.”
Today, it has about 26 million resident non-citizens, or 9.7
percent of its total population.27 The United States has done
well in dealing with legal immigrants, but faces a serious
problem with illegal immigration. It is estimated that there
were approximately 5 million undocumented immigrants
residing in the United States in October 1996.28 This
population is assumed to be growing by about 275,000 per
year. The American problem, however, is scarcely driven by
the flow of immigrants from the Middle East. Most of these
“illegals” (54 percent) are estimated to be from Mexico.
To put these numbers in perspective, 915,000 legal
immigrants were admitted to the United States in 1996.
Many of these legal immigrants were also Mexicans—
163,572 or 17.9 percent of the total number of immigrants.
The next ranking sources of immigrants were Philippinos,
Indians, Vietnamese, Chinese, and residents of the
Dominican Republic—with 40,000-55,000 immigrants
each. The next ranking countries include Cuba, the
Ukraine, Russia, Jamaica, Haiti, South Korea, El Salvador,
Canada, and Poland in that order. Only one of the top 30
“sending” countries was Middle Eastern—Iran, which
ranked 21st and sent less than 10,000 immigrants. An
unknown number of illegals also entered the United States,
but virtually all came from Latin America and Asia.
Officials of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
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Service estimate that only a negligible number of illegals
came from the Middle East. There are probably more
Russian illegals entering the United States each year than
illegals from all Middle Eastern countries combined.29
The United States does not have a demographic problem
with immigration from the Middle East, Arab, or Islamic
world. However, it may have one in terms of prejudice.
Middle Eastern immigration is linked to terrorism in the
eyes of many Americans, and religious and cultural
prejudice is sometimes an issue. In practice, Arab and
Iranian immigrants are among the least violent and
welfare-dependent of all immigrants to the United States,
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. While no
precise statistics are available, U.S. experts estimate that
the threat from terrorism has so far been negligible in both
actuarial terms and in terms of activists as a percent of the
total population. Latin American, Asia, and FSU immigrants have far higher percentages of overall violent crime
per capita.
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CHAPTER 5
“CONVENTIONAL” TERRORISM

Middle Eastern terrorist attacks on the West present far
fewer ambiguities than drugs and immigration, although
there is still a need to keep this threat in perspective. While
the media and fiction tend to concentrate on the terrorist
threat from the Middle East, the U.S. intelligence
community paints a very different picture. Table 5 shows
that terrorism is a global problem, and that the Middle East
is scarcely the center of terrorist activity.
The Role of the Middle East in Global Terrorism.
It should be stressed that the data in this table have
severe limitations. Some of these limitations are definitional. The term “terrorism” is defined to mean
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an
audience. The term “international terrorism” means
terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than
one country. The term “terrorist group” means any group
practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice,
international terrorism.
The U.S. State Department defines the term
“noncombatant” to include both civilians and military
personnel who are unarmed and/or not on duty at the time of
the incident. For example, it includes the murders of the
following U.S. military personnel: the 19 airmen killed in
the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing facility in
Saudi Arabia; Colonel James Rowe, killed in Manila in April
1989; Captain William Nordeen, U.S. defense attaché killed
in Athens in June 1988; the two servicemen killed in the La
Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin in April 1986; and
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Number of
Incidents
by Region

1990

1991

1992

Africa

53

3

28

7

Asia

92

48

25

135

Eurasia

6

6

0

1

151
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77

199

65

117

Latin America 163
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46
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0

2

Middle East
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1993 1994 1995
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1996 1997
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20
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287
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17

66

329

46

17
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256
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1 1,006

0

0

0

7
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Casualties
(Dead & Wounded)
by Region
Africa

140

3

10

6

25

10

11

11

Asia

481

150

13

37

24

16

11

21

Eurasia

2

7

3

5

11

5

24

42

Europe

22

56

113

185

88

272

121

52

Latin America 92

68

143

97

58

92

84

128

Middle East

97

33

79

100

116

45

45

37

0

0

2

1

0

0

0

13

North America

Source: Adopted by Anthony H. Cordesman from material provided on-line at the U.S. State
Department web site in annexes to the 1995, 1996, and 1997 editions of Patterns of Global
Terrorism, and by the office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

Table 5.
Patterns of Global International Terrorism
by Region.
four off-duty U.S. Embassy marine guards killed in a cafe in
El Salvador in June 1985. It also includes attacks on
military installations or on armed military personnel when
a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such
as the bombings against U.S. bases in Europe, the
Philippines, and elsewhere.
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Discussions with U.S. experts indicate that some
sensitive gray areas are not included in the data. These
include Indian and Pakistani acts of terror in Kashmir,
Turkish action against members of the PKK, and actions
taken by Western intelligence organizations and Israel in
counterterrorist operations. The most important limitation
from the perspective of anyone in the regions involved is
that data on transnational terrorism do not include acts of
state or private terrorism within a given country. State and
local terrorism within the Middle East, like terrorism in
most other regions, kills and wounds several orders of
magnitude more native citizens than are killed by terrorism
against foreign targets or targets outside the region.
At the same time, it is important to point out that
terrorist attacks do not focus exclusively on government
officials, military personnel, or diplomats—although these
are included in the data. Some reporting leaves the
impression that Western governments are the key victims
of terrorism. In fact, there were at least three times more
casualties from business people and other nongovernmental civilians as from diplomats, other government
personnel, and military in every year from 1990-1997.1
Nevertheless, Middle Eastern terrorism is still a very
real transnational threat to the West. There have been very
serious terrorist attacks on Western targets in the Middle
East in the past, such as the bombing of the marine Corps
Barracks in Beirut. There have also been bloody attacks
outside the Middle East, such as the bombings of Pan Am
flight #103 over Scotland in 1988 and the bombing of UTA
flight #772 over Chad in 1989. The bombing of Pan Am flight
#103 killed 259 people on board and 11 people on the
ground, and the bombing of UTA flight #772 killed 171
people on board.
Terrorism is also a threat which may be sharply
escalating. Middle Eastern attacks on Western targets
dropped in frequency and intensity (casualties) after the
Gulf War and Israel’s peace agreement with the
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Palestinians. This pattern may be reversing. The November
13, 1995, truck bombing of the National Guard
Headquarters in Riyadh killed five U.S. service men and
two Iranians. The June 25, 1996, bombing of the Khobar
Towers killed 19 U.S. servicemen, and it involved a massive
device. The 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania involved massive numbers of innocent
casualties—247 dead and over 5,000 wounded in the case of
Kenya, and 10 dead and more than 75 wounded in the case
of Tanzania. These attacks involved truck bombs with
600-800 pounds of explosives.
Civil tension in the Middle East has made tourists a
growing target. For example, the worst terrorist attack in
Egypt’s history occurred on November 17, 1997. Six gunmen
belonging to the Egyptian terrorist group al-Gama’at
al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group or IG) entered the Hatsheput
Temple in Luxor. For nearly half an hour, they methodically
shot and knifed tourists trapped inside the Temple’s
alcoves. Fifty-eight foreign tourists were murdered, along
with three Egyptian police officers and one Egyptian tour
guide. The gunmen then fled the scene, although Egyptian
security forces pursued them, and all six were killed.
Terrorists launched a grenade attack on a tour bus parked
in front of the Egyptian National Antiquities Museum in
Cairo on September 18, 1997. Nine German tourists and an
Egyptian bus driver were killed, and eight others were
wounded.
The U.S. cruise missile attacks on targets in
Afghanistan and the Sudan on August 20, 1998, reflected
the fact that U.S. intelligence had reliable information that
Osama Bin Laden, a leading sponsor and financier of
terrorism, planned large-scale attacks on U.S. targets. The
U.S. attack on the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in Khartoum
was a preemptive attempt to prevent the production and use
of VX nerve gas by Bin Laden’s organization.
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The Causes of Transnational Terrorism
in the Middle East.
There are many causes of transnational terrorism in the
Middle East, and many different Western targets:

•

The United States is a major target because it projects
the most power into the region, because of its close ties
to Israel, because attacks on the United States
produce the most world-wide publicity, and because
the United States can often be used as a proxy for less
popular attacks on Middle Eastern regimes.

•

The breakdown in the Arab-Israeli peace process
makes both Americans and others a target in Israel
and other parts of the Middle East, both out of
frustration and in an effort to break up the peace
process.

•

The failures of Middle Eastern secular governments,
state terrorism and authoritarianism, economic
hardship, social dislocation, and the alienation of
youth combine to create extremism groups that not
only attack their governments, but use Western
targets as proxies. Motives can include attempting to
drive out the Western military forces that provide
Middle Eastern countries with security, cripple the
economy to weaken governments, or win public
recognition in the region. While some of these groups
are secular, many claim to be Islamic in character.
Some totally reject both secularism and any ties to the
West or Western values.

•

European nations can become the scene of attacks by
opposition groups on the Embassies of Middle
Eastern regimes, or by opposition groups attacking
each other. Iran has sponsored state terrorist attacks
on the People’s Mujahideen and Kurdish opposition
groups in France, Germany, Switzerland, and
Turkey. Israel has killed Palestinians in nations like
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Norway. France has become the scene of fighting
between Algerian factions.

•

Western tourists and businessmen can be the targets
of terrorists in the Middle East, as such groups seek to
put economic pressure on local regimes, or prove their
status and power. For example, an Algerian terrorist
group called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) killed
seven foreigners in Algeria in 1997, bringing the total
number of foreigners the GIA has killed in Algeria to
133 (since 1992). Bombs have been used in civilian
areas in Bahrain, although Westerners have not been
major targets. Four U.S. businessmen, employees of
Union Texas Petroleum, and their Pakistani driver
were shot and killed in Karachi on November 12,
1998, when the vehicle in which they were riding was
attacked by terrorists that seem to have been
affiliated with Middle Eastern extremist groups.

•

The West is often attacked on the basis of its values,
and for corrupting Islamic countries and supporting
secular regimes. While the United States is the
primary target of such attacks, figures like the Saudi
terrorist financier Osama Bin Laden want to drive all
of the West out of the region. Bin Laden has
previously claimed responsibility for anti-U.S.
attacks in Somalia and Yemen. These include an
attempt to bomb 10 U.S. servicemen in Yemen in
December 1992. Bin Laden supplied arms to
extremist groups opposing Operation RESTORE
HOPE in Somalia in 1993, and seems to have financed
the groups responsible for the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993. He may have helped to finance and
organize the bombing of the National Guard
headquarters in Riyadh. He threatened to attack U.S.
forces in Saudi Arabia to force a U.S. withdrawal from
the region in March 1997. He continued to make
statements threatening Western interests
throughout 1997 and 1998, and made threats that
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identify him as a possible sponsor of the bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania. Bin Laden is claimed to finance
and “guide” Arab “Afghani” movements with up to
3,000 members which have conducted operations in
Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Tajikistan,
and Yemen.2
Terrorist Groups and State Links to Terrorism.
The U.S. State Department has identified a long list of
active terrorist groups in the Middle East. The identity and
character of these groups are summarized in Appendix A,
pp. 83-98. These groups, however, are only the visible side
of terrorism. The social, economic, and political tensions in
the Middle East constantly lead to the creation of new
groups or splinter groups.3 A wide range of Middle Eastern
states have also carried out covert operations on Western
soil. These include friendly states like Algeria, Egypt,
Israel, and Morocco. They also include extremist sponsors of
state terrorism like Iran, Iraq, and Libya.
Iran has conducted extensive operations, including
assassinations, against members of its opposition. Some of
the targets have been terrorist groups in their own right like
the People’s Mujahideen. Others have been moderates like
ex-Prime Minister Bahktiar. Questions also remain
regarding Iran’s role in the Marine Corps Barracks
bombing, bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish
Cultural Center in Argentina, and the apartment complex
in Al Khobar. A Berlin court found in April 1997 that the
highest levels of Iran’s political leadership followed a
deliberate policy of murdering political opponents who lived
outside the country. The court found four defendants guilty
in the murders of four Iranian Kurdish opposition figures in
Berlin’s Mykonos restaurant in 1992. Three of those
convicted were members of the Lebanese Hezbollah
organization; the fourth was an Iranian national. The court
judgment made it clear that other participants had escaped
to Iran, where one of them was given a Mercedes for his role
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in the operation. As a result, a German court issued an
arrest warrant for former Iranian Minister of Intelligence
and Security Ali Fallahian in March 1996.
Iraq sponsored an assassination attempt on President
Bush in April 1993; has killed opposition figures in the Iraqi
National Congress, and supports the People’s Mujahideen
in terrorist attacks in Iran. Iraq continues to have ties to the
Abu Nidal Organization, the Abu Abbas faction of the PLF,
Hamas, and the PFLP.
Libya and Qadhafi are the sponsors of the bombings of
Pan Am #103 and UTA #772. Syria is a major sponsor of the
Hezbollah, may have had some role in the Marine Corps
Barracks bombing, and has never fully explained how Jafar
Shuwaykat—a suspect in the Al Khobar bombing—died in
Syrian custody. The Sudan has not been linked to attacks on
targets in the West, but may have some responsibility for
attacks on U.S. officials in the Middle East and for an
assassination attempt on President Mubarak on June 26,
1995. The trial of five defendants suspected in the 1986 La
Belle discotheque bombing opened in Berlin on November
18, 1997. Two U.S. soldiers, Sergeants Kenneth Ford and
James Goins, were killed in this attack along with a Turkish
citizen, and some 200 other persons were wounded,
including 64 U.S. citizens. The United States believes the
attack was sponsored by Libya.
The Sudan allows terrorist groups to train and operate,
and to carry out terrorist actions—such as the June 1995
attack by Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya against President
Mubarak in Addis Ababa. It harbors a number of terrorist
groups. These include one secular group, the Abu Nidal
Organization, but most are Islamic extremist organizations. These include Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Egypt’s Al-Gama’at
al-Islamiyya. The Sudanese government also supports
Islamic and non-Islamic opposition groups in Algeria,
Uganda, Tunisia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
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The Sudan has tried to lower the profile of its support for
terrorism, and expelled Bin Laden and members of some
terrorist groups in 1996. However, Sudan has yet to comply
with the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1044, 1054, and
1070, which call on Sudan to extradite to Ethiopia the three
suspects in the June 1995 assassination attempt against
Egyptian President Mubarak and end its support for
terrorism. Sudan has not cut off its support for terrorist
organizations that continue to have a presence there. The
Sudan also permits Bin Laden’s groups to operate and
allowed him to set up a plant to produce the precursors for
VX nerve gas in Khartoum. The Sudan also still seems to
have links to Abu Nidal, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic
Jihad, Lebanese Hezbollah, the Islamic Group in Egypt,
and the Armed Islamic Group and Islamic Salvation Group
in Algeria.
There are also links between state and “private”
terrorism. While Iran has publicly attacked terrorism since
the election of President Khatami, senior Western
intelligence officials indicate that Iran’s organizations for
covert and terrorist operations remain intact and largely
under the control of factions loyal to Iran’s conservatives
and extremists.
Syria works with Iran in supporting the Lebanese
Hezbollah in training various terrorist groups and is a
supporter of the PKK in its attacks on Turkey. It supports a
number of Palestinian rejectionist groups, and Syrian
intelligence has a long history of links to terrorism and
extremist groups. Libya has links to a wide range of
terrorist groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
PFLP-GC, and Abu Nidal Organization.
Afghanistan has become a key sponsor of terrorism, and
permits a number of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations
to operate on its soil. Islamic extremists—including large
numbers of Egyptians, Algerians, Palestinians, and
Saudis—continue to use Afghanistan as a training ground
and home base. The Taliban and other combatants in the
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Afghan civil war facilitate the operation of training and
indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans in the territories
they control. Several Afghani factions provide logistic
support, free passage, and sometimes passports to the
members of various terrorist organizations. These include
groups and individuals involved in fighting in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, the
Philippines, and parts of the Middle East.
As has been touched upon earlier, the Saudi-born
terrorist financier Osama Bin Laden relocated from
Jalalabad to the Taliban’s capital of Qandahar in early
1997, and established a new base of operations. He
continued to incite violence against the United States,
particularly against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden
called on Muslims to retaliate against the U.S. prosecutor in
the Mir Aimal Kansi trial for disparaging comments he
made about Pakistanis and praised the Pakistan-based
Kashmiri group HUA in the wake of its formal designation
as a foreign terrorist organization by the United States.
According to the Pakistani press, following Kansi’s
rendition to the United States, Bin Laden warned the
United States that, if it attempted his capture, he would
“teach them a lesson similar to the lesson they were taught
in Somalia.”
New Forms of Terrorism?
The history of terrorism is a history of constant change
and adaptation, generally leading to cycles of violence using
a new type of attack that gains publicity and global
attention and which is then repeated. Once again, it is
difficult to put these threats into perspective. There are the
“alarmists” who make every incident into a megatrend,
every possible scenario into a cause for immediate action,
every contact and liaison between extremists into a
network, and every hostile political faction into a
super-intelligent nest of demons.
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These political “alarmists” are supported by
“techno-alarmists” who exaggerate the ease of weaponizing
and using new terrorist devices and the vulnerabilities of
modern societies by several orders of magnitude. Finally,
these two groups are supported by the “totalitarian
solutionists” who support the alarmists by advocating
solutions that would force the restructuring of modern
societies—often in ways whose consequences would be
worse than the real-world problem—and who often
advocate unproven and extremely expensive technologies.
At the same time, anyone who has spent any time
working on the problems posed by Middle Eastern terrorism
is struck by the fact that even paranoids face real terrorists.
It is impossible to ignore the growing vulnerability of
modern society and the fact that major risks do exist.
Similarly, it is impossible to study the subject without being
struck by the gap that exists between the past failure of
most terrorists to go beyond routine acts of terrorism and
the potential damage new techniques and technologies and
more effective forms of terrorism could do.
It is too early to be certain, but a pattern may be
emerging where terrorists seek to maximize both damage
and political impact by using steadily larger devices and/or
seeking more numerous casualties. Some of this pattern
seems to be a reaction to improved protection—terrorists
use larger devices because they must attack from further
outside a security perimeter. The Al Khobar bombings fit
this pattern. Some cases may be accidents. The bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania produced very
high civilian casualties because the terrorists never
succeeded in getting as close to their target as originally
planned. Cases like the World Trade Center, however, are
clearly cases where terrorists sought to make the largest
possible statement and produce the largest possible number
of casualties.
“Super-terrorism” is technically easy. It is possible to
postulate credible scenarios that produce much higher
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levels of casualties from terrorism using conventional
weapons and technologies. Exploding a jumbo jet, blowing
up a crowded office building, destroying an isolated urban
water supply, and destroying a key tunnel or bridge during
peak traffic periods are typical cases in point.
It is equally possible to postulate serious economic and
military costs from new forms of terrorism like cyberterrorism and successful attacks on governmental data
systems, military systems, national financial systems, and
the control systems for key utility, energy processing and
export facilities. Attacks on key utilities can have a massive
disruptive effect. Attacks on key leaders can destabilize or
paralyze some governments, and attacks on religious or
highly sensitive political symbols can trigger levels of
political disorder and violence out of any proportion to the
casualties and physical damage involved.
While much of the current attention to terrorism focuses
on the risk that terrorists may use steadily larger or more
lethal devices, it is equally possible that terrorists will
target the increasingly more complex and more integrated
structures that allow modern societies to function. Water
and power plants are good examples of local structures. So
are commuting systems, public transportation, media, and
key government officials and offices. Symbols of national
culture—historical monuments, museums, churches,
etc.—can often be destroyed with very small devices. The
information systems that link national, regional, and the
global economy are particularly attractive targets because
they can often be attacked remotely through the Internet or
by using viruses, hacking, and other methods that do not
involve any detectable weapon.
A recent Israel commentary on information warfare in
the Middle East summarized the threat as is shown in Table
6, which also includes World Bank data on the level of
computer activity in Middle Eastern states.4 “Information
warfare” has become a fashionable buzz word, but there is
no question that many Western systems are vulnerable to

72

Israeli Assessment*

Country
Israel
Iran
Kuwait
Jordan

Internet
In 1998
65,000
unknown
6,500
300

Egypt

3,500

Syria

unknown

Vulnerability to
Information
Warfare

Supercomputers

Potential for
Information
Warfare

yes

high

high

possible

moderate

low-moderate

yes

moderate-high

low

no

low

low

yes

low

moderate

no

low-moderate

low

World Bank Estimate of the National Technology Base**
Personal
Computers
Country
Per 1,000 People
Algeria
3.4
Bahrain
Egypt
5.8
Iran
32.7
Iraq
Israel
117.6
Jordan
7.2
Kuwait
74.1
Lebanon
7.9
Libya
Morocco
1.7
Oman
10.0
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
37.2
Sudan
0.7
Syria
1.4
Tunisia
6.7
Turkey
13.8
UAE
65.5
West Bank & Gaza
Yemen
-

Internet Server
Per 10,000 People
0.01
0.31
0.00
0.00
104.79
0.38
21.72
21.03
0.01
0.32
0.00
0.15
0.00
0.00
0.02
3.60
7.66
0.00

* Adapted from work by Arielt T. Sobleman, “An Information Revolution in
the Middle East?,” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 1, No. 2, July 1998, Tel Aviv:
Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 13-15.
** Source: Adapted by Anthony H. Cordesman from World Bank, World
Development Indicators, 1998, Washington: World Bank, 1998, pp. 294-300.

Table 6. Information Warfare in the Middle East.
73

A recent Israel commentary on information warfare in
the Middle East summarized the threat as is shown in Table
6, which also includes World Bank data on the level of
computer activity in Middle Eastern states.4 “Information
warfare” has become a fashionable buzz word, but there is
no question that many Western systems are vulnerable to
external penetration. Middle Eastern terrorist organizations already use the Internet and global satellite phone
systems to communicate and for propaganda purposes.
They also use fax machines and many other modern devices.
There is no way to quantify the threat or provide a
detailed description by group or country. It is clear,
however, that some terrorist groups and state sponsors of
terrorism in the Middle East also have enough sophistication to possess the potential to penetrate and attack
Western information and data systems. Like international
organized crime and other foreign threats, they are a
warning that governments must defend themselves and
make information warfare a priority. As for businesses, the
now routine threat of computer crime is so serious that
businesses that do not routinely and aggressively defend
themselves are unlikely to survive.
Ridiculous as most novels and screenplays about
super-terrorists may be, they conceal the same kernel of
truth as exaggerated warnings from experts on counterterrorism. The impact of Middle Eastern terrorism has so
far been limited largely by the failure or unwillingness of
terrorists to exploit new technologies and complex
vulnerabilities, and not by the inherent difficulty in
conducting much more lethal attacks. There are many
credible means, and the West’s protection consists largely of
the lack of a real-world “Dr. No” or “Professor Moriarity.”
Western Response.
Until recently, Western governments have been able to
accept the risks and costs in taking a political and reactive
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approach to potential new terrorist threats. There has often
been an emphasis on agreements, conferences, and legal
sanctions. Most Western governments are members of nine
major multilateral conventions related to states’
responsibilities for combating terrorism:

•

Convention on offenses and certain other acts
committed on board aircraft (“Tokyo Convention;”
9/63; applies to acts affecting in-flight safety).

•

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of
aircraft (“Hague Convention;” 12/70; applies to
hijackings).

•

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation (“Montreal
Convention;” 9/71; applies to acts of aviation sabotage
such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight).

•

Convention on the prevention and punishment of
crimes against internationally protected persons
(12/73; protects senior government officials and
diplomats).

•

Convention on the physical protection of nuclear
material (10/79; combats unlawful taking and use of
nuclear material).

•

International Convention against the taking of
hostages (12/79).

•

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts of
violence at airports serving international civil
aviation (2/88; extends and supplements Montreal
Convention).

•

Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against
the safety of maritime navigation, with related
protocol (3/88; applies to terrorist attacks on ships and
on fixed offshore platforms).
75

•

Convention on the marking of plastic explosives for
the purpose of identification (provides for chemical
marking to facilitate detection of plastic explosives,
e.g. to combat aircraft sabotage; 3/91).

There are a host of formal and informal intelligence
sharing and notification agreements. These often include
informal relations with Middle Eastern governments or
governments with Middle Eastern terrorists on their soil.
Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian authority, Kuwait,
and Pakistan have provided considerable cooperation, but
so have a number of other states. This has sometimes led to
the transfer or extradition of terrorists or cooperation in
suppressing their activities.
Key conferences have included the Summit of the
Peacemakers in Egypt in March 1996, which took place
after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin and terrorist bombings in Israel. President Clinton
called for and co-chaired a gathering of 29 regional and
world leaders to design and support new counter-terrorism
initiatives. Another example is the Paris Terrorism
Ministerial, which took place on July 30, 1996. This
conference made 25 recommendations which summarize
current Western approaches to counterterrorism:5
1. Strengthen internal cooperation among government
agencies which deal with different aspects of counterterrorism.
2. Expand training of counterterrorism personnel.
3. Intensify consultations to improve the capability of
governments to respond to terrorist attacks against public
transport.
4. Accelerate research, development, and consultation
on methods for detecting explosives and for tracing their
origins.
5. Act against terrorist front organizations.
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6. Prevent terrorist use of electronic or wire communications.
7. Adopt effective legal controls over terrorist devices.
8. Strengthen punishments for terrorist acts.
9. Prosecute terrorists and their supporters.
10. Refrain from supporting terrorists.
11. Accelerate consultations on law enforcement access
to encrypted data.
12. Improve travel barriers to terrorists.
13. Prevent terrorist abuse of asylum.
14. Ratify international conventions.
15.Develop and enhance mutual legal assistance procedures.
16. Expand extradition arrangements.
17.Promote an international terrorist bombing
convention. Seek ICAO action to establish international
bomb detection standards and to heighten airport security.
18. Implement biological weapons controls.
19. Prevent terrorist fundraising.
20. Intensify information exchange on the international
movement of funds for terrorist purposes.
21. Adopt regulatory measures to impede the movement
of terrorists’ funds.
22. Facilitate information exchange via central
authorities.
23. Intensify exchange of basic information on persons
and groups suspected of terrorist-linked activities.
24. Intensify the exchanges of operational information
on suspect persons and groups.
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25. Accelerate exchanges of information.
The United States has also attempted to legislate
unilaterally against Middle Eastern terrorism. Some of
these efforts have helped publicize and expose terrorism
and its supporters, and it is important to note that the U.S.
State Department Human Rights reports have done as
much to expose state terrorism against the peoples of the
Middle East as its reports on Patterns of Global Terrorism
have done to expose transnational terrorism.
Some legislation has provoked more controversy than
substance. The most famous (infamous?) example of such
legislation is the “Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.”
This law imposed sanctions on foreign companies that
engaged in specified economic transactions with Iran or
Libya, and sanctioned companies that provided new
investments over $40 million for the development of
petroleum resources in Iran or Libya. The bill also
sanctioned foreign companies that violate existing U.N.
prohibitions against trade with Libya in certain goods and
services such as arms, certain oil equipment, and civil
aviation services.
If a violation occurs, the President is to impose two out of
seven possible sanctions against the violating company.
These sanctions included denial of Export-Import Bank
assistance; denial of export licenses for exports to the
violating company; prohibition on loans or credits from U.S.
financial institutions of over $10 million in any 12-month
period; prohibition on designation as a primary dealer for
U.S. Government debt instruments; prohibition on serving
as an agent of the United States or as a repository for U.S.
Government funds; denial of U.S. government procurement
opportunities (consistent with WTO obligations); and a ban
on all or some imports of the violating company.
There have been relatively few Western uses of force
against Middle Eastern terrorists, and most have involved
gray areas related to quasi-military action by the Iranian
and Iraqi governments. These cases include:
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•

October 10, 1985: U.S. F-14s divert an Egyptian
airliner to a NATO base in Sicily. The aircraft was
transferring PLO terrorists from Egypt to Tunisia
who had been involved in the seizure of the Achille
Lauro, and had released the ship on the condition of
safe passage.

•

April 14, 1986: U.S. Air Force and Navy jets bomb
Libyan targets in retaliation for Libyan terrorist
attacks on Americans in Europe.

•

October 19, 1987: U.S. warships bombard an offshore
Iranian oil rig that was harboring Iranian gunboats.
The bombardment was retaliation for an Iranian
missile attack on a U.S. tanker.

•

April 18, 1988: U.S. ships and planes attack two
Iranian oil platforms in the Gulf, after an April 14
incident in which a U.S. ship had been damaged by a
mine. They sink two Iranian warships.

•

June 26, 1993: U.S. ships launch cruise missile
attacks on the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in
retaliation for an assassination plot against former
President George Bush

•

August 21, 1998: The U.S. launches 75 to 80 cruise
missiles against a terrorist training complex in
Afghanistan, and a plant suspected of producing the
precursors for VX nerve gas in the Sudan. Significant
damage is done to the training complex, and the plant
is largely destroyed.

Western governments have generally found it best to
limit any “war” on terrorism to rhetoric. There are often
valid concerns that confrontations may provoke more
terrorism while negotiations may reduce it. Taking major
military action can lead to a host of complications with other
governments, and accepting moderate casualties as the
result of a terrorist activities has been more “cost-effective”
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than carrying out expensive and aggressive efforts to
prevent all forms of terrorism.
Once again, there is a need for perspective. Every
activity in government—whether it is counterterrorism,
road repair, or medical treatment—involves a tacit or
explicit acceptance of actuarial trade-offs in costeffectiveness in which a government accepts the death of its
citizens in order to save money, preserve personal freedom,
or concentrate on higher priority problems. Choices have to
be made on something approaching an actuarial basis.
When it comes to using government funds, it is scarcely
important to the dead whether they were killed by
government choices regarding counterterrorism or the
funding of kidney transplants. It is equally unimportant
whether they died as a result of deliberate bureaucratic
choices or a decision to ignore the actuarial consequences of
public policy.
Recent attacks and bombings have reached a scale,
however, where the United States felt it was forced to attack
terrorists in Afghanistan and the Sudan in August 1998.
This may mark a major change in the previous pattern.
There is little doubt that the United States will continue to
be the focus of large-scale attacks by Middle East terrorists,
and faces serious challenges in protecting its embassies,
forces, other nationals and facilities abroad. Negotiation
and legal efforts will continue to be key tools in the U.S.
response, but terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare,
and the United States may have to deal with
counterterrorism as a form of low intensity combat.
Whatever path the United States chooses, the problem is
serious enough that all Western governments need to
strengthen their intelligence efforts, and improve their
warning. They need to strengthen immigration controls,
and some aspects of internal security—particularly the
surveillance and tracking of suspect groups and
individuals. They also need to consider how to improve
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emergency response and counterterrorist activities.
Excessive vulnerability invites attack.
CHAPTER 5 - ENDNOTES
1. U.S. Department of State, Patterns in Global Terrorism, 1995,
1996, 1997, Appendix C, Statistical Review.
2. For historical background on Bin Laden, see Kenneth Katzman,
“Persian Gulf: Radical Islamic Movements,” Washington: Congressional Research Service, 96-731-F, August 30, 1996.
3. Also see Kenneth Katzman, “Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups
and State Sponsors, 1997,” Washington: Congressional Research
Service, 97-692F, July 10, 1997.
4. Arielt T. Sobleman, “An Information Revolution in the Middle
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORIST
GROUPS

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) a.k.a. Fatah Revolutionary
Council, Arab Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary
Brigades, Black September, and Revolutionary Organization of
Socialist Muslims
Description: International terrorist organization led by Sabri
al-Banna. Split from PLO in 1974. Made up of various functional
committees, including political, military, and financial.
Activities: Has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing
or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and
various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna
airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, the
Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City
of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of
assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu
Hul in Tunis in January 1991. ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat
in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the
PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the
late 1980s.
Strength: Several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and limited
overseas support structure.
Location/Area of Operation: Currently headquartered in Libya with
an operational presence in Lebanon in the Al Biqa’ (Bekaa Valley) and
also several Palestinian refugee camps in coastal areas of Lebanon. Also
has a presence in Sudan, Syria, and Iraq, among others. Has
demonstrated ability to operate over wide area, including the Middle
East, Asia, and Europe.
External Aid: Has received considerable support, including
safehaven, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Iraq and
Syria (until 1987); probably continues to receive aid from Libya, in
addition to close support for selected operations.
Al Quaida—see Quaida
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Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Description: An Islamic extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow
the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The
GIA began its violent activities in early 1992 after Algiers voided the
victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)—the largest Islamic
party—in the first round of December 1991 legislative elections.
Activities: Frequent attacks against civilians, journalists, and
foreign residents. In the last year, the GIA has embarked on a terrorist
campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in
its area of operations and frequently killing hundreds of civilians. Since
announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in
September 1993, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and
women—mostly Europeans—in the country. The GIA uses
assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to
favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an
Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994, and suspicions centered
on the group for a series of bombings in France in 1995.
Strength: Unknown, probably several hundred to several thousand.
Location/Area of Operation: Algeria.
External Aid: Algerian expatriates and GIA members abroad, many
of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial and logistic
support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and
Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists and severed diplomatic
relations with Iran in March 1993.
Azzam—See Quaida
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Description: Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 when it
split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).
Believes Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through
revolution of the masses. In early 1980s, occupied political stance
midway between Arafat and the rejectionists. Split into two factions in
1991; Nayif Hawatmah leads the majority and more hard-line faction,
which continues to dominate the group. Joined with other rejectionist
groups to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) to oppose the
Declaration of Principals signed in 1993. Broke from the APF—along
with the PFLP—over ideological differences. Has made limited moves
toward merging with the PFLP since the mid-1990s.
Activities: In the 1970s carried out numerous small bombings and
minor assaults and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the
occupied territories, concentrating on Israeli targets. Involved only in
border raids since 1988, but continues to oppose the Israel-PLO peace
agreement.
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Strength: Estimated at 500 (total for both factions).
Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, and the
Israeli-occupied territories; terrorist attacks have taken place entirely
in Israel and the occupied territories. Conducts occasional guerrilla
operations in southern Lebanon.
External Aid: Receives limited financial and military aid from
Syria.
al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
Description: An indigenous Egyptian Islamic extremist group active
since the late 1970s; appears to be loosely organized with no single
readily identifiable operational leader. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is
the group’s preeminent spiritual leader. Goal is to overthrow the
government of President Hosni Mubarak and replace it with an Islamic
state.
Activities: Armed attacks against Egyptian security and other
government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of
Islamic extremism. The group also has launched attacks on tourists in
Egypt since 1992. Al-Gama’at claimed responsibility for the attempt in
June 1995 to assassinate President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.
Strength: Unknown, but probably several thousand hard-core
members and another several thousand sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates mainly in the Al Minya,
Asyu’t, Qina, and Soha Governorates of southern Egypt. It also appears
to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations,
particularly among unemployed graduates and students.
External Aid: Unknown. Egyptian Government believes that Iran,
Sudan, and Afghan militant Islamic groups support the group.
HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Description: HAMAS was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the
Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various elements of
HAMAS have used both political and violent means, including
terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian
state in place of Israel. HAMAS is loosely structured, with some
elements working openly through mosques and social service
institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and
distribute propaganda. Militant elements of HAMAS, operating
clandestinely, have advocated and used violence to advance their goals.
HAMAS’s strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and in a few areas
of the West Bank. It also has engaged in peaceful political activity, such
as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.
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Activities: HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din
al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks—including
large-scale suicide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military
targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Fatah rivals.
Strength: Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of
thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
Location/Area of Operation: Primarily the occupied territories,
Israel, and Jordan.
External Aid: Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran,
and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab
states. Some fundraising and propaganda activities take place in
Western Europe and North America.
Hezbollah or Hizballah (Party of God) a.k.a. Islamic Jihad,
Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the
Oppressed on Earth, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of
Palestine
Description: Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to
creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and removal of all
non-Islamic influences from area. Strongly anti-Western and
anti-Israeli. Closely allied with, and often directed by Iran, but may
have conducted operations that were not approved by Tehran.
Activities: Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous
anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the
U.S. Embassy and U.S. marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 and
the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut in September 1984. Elements of the
group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S. and
other Western hostages in Lebanon. The group also attacked the Israeli
Embassy in Argentina in 1992.
Strength: Several thousand.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in the Al Biqa’ (Bekaa Valley),
the southern suburbs of Beirut, and southern Lebanon. Has established
cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and elsewhere.
External Aid: Receives substantial amounts of financial, training,
weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from
Iran and Syria.
International Islamic Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders
A group formed by Osama Bin Laden in February 1998, which
includes al Quaida, the Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad, the Harakat ul-Ansar, and two other groups. (see
Quaida)
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Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Shrines.(Claimed
responsibility for the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania.) See al Quaida and International Islamic Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders
Islamic Resistance Movement (see HAMAS)
Jamaat ul-Fuqra
Description: Jamaat ul-Fuqra is an Islamic sect that seeks to purify
Islam through violence. Fuqra is led by Pakistani cleric Shaykh
Mubarik Ali Gilani, who established the organization in the early 1980s.
Gilani now resides in Pakistan, but most Fuqra cells are located in
North America and the Caribbean. Fuqra members have purchased
isolated rural compounds in North America to live communally, practice
their faith, and insulate themselves from Western culture.
Activities: Fuqra members have attacked a variety of targets that
they view as enemies of Islam, including Muslims they regard as
heretics and Hindus. Attacks during the 1980s included assassinations
and firebombings across the United States. Fuqra members in the
United States have been convicted of criminal violations, including
murder and fraud.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: North America, Pakistan.
External Aid: None.
al-Jihad a.k.a. Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad, New Jihad Group,
Vanguards of Conquest, Talaa’ al- Fateh
Description: An Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the
late 1970s; appears to be divided into at least two separate factions:
remnants of the original Jihad led by Abbud al-Zumar, currently
imprisoned in Egypt, and a faction calling itself Vanguards of Conquest
(Talaa’ al-Fateh or the New Jihad Group). The Vanguards of Conquest
appears to be led by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is currently outside
Egypt; his specific whereabouts are unknown. Like al-Gama’at
al-Islamiyya, the Jihad factions regard Sheikh Umar Abd-al Rahman as
their spiritual leader. The goal of all Jihad factions is to overthrow the
government of President Hosni Mubarak and replace it with an Islamic
state.
Activities: Specializes in armed attacks against high-level Egyptian
Government officials. The original Jihad was responsible for the
assassination in 1981 of President Anwar Sadat. Unlike al-Gama’at
al-Islamiyya, which mainly targets mid- and lower-level security
personnel, Coptic Christians, and Western tourists, al-Jihad appears to
concentrate primarily on high-level, high-profile Egyptian Government

87

officials, including cabinet ministers. Claimed responsibility for the
attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan Al-Alfi in August
1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993.
Strength: Not known, but probably several thousand hardcore
members and another several thousand sympathizers among the
various factions.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates mainly in the Cairo area. Also
appears to have members outside Egypt, probably in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Sudan.
External Aid: Not known. The Egyptian Government claims that
Iran, Sudan, and militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan support the
Jihad factions.
Kach and Kahane Chai
Description: Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel.
Kach (founded by radical Israeli-American Rabbi Meir Kahane) and its
offshoot Kahane Chai, which means “Kahane Lives” (founded by Meir
Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s assassination in the
United States), were declared to be terrorist organizations in March
1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law. This
followed the groups’ statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s
attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque—Goldstein was
affiliated with Kach—and their verbal attacks on the Israeli
Government.
Activities: Organize protests against the Israeli Government.
Harass and threaten Palestinians in Hebron and the West Bank.
Groups have threatened to attack Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli
Government officials. They also claimed responsibility for several
shooting attacks on West Bank Palestinians in which four persons were
killed and two were wounded in 1993.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Israel and West Bank settlements,
particularly Qiryat Arba’ in Hebron.
External Aid: Receives support from sympathizers in the United
States and Europe.
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Description: Established in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent
group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. In recent years has moved
beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism.
Seeks to set up an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey,
where there is a predominantly Kurdish population.
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Activities: Primary targets are Turkish Government security forces
in Turkey but also has been active in Western Europe against Turkish
targets. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial
facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring
1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the PKK has
bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists.
Strength: Approximately 10,000 to 15,000 guerrillas. Has
thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.
Location/Area of Operation: Operates in Turkey, Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.
External Aid: Receives safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq,
and Iran.
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO) a.k.a. The
National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the
MEK), the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), Muslim Iranian
Student’s Society (front organization used to garner financial
support)
Description: Formed in the 1960s by the college- educated children
of Iranian merchants, the MEK sought to counter what is perceived as
excessive Western influence in the Shah’s regime. In the 1970s, the
MEK concluded that violence was the only way to bring about change in
Iran. Since then, the MEK—following a philosophy that mixes Marxism
and Islam—has developed into the largest and most active armed
Iranian dissident group. Its history is studded with anti-Western
activity and, most recently, attacks on the interests of the clerical
regime in Iran and abroad.
Activities: The MEK directs a worldwide campaign against the
Iranian Government that stresses propaganda and occasionally uses
terrorist violence. During the 1970s, the MEK staged terrorist attacks
inside Iran to destabilize and embarrass the Shah’s regime; the group
killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense
projects in Tehran. The group also supported the takeover in 1979 of the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In April 1992 the MEK carried out attacks on
Iranian embassies in 13 different countries, demonstrating the group’s
ability to mount large-scale operations overseas.
Strength: Several thousand fighters based in Iraq with an extensive
overseas support structure. Most of the fighters are organized in the
MEK’s National Liberation Army (NLA).
Location/Area of Operation: In the 1980s the MEK’s leaders were
forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. Most resettled in Iraq
by 1987. Since the mid-1980s, the MEK has not mounted terrorist
operations in Iran at a level similar to its activities in the 1970s. Aside
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from the National Liberation Army’s attacks into Iran toward the end of
the Iran-Iraq war, and occasional NLA cross-border incursions since,
the MEK’s attacks on Iran have amounted to little more than
harassment. The MEK has had more success in confronting Iranian
representatives overseas through propaganda and street
demonstrations.
External Aid: Beyond support from Iraq, the MEK uses front
organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian
communities.
Osama Bin Laden (see al Quaida)
The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Description: The PIJ, which originated among militant Palestinians
in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s, is a series of loosely affiliated
factions rather than a cohesive group. The PIJ is committed to the
creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel
through holy war. Because of its strong support for Israel, the United
States has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ. The PIJ also opposes
moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by
Western secularism.
Activities: PIJ militants have threatened to retaliate against Israel
and the United States for the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in
Malta in October 1995. It has carried out suicide bombing attacks
against Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. The PIJ
has threatened to attack U.S. interests in Jordan.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Primarily Israel and the occupied
territories and other parts of the Middle East, including Jordan and
Lebanon. The largest faction is based in Syria.
External Aid: Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited
assistance from Syria.
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Description: Terrorist group that broke away from the PFLP-GC in
mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan
factions. Pro-PLO faction is led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who
became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991.
Activities: The Abu Abbas-led faction has carried out attacks
against Israel. Abbas’s group was also responsible for the attack in 1985
on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon
Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas’s arrest is outstanding in Italy.
Strength: At least 50.
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Location/Area of Operation: PLO faction based in Tunisia until
Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.
External Aid: Receives support mainly from Iraq, has received
support from Libya in the past.
PKK (see Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Description: Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George
Habash as a member of the PLO. Joined the Alliance of Palestinian
Forces (APF) to oppose the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 and
has suspended participation in the PLO. Broke away from the APF,
along with the DFLP, in 1996 over ideological differences. Has made
limited moves toward merging with the DFLP since the mid-1990s.
Activities: Committed numerous international terrorist attacks
during the 1970s. Since 1978, PFLP has carried out numerous attacks
against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including the killing of a
settler and her son in December 1996.
Strength: Some 800.
Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and the
occupied territories.
External Aid: Receives most of its financial and military assistance
from Syria and Libya.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command (PFLP-GC)
Description: Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming that it wanted to
focus more on fighting and less on politics. Violently opposed to Arafat’s
PLO. Led by Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely
tied to both Syria and Iran.
Activities: Has carried out numerous cross-border terrorist attacks
into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized
hang gliders.
Strength: Several hundred.
Location/Area of Operation: Headquartered in Damascus, bases in
Lebanon, and cells in Europe.
External Aid: Receives logistic and military support from Syria and
its financial support from Iran.
Quaida (al-Quaida, Osama Bin Laden)
Description. An umbrella organization led by Osama bin Laden and
formed out of elements of the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) or Services
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Office. Bin Laden and a member of the Palestinian Moslem Brotherhood
called Abdallah Azzam founded the MAK in Peshawar in the mid-1980s
to provide money and volunteers to the Afghan resistance. The MAK
eventually had recruitment and fund-raising centers in many places,
including the U.S., Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Thousands of
volunteers were recruited, transported, and trained from over 50
countries—many from Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden used his money (up to
several hundred million dollars) to import heavy equipment to cut roads
and tunnels, and create storage depots in Afghanistan. Bin Laden is also
known to have fought bravely against the Soviets in 1986 at the battle of
Jaji and at the battle of Shaban in 1987. Bin Laden split with Azzam in
1988. Bin Laden wanted to attack the “enemies of Islam” all over the
world, and Azzam wanted to provide military support to Muslims
waging military campaigns. Bin Laden formed a new organization in
1989 called al Quaida (the base). Azzam was assassinated in 1989 by a
car bomb, the MAK split, and many of his supporters joined Bin Laden.
Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia after the Soviets withdrew from
Afghanistan in 1989. He was expelled in 1991, and moved al-Quaida’s
operations to the Sudan, where it became steadily more hostile to the
U.S., secular movements in the Middle East, Shi’ites, and Western
culture. As a result of U.S. pressure, the Sudan expelled Bin Laden in
May 1996, following the Sudan’s alleged role in an assassination
attempt on President Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995. Bin Laden has since
been in Afghanistan.
Activities: Highly active in sponsoring or supporting terrorism
throughout the Middle East. Bin Laden declared war on the U.S. in
1996, and praised the bombings in Riyadh and Al Khobar in November
1996. He formed the International Islamic Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders in February 1998, which includes al Quaida, the Egyptian
al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Harakat
ul-Ansar, and two other groups. Probably a key sponsor of the bombings
of the U.S. Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.
Location: Several centers in Afghanistan. Possibly officers and
facilities in the Sudan. Ties to many other Sunni Islamic terrorist
groups like the EIJ, IJ, etc. It supports Muslim fighters and Islamic
terrorists in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia,
Yemen, and Kosovo. It trains volunteers from countries ranging from
the Philippines to Algeria and Eritrea.
External aid: Bin Laden remains wealthy, but there are indications
that al-Quaida is financed by wealthy Islamists in Saudi Arabia, other
Arab states, Europe, and the U.S. It receives some support from the
Sudanese government and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
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Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Description : A radical leftist group established in 1975 and named
for the November 1973 student uprising in Greece protesting the
military regime. The group is anti-Greek establishment, anti-United
States, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO; committed to the ouster of U.S. bases,
removal of Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and severing of
Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union (EU). Organization is
obscure, possibly affiliated with other Greek terrorist groups.
Activities: Initial attacks were assassinations of senior U.S. officials
and Greek public figures. Added bombings in 1980s. Since 1990, has
expanded targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in
Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods.
Strength: Unknown, but presumed to be small.
Location/Area of Operation: Athens, Greece.
External Aid: Unknown.
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) a.k.a.
Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), Dev Sol
Description: Originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol,
it was a splinter faction of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front.
Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it still espouses a Marxist
ideology and is virulently anti-United States and anti-NATO. The group
finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.
Activities: Since the late 1980s, has concentrated attacks against
current and retired Turkish security and military officials. Began a new
campaign against foreign interests in 1990. Protesting the Gulf War, it
assassinated two U.S. military contractors and wounded a U.S. Air
Force officer. Launched rockets at U.S. Consulate in Istanbul in 1992.
Assassinated prominent Turkish businessman in early 1996, which was
its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C.
Strength: Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation: Carries out attacks in Turkey,
primarily in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Conducts fundraising
operations in Western Europe.
External Aid: Unknown.
World Islamic Front for the Jihad Against the Jews and
Crusaders (See al Quaida and International Islamic Jihad
Against the Jews and Crusaders)
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Note: The list of terrorist groups is not exhaustive, and focuses on the
groups that were designated foreign terrorist organizations on October
8. Terrorist groups whose activities were limited in scope in 1997 were
not included.
Source: This list is excerpted from U.S. State Department, Patterns of
Global Terrorism, 1997, Appendix B, Background Information on
Terrorist Groups, and from background material provided by the
Department of Defense.
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CHAPTER 6
PROLIFERATION AND LONG-RANGE
MISSILE STRIKES

Proliferation is a growing problem in the Middle East,
and one that is not likely to diminish in the near future.
Appendix B describes the complex pattern of proliferation in
the region. It also shows that the range of delivery systems
is steadily expanding, that Iran has missiles under
development that could strike targets deep in Europe, and
that Iran and Iraq have at least examined much
longer-range systems in the past.
The nations listed in Appendix B are so different in
terms of regime, goals, and behavior that it is obvious that
there is no regional threat to the West, but rather the
possibility that individual states might pose a threat to
individual Western nations or interests. Three major
proliferators—Iran, Iraq, and Libya—are of special
interest. These are nations that have posed a threat to the
West in the past and which have also sponsored attacks of
state terrorism against Western targets/and or on Western
soil.
Appendix B shows that Iran currently poses the most
significant near-term threat in terms of acquiring biological
and nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that might
strike Europe or the United States. In spite of Iranian
denials, there is little doubt that Iran has an active nuclear
and biological weapons program, and it has already begun
to test long-range missiles. Iran’s capabilities, however, will
remain highly limited for the next decade, and Iran faces a
strong regional threat from Israel. While Iran’s regime may
or may not become truly moderate in character, it has
become progressively more pragmatic since the death of
Khomeini, and it is far from clear that it would take
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“existential” risks of the kind posed by such an attack on the
West.
Libya has the dubious distinction of being the only
Middle Eastern state to have fired a long-range missile on a
Western target—it fired on the Italian island of Lampadusa
following the U.S. raid on Tripoli. At the same time, Libya’s
grandiose military plans have ended in failure. Libya has
some chemical weapons capability, but has failed to develop
ballistic missiles with longer ranges than the Scud. It has
explored biological and nuclear weapons programs, but
there is little evidence of success.
Appendix B describes Iraq’s massive efforts to
proliferate and to acquire long-range missiles and biological
and nuclear weapons. These programs would already pose a
serious potential threat to the West had they not been
halted by the Gulf War and by the efforts of UNSCOM and
the IAEA. The appendix shows that most of Iraq’s past
capabilities have been largely destroyed. As a result, it is
not Iraq’s past capabilities that threaten the West, but
rather the break out capabilities listed in Appendix C.
It currently seems unlikely that even the most radical
Middle Eastern power would readily take the risk of directly
confronting the West, given the relative military weakness
of key potential threats and the risk of massive retaliation.
No Middle Eastern state can disregard the fact that any use
of a biological or nuclear weapon that produced massive
casualties could trigger devastating conventional strategic
strikes or even the use of nuclear weapons by the West.
At the same time, there are dangers in assuming that
Middle Eastern states will always behave as “rational
actors.” The history of the region is filled with
miscalculations, erratic behavior, and risk taking. Behavior
can alter rapidly in a crisis, and the most threatening states
have single rulers or small groups of ruling elites that may
choose to escalate in ways that are far less conservative
than Western planners would escalate under similar
conditions.
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The following scenarios may not represent even
moderate probability cases, but they are plausible enough to
deserve serious consideration:

•

Weapons of mass destruction might be used against
key energy and energy export facilities in
intra-regional conflicts, posing a major economic
threat.

•

Attacks might be carried out on Western power
projection forces in the region, or the threat of such
attacks might be used to try to force a regional power
to expel Western power projection forces or carry out
other acts hostile to Western interests.

•

Threats against the West, demonstrative long-range
missile attacks against targets in the West, or
low-level uses of weapons of mass destruction might
be used to try to force Western nations to support the
policies of a given Middle Eastern state, or intervene
in a regional conflict. The escalation of an
Israeli-Syrian conflict, or future Iranian-Iraqi conflict
might lead to such a threat.

•

A regional power might set up a launch-under-attack
system targeted on the West in an effort to deter
Western intervention or military action. Such a
system might be created to prevent Western
counterproliferation strikes.

•

The threat, demonstrative use, or larger scale use of
such weapons might be undertaken in an effort to
force an end to sanctions.

•

A regime on the edge of collapse might lash out,
feeling it had nothing to lose and accepting the risk of
broader retaliation against the nation. Alternatively,
a nation under nuclear attack by Israel might feel that
attacks were justified against Western targets,
particularly U.S. bases.
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•

Middle Eastern states are not limited to conventional
forms of warfare. While a great deal of attention
focuses on long-range missiles, a Middle Eastern state
might use unconventional delivery means or a
terrorist proxy to deliver such weapons—hoping that
it would not be identified as the source or that enough
ambiguity would exist to prevent a decisive response.

•

Technology or fissile material transfers might
suddenly destabilize the balance. This might include
the transfer of long-range missiles or fissile material,
or key components and technology for missiles and
weapons. This could suddenly alter the regional
balance and the perceived risk in threatening the
West or Western interests.

Once again, the problem is to balance possible risks
against probable risks, and draw suitable consequences for
policy. The actions of most Middle East states and leaders
are normally cautious, and self-preservation is normally the
highest single priority. The developments in Appendix B
also still represent limited war fighting capabilities.
It does seem prudent, however, for the West to continue
to develop much stronger counterproliferation capabilities.
Such counterproliferation capabilities might include a mix
of the following efforts:

•

Efforts to convince nonweapons of mass destruction
states that their security interests are best served
through not acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

•

Expansion of arms control programs such as
strengthening the NNPT, CTB, and BWC. Related
options include establishing a stronger COCOM
successor regime, and improving controls on exports
and technology by strengthening the MTCR, Nuclear
Suppliers Group, and Australia Group. Encourage
regional efforts such as nuclear free zones,
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conventional arms treaties that stabilize arms races,
and confidence- and security-building measures.

•

Clarify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow
deployment of advanced theater ballistic missile
defenses.

•

Defuse potentially dangerous situations by
undertaking actions to reduce the threat from
weapons of mass destruction already in the hands of
selected countries—such as agreements to destroy,
inspect, convert, monitor, or even reverse their
capabilities.

•

Create military capabilities to seize, disable, or
destroy weapons of mass destruction in time of
conflict.

•

Improve detection and characterization of biological
and chemical agents. Accelerate the fielding of
stand-off detection, point detection, and
characterization systems. Address the integration of
sensors into existing and planned carrier platforms,
emphasizing man-portability and compatibility with
UAVs.

•

Seek new sensors, enhanced lethality, and
penetrating weapons to increase the probability of
destroying stockpiles of weapons, delivery systems,
and production methods, while minimizing the risk of
collateral damage.

•

Improve detection, characterization, and defeat of
hard, underground targets.

•

Improve detection, localization, and neutralization of
weapons of mass destruction inside and outside the
nation. Identify and evaluate systems, force
structures, and operational plans to protect key
military facilities and logistic nodes, and to conduct
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joint exercises to improve the capability to respond to
potential biological and chemical threats.

•

Deploy new passive defense capabilities, including
development and production of biological agent
vaccines. Develop and field improved protective suits,
shelters, filter systems, and equipment. Develop
improved decontamination methods and passive
defensive capabilities (protective gear and vaccines)
that will mitigate or neutralize the effects of weapons
of mass destruction and enable forces to fight
effectively even on a contaminated battlefield.

•

Develop the capability to deploy missile defense
capabilities, with primary emphasis on theater
ballistic missile defenses. Such activity involves
improvements in active and passive defenses, attack
operations, and improvements in BM/C4I as well as
the deployment of theater missile defenses. The
primary focus, however, is on anti-ballistic missile
defenses.

•

Declare counterstrike options ranging from
conventional strikes devastating a user nation’s
economy, political structure, and military forces to the
use of nuclear weapons against the population centers
of user nations.

•

Expand forces tailored to dealing with terrorist and
unconventional threats and supporting them with
new intelligence and tracking systems dedicated to
the prevention of mass terrorism, and tailored special
forces to detect and attack terrorist groups and to deal
with unconventional uses of weapons of mass
destruction.

•

Deny access to technology and materials for weapons
of mass destruction through export controls and other
tools. Punish violators with trade sanctions to
publicize and expose companies and countries that
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assist proliferators, and to share intelligence to
heighten awareness of the proliferation problem.
Arms control programs and efforts to block technology
and weapons transfers are the cheapest and potentially the
most effective items on this list. It should be noted in this
regard that the mix of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean
transfers summarized in Appendix B poses a major indirect
transnational threat to the West. Further, there are
numerous cases in which the West has acted as a
transnational threat to itself, carelessly transferring
weapons and technology to the Middle East that may
eventually be used against it.
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APPENDIX B
THE THREAT POSED BY PROLIFERATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Algeria’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•
•
•
•

10 Su-24 long range strike aircraft.
40 MiG-23BN fighter ground attack aircraft.
Tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers.
Possible modification of Soviet SS-N-2B Styx.

Chemical Weapons

•

Possible development. No evidence of deployed systems.

Biological Weapons

•
•

Some early research activity.
No evidence of production capability.

Nuclear Weapons

•

Deliberately sought to create a covert nuclear research program
under military control with Chinese support.

•

Secretly built a research reactor (Es Salam) at the Ain Oussera
nuclear research facility. This was announced to be a 10-15
megawatt reactor using heavy water and low enriched uranium.
The size of its cooling towers, however, indicated it might be as
large as 60 megawatts. It was also located far from population
centers, had no visible electric generating facilities and was
defended by SA-5s. There were also indications Algeria might be
constructing a facility to separate out weapons grade plutonium.

•

Exposure led to Algeria’s agreement to place the facility under
IAEA inspection in May 1991, and adhere to the NPT in May
1993. It formally acceded to the NPT on January 12, 1995.

•

Exposure to public opinion and Western objections and
economic/political crisis may have halted further progress.
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•

Algeria does, however, have uranium deposits west of
Tamanrasset in southeast Algeria, has a 1 megawatt reactor
(Nur) at Draria on the coast east of Algiers, and has hot cells for
the production of radioactive isotopes at Draria.

•

A Spanish paper, El Pais, claimed on August 23, 1998 that
Spain’s military secret service, the CESID, had issued a report
has said that Algeria will be able in two years to produce
military-grade plutonium, a key ingredient for making atomic
weapons. The report is said to have concluded that Algeria had
forged ahead with a nuclear program with Chinese and
Argentine technical support that far exceeded its civilian needs,
despite having signed the international nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The report is said to have been submitted to
the Spanish government in July and to have sounded a warning
of the danger involved if Algeria decided to divert its nuclear
program to military purposes. The report indicated that the
nuclear complex at Birine, 250 km (155 miles) south of Algiers,
already had a heavy-water reactor in operation capable of
producing weapons-grade plutonium. The CESID report stated
that Algeria “has all the installations needed to carry out
activities linked to the complete cycle for the creation of military
plutonium” by the end of the century, the newspaper said.
CESID concluded that if the Algerian government decided to
change its current policy of not acquiring atomic weapons, “the
knowledge gathered by a significant team of technicians and
scientists, in addition to the availability of facilities ... will place
this country in the position of initiating a program of military
purposes.”

Libya’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

Has developed a liquid-fueled missile with a range of 200
kilometers. No evidence of deployment.

•

Al-Fatih solid-fueled missile with 300-450 mile range reported to
have been under development with aid of German technical
experts, but no signs of successful development.

•
•

FROG-7 rocket launchers with 40 kilometer range.

•

Purchased SS-N-2C and SSC-3 cruise missiles. Little
operational capability.

Deployed 80 Scud B launchers with 190 mile range in 1976, but
could not successfully operate system. Many of the launchers
and missiles sold to Iran.
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•
•
•

Pursued other missile development programs with little success.

•

Operational Mirage 5D/DE and 10 Mirage 5DD fighter ground
attack aircraft.

•
•
•
•
•

Mirage F-1AD fighter ground attack aircraft.

Tu-22 bombers with minimal operational capability.
Su-24 long-range strike fighters. These are operational and have
limited refueling capability using C-130s.

MiG-23BM Flogger F and 14 MiG-23U fighter ground attack.
Su-20 and Su-22 Fitter E, J, F fighter ground attack aircraft.
Tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers.
Fired Scud missiles against the Italian island of Lampadusa in
1987.

Chemical Weapons

•

Claims will not sign CWC as long as other states have nuclear
weapons.

•

May have used mustard gas delivered in bombs by AN-26
aircraft in final phases of war against Chad in September 1987.

•

Pilot plant near Tripoli has been producing small amounts of
chemical weapons since early 1980s.

•

Are probably two other small research/batch production
facilities.

•

Main nerve and mustard gas production facilities in an
industrial park at chemical weapons plant at Rabta. This plant
can produce both the poison gas and the bombs, shells, and
warheads to contain it. Are probably two other research
facilities.

•

Rabta Plant seems to have started test runs in mid-1988. It is a
30 building facility defended by SAM batteries and special
troops. Has sheltered underground areas.

•

Libya has acquired large stocks of feedstocks for mustard
gas like thiodiglycol and precursors for nerve gas, and
extensive amounts have been sent to Rabta.

•

At least 100 metric tons of blister and nerve agents have
been produced at Rabta since the late 1980s, but production
rate has been very low and plant is either not successful or is
not being utilized because of fear of attack.
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•

The plant would have a capacity of 100 metric tons per year
if operated at full capacity.

•

Fabricated fire at Rabta in 1990 to try to disguise the
function of plant and fact was operating.

•

German courts have convicted a German national in
October 1996, for selling Libya a computer designed for use
in chemical weapons programs and helping Libya to import
equipment to clean the waste emissions from poison gas
production from India using an Irish dummy corporation.

•

Additional major chemical weapons plant in construction in
extensive underground site near Tarhunah, a mountainous area
65 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, but few recent signs of
activity.

•

Tarhunah has been designed to minimize its vulnerability to air
attack and has twin tunnels 200-450 feet long, protected by 100
feet of sandstone above the tunnels and a lining of reinforced
concrete. This is far beyond the penetration capabilities of the
U.S. GBU-27B and GBU-28 4 bombs. The GBU-28 can penetrate
a maximum of 25-30 meters of earth or 6 meters of concrete.

•

Libya rejected the proposal of President Mubarak that it open
the Tarhuna facility to third country inspection to prove it was
not a chemical weapons facility in April 1996.

•

Reports of construction of another sheltered major facility near
Sabha, 460 miles south of Tripoli.

•

Reports of Chinese, North Korean, German, Swiss, and other
European technical support and advisors.

•

Reports of shipments of chemical weapons to Syria and Iran do
not seem valid.

•

Very low quality weapons designs with poor fusing and lethality.

Biological Weapons

•
•

Some early research activity.
No evidence of production capability.

Nuclear Weapons

•

Has sought to create a development and production capability,
but no evidence of any real progress or success.

•

Unsuccessfully attempted to buy nuclear weapons from China in
the 1970s.
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•

Qaddhafi called for Libyan production of nuclear weapons on
April 29, 1990.

•

Has explored for uranium, but no active mines or uranium
mills.

•

10 megawatt, Soviet-supplied nuclear research reactor at
Tajura acquired from the USSR in 1970s. Operates under IAEA
safeguards.

•

Had plan to build at 440 megawatt, Soviet-supplied reactor
near the Gulf of Sidra in the 1970s, but canceled project.

•

Ratified NPT is 1975. Declares all facilities under IAEA
safeguards.

•

Continues to train nuclear scientists and technicians abroad.

Egypt’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

Cooperation with Iraq in paying for development and
production of “Badar 2000” missile with a 750-1,000 kilometer
range. This missile is reported to be a version of the Argentine
Condor II or Vector missile. Ranges were reported from
820-980 kilometers, with the possible use of an FAE warhead.

•

Egyptian officers were arrested for trying to smuggle
carbon materials for a missile out of the U.S. in June 1988.

•

Covert U.S. efforts seem to have blocked this development
effort.

•

Has Scud B TELs and approximately 100 missiles with 300
kilometers range.

•

Reports that Egypt has developed a plant to produce an
improved version of the Scud B, and possibly Scud C, with
North Korean cooperation.

•

North Korean transfers include equipment for building Scud
body, special gyroscope measuring equipment and pulse-code
modulation equipment for missile assembly and testing.

•

Reports in June 1996 that has made major missile purchase
from North Korea, and will soon be able to assemble such
missiles in Egypt. Seven shipments from North Korea reported
in March and April.

•

Media reports that U.S. satellites detected shipments of Scud C
missile parts to Egypt in February-May, 1996—including

107

rocket motors and guidance devices—do not seem correct. The
Scud C has a range of roughly 480 kilometers.

•

The CIA reported in June 1997, however, that Egypt had
acquired Scud B parts from Russia and North Korea during
1996.

•

U.S. suspects Egypt is developing a liquid-fueled missile called
the Vector with an estimated range of 600-1200 kilometers.

•

Another liquid-fueled missile under development known as
‘Project T’ has an estimated range of 450 kilometers.

•
•

FROG 7 rocket launch units with 40 kilometers range.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

AS-15, SS-N-2, and CSS-N-1 cruise missiles.

Cooperation with Iraq and North Korea in developing the Saqr
80 missile. This rocket is 6.5 meters long and 210 mm in
diameter, and weighs 660 kilograms. It has a maximum range of
50 miles (80 kilometers) and a 440 pound (200 kilogram)
warhead. Longer range versions may be available.

F-4E fighter ground attack aircraft.
Mirage 5E2 fighter ground attack.
Mirage 2000EM fighters.
F-16A and 80 F-16C fighters.
Multiple rocket launcher weapons.
Tube artillery.

Chemical Weapons

•

Produced and used mustard gas in Yemeni civil war in 1960s, but
agents may have been stocks British abandoned in Egypt after
World War II. Effort was tightly controlled by Nasser and was
unknown to many Egyptian military serving in Yemen.

•

Completed research and designs for production of nerve and
cyanide gas before 1973.

•

Former Egyptian Minister of War, General Abdel Ranny
Gamassay stated in 1975 that, “if Israel should decide to use a
nuclear weapon in the battlefield, we shall use the weapons of
mass destruction that are at our disposal.”

•

Seems to have several production facilities for mustard and
nerve gas. May have limited stocks of bombs, rockets, and shells.
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•

Unconfirmed reports of recent efforts to acquire feed stocks for
nerve gas. Some efforts to obtain feed stocks from Canada. May
now be building feed stock plants in Egypt.

•

Industrial infrastructure present for rapid production of cyanide
gas.

Biological Weapons

•
•

Research and technical base.
No evidence of major organized research activity.

Nuclear Weapons

•

Low level research effort. No evidence of more than basic
research since the 1960s.

Israel’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

New IRBM/ICBM range high payload booster developed with
South Africa.

•

A major missile test took place on September 14, 1989. It was
either a missile test or failure of Ofeq-2 satellite.

•

Israel has done technical work on a TERCOM type smart
warhead. It has examined cruise missile guidance developments
using GPS navigation systems.

•

Up to 50 “Jericho I” missiles deployed in shelters on mobile
launchers with up to 400 miles range with a 2,200 pound
payload, and with possible nuclear warhead storage nearby.

•

Jericho II missiles now deployed, and some were brought to
readiness for firing during the Gulf War.

•

These missiles seem to include a single stage follow-on to the
Jericho I and a multistage longer range missile.

•

•

The missile seems to have a range of up to 900 miles with a
2,200 pound payload, and may be a cooperative
development with South Africa. (Extensive reporting of
such cooperation in press during October 25 and 26, 1989).

•

Commercial satellite imaging indicates the missile may be
14 meters long and 1.5 meters wide. Its deployment
configuration hints that it may have radar area guidance
similar to the terminal guidance in the Pershing II.

Jericho II missile production facility at Be’er Yakov.
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•

Unverified claims that up to 100 missiles are deployed west of
Jerusalem.

•

A missile base exists at Zachariah, several miles southeast of Tel
Aviv.

•

Limestone region with caves, to shelter missiles,
Transport-Erector-Launchers (TELs), and vehicles.

•

TELs have been seen at this base on vehicles 16 meters long, 4
meters wide, and 3 meters high. May be road mobile for
dispersal.

•
•
•

They carry missiles 14 meters long and 1.5 meters wide.

•

The base is not hardened against nuclear attack, and would be
vulnerable to chemical and biological attack.

•

Israel’s current review of its military doctrine seems to include a
review of its missile basing options, and the study of possible
hardening and dispersal systems. There are also reports that
Israel will solve its survivability problems by deploying some
form of nuclear-armed missile on its new submarines.

•

F-15, F-16, F-4E, and Phantom 2000 fighter-bombers capable of
long range refueling and of carrying nuclear and chemical
bombs.

•

Tel Nof may be the air base used to arm aircraft with nuclear
weapons. Storage facilities may exist at Zachariah

•

Lance missile launchers and 160 Lance missiles with 130
kilometers range.

•

Variant of the Popeye air-to-surface missile believed to have
nuclear warhead.

•

MAR-290 rocket with 30 kilometers range believed to be
deployed

•

MAR-350 surface-to-surface missile with range of 56 miles and
735 lb. payload believed to have completed development or to be
in early deployment.

There seem to be 50 missiles deployed at the base.
Each TEL has three support vehicles. One is a guidance
programmer and power vehicle. Another seems to be a firing
control vehicle, and the third seems to be a communications
vehicle.
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•

Israel is seeking super computers for Technion Institute
(designing ballistic missile RVs), Hebrew University (may be
engaged in hydrogen bomb research), and Israeli Military
Industries (maker of “Jericho II” and Shavit booster).

Chemical Weapons

•

Reports of mustard and nerve gas production facility established
in 1982 in the restricted area in the Sinai near Dimona seem
incorrect. May have additional facilities. May have capacity to
produce other gases. Probable stocks of bombs, rockets, and
artillery.

•
•

Extensive laboratory research into gas warfare and defense.

•
•

Extensive field exercises in chemical defense.

•

Warhead delivery capability for bombs, rockets, and missiles,
but none now believed to be equipped with chemical agents.

Development of defensive systems includes Shalon Chemical
Industries protection gear, Elbit Computer gas detectors, and
Bezal R&D air crew protection system.

Gas masks stockpiled, and distributed to population with other
civil defense instructions during Gulf War.

Biological Weapons

•
•

Extensive research into weapons and defense.
Ready to quickly produce biological weapons, but no reports of
active production effort.

Nuclear Weapons

•

Director of CIA indicated in May 1989, that Israel may be
seeking to construct a thermonuclear weapon.

•

Has two significant reactor projects: the 5 megawatt HEU
light-water IRR I reactor at Nahal Soreq; and the 40-150
megawatt heavy water, IRR-2 natural uranium reactor used for
the production of fissile material at Dimona. Only the IRR-1 is
under IAEA safeguards.

•

Dimona has conducted experiments in pilot scale laser and
centrifuge enrichment, purifies UO 2 , converts UF 6 , and
fabricates fuel for weapons purposes.

•

Uranium phosphate mining in Negev, near Beersheba, and
yellow cake is produced at two plants in the Haifa area and one in
southern Israel.
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•
•

•

Pilot-scale heavy water plant operating at Rehovot.
Estimates of numbers and types of weapons differ sharply.

•
•

Stockpile of at least 60-80 plutonium weapons.

•

U.S. experts believe Israel has highly advanced implosion
weapons. Known to have produced Lithium-6, allowing
production of both tritium and lithium deuteride at Dimona.
Facility no longer believed to be operating.

•
•

Some weapons may be ER variants or have variable yields.

May have well over 100 nuclear weapons assemblies, with
some weapons with yields over 100 kilotons.

Stockpile of up to 200-300 weapons is possible.

Major weapons facilities include production of weapons grade
plutonium at Dimona, nuclear weapons design facility at Nahal
Soreq (south of Tel Aviv), missile test facility at Palmikim,
nuclear armed missile storage facility at Kefar Zekharya,
nuclear weapons assembly facility at Yodefat, and tactical
nuclear weapons storage facility at Eilabun in eastern Galilee.

Missile Defenses

•

Patriot missiles with future PAC-3 upgrade to reflect lessons of
the Gulf War.

•

Arrow 2 two-stage ATBM with slant intercept ranges at
altitudes of 8-10 and 50 kilometers and speeds of up to Mach 9,
plus possible development of the Rafale AB-10 close in defense
missile with ranges of 10-20 kilometers and speeds of up to Mach
4.5. Taas rocket motor, Rafael warhead, and Tadiran BM/C4I
system and “Music” phased array radar.

•

Israel plans to deploy three batteries of the Arrow to cover Israel,
each with four launchers, to protect up to 85 percent of its
population. It seeks to deploy the system early in the 2000s.

•

The program has progressed with considerable success since
phase two tests, with successful flights on August 20, 1996 and
March 11, 1997. Development costs are estimated at $330
million with Israel paying 28 percent and the U.S. paying 72
percent. Deployment will be jointly funded under a 1996 accord,
as a part of a $556 million six-year program. Israel will pay 64
percent and the U.S. 36 percent. The total program cost is
estimated at $1.6 billion.
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•

The Arrow will be deployed in batteries as a wide area defense
system with intercepts normally at reentry or atmospheric
altitudes. Capable of multi-target tracking and multiple
intercepts.

•

Israel is also examining the possibility of boost-phase defenses.

Advanced Intelligence Systems

•

The Shavit I launched Israel’s satellite payload on September 19,
1989. It used a three stage booster system capable of launching a
4,000 pound payload over 1,200 miles or a 2,000 pound payload
over 1,800 miles. It is doubtful that it had a payload capable of
intelligence missions and seems to have been launched, in part,
to offset the psychological impact of Iraq’s missile launches.

•

Ofeq 2 launched in April 1990—one day after Saddam Hussein
threatens to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if it should
attack Baghdad.

•

Launched first intelligence satellite on April 5, 1995, covering
Syria, Iran, and Iraq in orbit every 90 minutes. The Ofeq 3
satellite is a 495 pound system launched using the Shavit launch
rocket, and is believed to carry an imagery system. Its orbit
passes over or near Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad.

Syria’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

Four SSM brigades: 1 with FROG, 1 with Scud Bs, 1 with Scud
Cs, and 1 with SS-21s.

•

New long range North Korean Scud Cs deployed.

•

Two brigades of 18 launchers each are said to be deployed in
a horseshoe shaped valley. This estimate of 36 launchers is
based on the fact there are 36 tunnels into the hillside. The
launchers must be for the Scud C since the older Scud Bs
would not be within range of most of Israel. Up to 50
missiles are stored in bunkers to the north as possible
reloads. There is a maintenance building and barracks.

•

Estimates indicate that Syria has 24-36 Scud launchers for
a total of 120 missiles of all types. The normal ratio of
launchers to missiles is 10:1, but Syria is focusing on both
survivability and the capability to launch a large
preemptive strike.

•

The Scud Cs have ranges of up to 550-600 kilometers.
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•

Possible nerve gas warheads with cluster bomblets reported
in September 1997

•
•

CEP of 1,000-2,600 meters.
A training site exists about 6 kilometers south of Hama,
with an underground facility where TELs and missiles are
stored.

•

Up to 12 additional Scud B launchers and 200 Scud B missiles
with 310 kilometers range. Believed to have chemical warheads.
Scud B warhead weighs 985 kilograms.

•

18 SS-21 launchers and at least 36 SS-21 missiles with 80-100
kilometers range. May be developing chemical warheads.

•

Reports of Chinese deliveries of missiles do not seem correct:

•

Reports of PRC deliveries of missile components by China
Precision Machinery Company, maker of the M-11, in July
1996. The M-11 has a 186 mile range with a warhead of
1,100 pounds.

•

Some sources believe M-9 missile components, or M-9-like
components delivered to Syria. Missile is reported to have a
CEP as low as 300 meters.

•

Sheltered or underground missile production/assembly facilities
at Aleppo and Hamas have been built with aid from Chinese,
Iranian, and North Korean technicians. Possibly some Russian
technical aid.

•

A missile test site exists 15 kilometers south of Homs where
Syria has tested missile modifications and new chemical
warheads. It has heavy perimeter defenses, a storage area and
bunkers, heavily sheltered bunkers, and a missile storage area
just west of the site.

•
•

Syria has shorter range systems:

•

SS-N-3 and SSC-1b cruise missiles.

Short range M-1B missiles (up to 60 miles range) seem to be
in delivery from PRC.

•

May be converting some long-range surface-to-air and naval
cruise missiles to use chemical warheads.

•
•

20 Su-24 long-range strike fighters.
30-60 operational MiG-23BM Flogger F fighter ground attack
aircraft.
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•
•
•
•
•

20 Su-20 fighter ground attack aircraft.
60-70 Su-22 fighter ground attack aircraft.
18 FROG-7 launchers and rockets.
Negotiations for PRC-made M-9 missile (185-375 mile range).
Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.

Chemical Weapons

•

First acquired small amounts of chemical weapons from Egypt in
1973.

•

Began production of non-persistent nerve gas in 1984. May have
had chemical warheads for missiles as early as 1985.

•

Experts believe has stockpiled 500 to 1,000 metric tons of
chemical agents.

•

Believed to have begun deploying VX in late 1996, early 1997.

•
•

•

CIA reported in June 1997 that Syria had acquired new
chemical weapons technology from Russia and Eastern
Europe in 1996.

•

Unconfirmed reports of sheltered Scud missiles with
unitary Sarin or Tabun nerve gas warheads deployed in
caves and shelters near Damascus.

•

Tested Scuds in manner indicating possible chemical
warheads in 1996.

•
•

Seems to have cluster warheads and bombs.
May have VX and Sarin in modified Soviet ZAB-incendiary
bombs and PTAB-500 cluster bombs.

Acquired design for Soviet Scud warhead using VX in 1970s.
Major nerve gas, and possible other chemical agent production
facilities north of Damascus. Two to three plants.

•

One facility is located near Homs and is located next to a
major petrochemical plant. It reportedly produces several
hundred tons of nerve gas a year.

•
•

Reports is building new major plant near Aleppo.
Reports that a facility co-located with the Center d’Etdues
et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS) is developing a
warhead with chemical bomblets for the Scud C.
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•

Many parts of the program are dispersed and compartmented.
Missiles, rockets, bombs, and artillery shells are
produced/modified and loaded in other facilities.

•

Wide range of delivery systems:

•

Extensive testing of chemical warheads for Scud Bs. May
have tested chemical warheads for Scud Cs.

•

Shells, bombs, and nerve gas warheads for multiple rocket
launchers.

•
•

FROG warheads may be under development.

•

Israeli sources believe Syria has binary weapons and cluster
bomb technology suitable for delivering chemical weapons.

Reports of SS-21 capability to deliver chemical weapons are
not believed by U.S. or Israeli experts.

Biological Weapons

•

Signed, but not ratified the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention. Extensive research effort.

•

ACDA report in August 1996 indicated that, “it is highly
probable that Syria is developing an offensive biological
capability.”

•

Extensive research effort. Reports of one underground facility
and one near the coast.

•

Probable production capability for anthrax and botulism, and
possibly other agents.

•

Israeli sources claim Syria weaponized Botulin and Ricin toxin
in early 1990s, and probably anthrax.

•

Limited indications may be developing or testing biological
variations on ZAB-incendiary bombs and PTAB-500 cluster
bombs and Scud warheads.

Nuclear Weapons

•
•
•

Ongoing research effort.
No evidence of major progress in development effort.
Announced nuclear reactor purchase plans including 10
megawatt research reactor and six power reactors in 1980s, but
never implemented.
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•

Has miniature 30 kilowatt neutron-source reactor, but
unsuitable for weapons production.

Missile Defenses

•

Seeking Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system with
limited anti-tactical ballistic missile capability.

Iran’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

The Soviet-designed Scud B (17E) guided missile currently forms
the core of Iran’s ballistic missile forces—largely as a result of
the Iran-Iraq War.

•

Iran only acquired its Scuds in response to Iraq’s invasion.
It obtained a limited number from Libya and then obtained
larger numbers from North Korea. It deployed these units
with a special Khatam ol-Anbya force attached to the air
element of the Pasdaran. Iran fired its first Scuds in March
1985. It fired as many as 14 Scuds in 1985, 8 in 1986, 18 in
1987, and 77 in 1988. Iran fired 77 Scud missiles during a 52
day period in 1988, during what came to be known as the
“war of the cites.” Sixty-one were fired at Baghdad, nine at
Mosul, five at Kirkuk, one at Takrit, and one at Kuwait.
Iran fired as many as five missiles on a single day, and once
fired three missiles within 30 minutes. This still, however,
worked out to an average of only about one missile a day,
and Iran was down to only 10-20 Scuds when the war of the
cities ended.

•

Iran’s missile attacks were initially more effective than
Iraq’s attacks. This was largely a matter of geography.
Many of Iraq’s major cities were comparatively close to its
border with Iran, but Tehran and most of Iran’s major cities
that had not already been targets in the war were outside
the range of Iraqi Scud attacks. Iran’s missiles, in contrast,
could hit key Iraqi cities like Baghdad. This advantage
ended when Iraq deployed extended range Scuds.

•

The Scud B is a relatively old Soviet design which first
became operational in 1967, designated as the R-17E or
R-300E. The Scud B has a range of 290-300 kilometers with
its normal conventional payload. The export version of the
missile is about 11 meters long, 85-90 centimeters in
diameter, and weighs 6,300 kilograms. It has a nominal
CEP of 1,000 meters. The Russian versions can be equipped
with conventional high explosive, fuel air explosive, runway
penetrator, submunition, chemical, and nuclear warheads.
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•

•

The export version of the Scud B comes with a conventional
high explosive warhead weighing about 1,000 kilograms, of
which 800 kilograms are the high explosive payload and 200
are the warhead structure and fusing system. It has a single
stage storable liquid rocket engine and is usually deployed
on the MAZ-543 eight wheel transporter-erector-launcher
(TEL). It has a strap-down inertial guidance, using three
gyros to correct its ballistic trajectory, and uses internal
graphite jet vane steering. The warhead hits at a velocity
above Mach 1.5.

•

Most estimates indicate that Iran now has 6-12 Scud
launchers and up to 200 Scud B (R-17E) missiles with
230-310 KM range.

•

Some estimates give higher figures. They estimate Iran
bought 200-300 Scud Bs from North Korea between 1987
and 1992, and may have continued to buy such missiles
after that time. Israeli experts estimate that Iran had at
least 250-300 Scud B missiles, and at least 8-15 launchers
on hand in 1997.

•

U.S. experts also believe that Iran can now manufacture
virtually all of the Scud B, with the possible exception of the
most sophisticated components of its guidance system and
rocket motors. This makes it difficult to estimate how many
missiles Iran has in inventory and can acquire over time, as
well as to estimate the precise performance characteristics
of Iran’s missiles, since it can alter the weight of the
warhead and adjust the burn time and improve the
efficiency of the rocket motors.

Iran has new long-range North Korean Scuds—with ranges near
500 kilometers.

•

The North Korean missile system is often referred to as a
“Scud C.” Typically, Iran formally denied the fact it had
such systems long after the transfer of these missiles
became a reality. Hassan Taherian, an Iranian foreign
ministry official, stated in February 1995, “There is no
missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea
whatsoever. We deny this.”

•

In fact, a senior North Korean delegation traveled to Tehran
to close the deal on November 29, 1990, and met with
Mohsen Rezaei, the former commander of the IRGC. Iran
either bought the missile then, or placed its order shortly
thereafter. North Korea then exported the missile through
its Lyongaksan Import Corporation. Iran imported some of
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these North Korean missile assemblies using its B-747s,
and seems to have used ships to import others.

•

Iran probably had more than 60 of the longer range North
Korean missiles by 1998, although other sources report 100,
and one source reports 170.

•

Iran may have 5-10 Scud C launchers, each with several
missiles. This total seems likely to include four new North
Korean TELs received in 1995.

•

Iran seems to want enough missiles and launchers to make
its missile force highly dispersible.

•

Iran may have begun to test its new North Korean missiles.
There are reports it has fired them from mobile launchers at
a test site near Qom about 310 miles (500 kilometers) to a
target area south of Shahroud. There are also reports that
units equipped with such missiles have been deployed as
part of Iranian exercises like the Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt 3)
exercise in late October 1993.

•

The missile is more advanced than the Scud B, although
many aspects of its performance are unclear. North Korea
seems to have completed development of the missile in
1987, after obtaining technical support from the People’s
Republic of China. While it is often called a “Scud C,” it
seems to differ substantially in detail from the original
Soviet Scud B. It seems to be based more on the
Chinese-made DF-61 than on a direct copy of the Soviet
weapon.

•

Experts estimate that the North Korean missiles have a
range of around 310 miles (500 kilometers), a warhead with
a high explosive payload of 700 kilograms, and relatively
good accuracy and reliability. While this payload is a bit
limited for the effective delivery of chemical agents, Iran
might modify the warhead to increase payload at the
expense of range and restrict the using of chemical
munitions to the most lethal agents such as persistent
nerve gas. It might also concentrate its development efforts
on arming its Scud C forces with more lethal biological
agents. In any case, such missiles are likely to have enough
range-payload to give Iran the ability to strike all targets on
the southern coast of the Gulf and all of the populated areas
in Iraq, although not the West. Iran could also reach targets
in part of eastern Syria, the eastern third of Turkey, and
cover targets in the border area of the former Soviet Union,
western Afghanistan, and western Pakistan.
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•

Accuracy and reliability remain major uncertainties, as
does operational CEP. Much would also depend on the
precise level of technology Iran deployed in the warhead.
Neither Russia nor the People’s Republic of China seem to
have transferred the warhead technology for biological and
chemical weapons to Iran or Iraq when they sold them the
Scud B missile and CSS-8. However, North Korea may have
sold Iran such technology as part of the Scud C sale. If it did
so, such a technology transfer would save Iran years of
development and testing in obtaining highly lethal
biological and chemical warheads. In fact, Iran would
probably be able to deploy far more effective biological and
chemical warheads than Iraq had at the time of the Gulf
War.

•

Iran may be working with Syria in such development
efforts, although Middle Eastern nations rarely cooperate
in such sensitive areas. Iran served as a transshipment
point for North Korean missile deliveries during 1992 and
1993. Some of this transshipment took place using the same
Iranian B-747s that brought missile parts to Iran. Others
moved by sea. For example, a North Korean vessel called the
Des Hung Ho, bringing missile parts for Syria, docked at
Bandar Abbas in May 1992. Iran then flew these parts to
Syria. An Iranian ship coming from North Korea and a
second North Korean ship followed, carrying missiles and
machine tools for both Syria and Iran. At least 20 of the
North Korean missiles have gone to Syria from Iran, and
production equipment seems to have been transferred to
Iran and to Syrian plants near Hama and Aleppo.

•

Iran has created shelters and tunnels in its coastal areas which it
could use to store Scud and other missiles in hardened sites and
reduce their vulnerability to air attack.

•

Iran can now assemble Scud and Scud C missiles using
foreign-made components.

•

Iran is developing an indigenous missile production capability
with both solid and liquid fueled missiles. Seems to be seeking
capability to produce MRBMs.

•

The present scale of Iran’s production and assembly efforts
is unclear. Iran seems to have a design center, at least two
rocket and missile assembly plants, a missile test range and
monitoring complex, and a wide range of smaller design and
refit facilities.
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•

The design center is said to located at the Defense
Technology and Science Research Center, which is a branch
of Iran’s Defense Industry Organization, and located
outside Karaj—near Tehran. This center directs a number
of other research efforts. Some experts believe it has
.
support from Russian and Chinese scientists

•

Iran’s largest missile assembly and production plant is said
to be a North Korean-built facility near Isfahan, although
this plant may use Chinese equipment and technology.
There are no confirmations of these reports, but this region
is the center of much of Iran’s advanced defense industry,
including plants for munitions, tank overhaul, and
helicopter and fixed wing aircraft maintenance. Some
reports say the local industrial complex can produce liquid
fuels and missile parts from a local steel mill.

•

A second missile plant is said to be located 175 kilometers
east of Tehran, near Semnan. Some sources indicate this
plant is Chinese-built and began rocket production as early
as 1987. It is supposed to be able to build 600-1,000 Oghab
rockets per year, if Iran can import key ingredients for solid
fuel motors like ammonium perchlorate. The plant is also
supposed to produce the Iran-130.

•

Another facility may exist near Bandar Abbas for the
assembly of the Seersucker. China is said to have built this
facility in 1987, and is believed to be helping the naval
branch of the Guards to modify the Seersucker to extend its
range to 400 kilometers. It is possible that China is also
helping Iran develop solid fuel rocket motors and produce or
assemble missiles like the CS-801 and CS-802. There have,
however, been reports that Iran is developing extended
range Scuds with the support of Russian experts, and of a
missile called the Tondar 68, with a range of 700 kilometers.

•

Still other reports claim that Iran has split its
manufacturing facilities into plants near Pairzan, Seman,
Shiraz, Maghdad, and Islaker. These reports indicate that
the companies involved in building the Scuds are also
involved in Iran’s production of poison gas and include
Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and
Shahid Hemat Industrial Group.

•

Iran’s main missile test range is said to be further east, near
Shahroud, along the Tehran-Mashhad railway. A telemetry
station is supposed to be 350 kilometers to the south at
Taba, along the Mashhad-Isfahan road. All of these
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facilities are reportedly under the control of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps.

•

There were many reports during the late 1980s and early
1990s that Iran had ordered the North Korean No Dong
missile, which was planned to have the capability to carry
nuclear and biological missile ranges of up to 900
kilometers. This range would allow the missile could reach
virtually any target in Gulf, Turkey, and Israel. The status
of the No Dong program has since become increasingly
uncertain, although North Korea deployed some
developmental types at test facilities in 1997.

•

The No-Dong underwent flight tests at ranges of 310 miles
(500 kilometers) on May 29, 1993. Some sources indicate that
Iranians were present at these tests. Extensive further
propulsion tests began in August 1994, and some reports
indicate operational training began for test crews in May
1995. Missile storage facilities began to be built in July 1995,
and four launch sites were completed in October 1995.

•

The progress of the program has been slow since that time,
and may reflect development problems. However, mobile
launchers were seen deployed in northeast North Korea on
March 24, 1997. According to some reports, a further seven
launcher units were seen at a facility about 100 kilometers
from Pyongyang.

•

The No-Dong 1 is a single-stage liquid-fueled missile, with a
range of up to 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers (810 miles),
although longer ranges may be possible with a reduced
warhead and maximum burn. There are also indications
that there may be a No-Dong 2, using the same rocket
motor, but with an improved fuel supply system that allows
the fuel to burn for a longer period.

•

The missile is about 15.2 meters long—four meters longer
than the Scud B—and 1.2 meters in diameter. The warhead
is estimated to weigh 770 kilograms (1,200-1,750 pounds)
and a warhead manufacturing facility exists near
Pyongyang. The No-Dong has an estimated theoretical CEP
of 700 meters at maximum range, versus 900 meters for the
Scud B, although its practical accuracy could be as wide as
3,000-4,000 meters. It has an estimated terminal velocity of
Mach 3.5, versus 2.5 for the Scud B, which presents added
problems for tactical missile defense. The missile is be
transportable on a modified copy of the MAZ-543P TEL that
has been lengthened with a fifth axle and which is roughly
40 meters long. The added support stand for the vertical
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launch modes brings the overall length to 60 meters, and
some experts questioned whether a unit this big is practical.

•

•

Other reports during the later 1980s and early 1990s indicated
that Iran was also interested in two developmental North
Korean IRBMs called the Tapeo Dong 1 and Tapeo Dong 2.

•

The Tapeo Dong 1 missile has an estimated maximum
range of 2,000 kilometers, and the Tapeo Dong 2 may have a
range up to 3,500 kilometers.

•

Both Tapeo Dongs are liquid fueled missiles which seem to
have two stages.

•

Unlike the No-Dong, the Tapeo Dongs must be carried to a
site in stages and then assembled at a fixed site. The
No-Dong transporter may be able to carry both stages of the
Tapeo Dong 1, but some experts believe that a special
transporter is needed for the first stage of the Tapeo Dong 1,
and for both stages of the Tapeo Dong 2.

Since the early 1990s, the focus of reports on Iran’s missile efforts
have shifted, and it has become clear that Iran is developing its
own longer-range variants of the No-Dong for indigenous
production with substantial Russian and some Chinese aid:

•

As early as 1992, one such missile was reported to have a
range of 800-930 miles and a 1,650 pound warhead. Reports
differ sharply on its size. Jane’s estimates a launch weight
up to 16,000 kilograms, provided the system is derived from
the No Dong. It could have a launch weight of 15,000
kilograms, a payload of 600 kilograms, and a range of
1,700-1,800 kilometers if it is based on a system similar to
the Chinese CSS-5 (DF-21) and CSS-N3 (JL-1). These
systems entered service in 1983 and 1987.

•

A longer-range missile was said to have improved guidance
components, a range of up to 1,240 miles and a warhead of
up to 2,200 pounds.

•
•

IOC dates were then estimated to be 1999-2001.
Russia agreed in 1994 that it would adhere to the terms of
the Missile Technology Control Regime and would place
suitable limits on the sale or transfer of rocket engines and
technology. Nevertheless, the CIA has identified Russia as
a leading source of Iranian missile technology, and the
State Department has indicated that President Clinton
expressed U.S. concerns over this cooperation to President
Yeltsin. This transfer is one reason the President appointed
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former Ambassador Frank Wisner, and then Robert
Galluci, as his special representatives to try to persuade
Russia to put a firm halt to aid support of the Iran.

•

•

These programs are reported to have continuing support
from North Korea, and from Russian and Chinese firms and
technicians. One such Chinese firm is Great Wall
Industries. The Russian firms include the Russian Central
Aerohydrodynamic Institute, which has provided Iran’s
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) with wind
tunnels for missile design, equipment for manufacturing
missile models, and the software for testing launch and
reentry performance. They may also include
Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian arms-export agency;
NPO Trud, a rocket motor manufacturer; a leading research
center called the Bauman Institute, and Polyus (Northstar),
a major laser test and manufacturing equipment firm.

•

The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran obtained major
new transfers of new long-range missile technology from
Russian and Chinese firms during 1996. Since that time,
there have been many additional reports of technology
transfer from Russia.

•

The reports on Chinese technology transfers involve the
least detail:

•

There have been past reports that Iran placed orders for
PRC-made M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) missile (280-620 kilometers
range, launch weight of 6,000 kilograms).

•

It is more likely, however, that PRC firms are giving
assistance in developing indigenous missile Rpercent D and
production facilities for the production of an Iranian solid
fueled missile.

•

The U.S. offered to provide China with added missile
technology if it would agree to fully implement an end of
technology transfer to Iran and Pakistan during meetings
in Beijing on March 25-26, 1998.

Recent reports and tests have provided more detail on these
systems:

•

Some U.S. experts believe that Iran tested booster engines
in 1997 capable of driving a missile ranges of 1,500
kilometers. Virtually all U.S. experts believe that Iran is
rapidly approaching the point where it will be able to
manufacture missiles with much longer ranges than the
Scud B. It is less clear when Iran will be able to bring such
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programs to the final development stage, carry out suitable
test firings, develop effective warheads, and deploy actual
units. Much still depends on the level of foreign assistance.

•

•

Eitan Ben Eliyahu—the commander of the Israeli Air
Force—reported on April 14, 1997 that Iran had tested a
missile capable of reaching Israel. The background
briefings to his statement implied that Russia was assisting
Iran in developing two missiles—with ranges of 620 and 780
miles. Follow-on intelligence briefings that Israel provided
in September 1997, indicated that Russia was helping Iran
develop four missiles. U.S. intelligence reports indicate that
China has also been helping Iran with some aspects of these
missile efforts.

•

These missiles included the Shihab (“meteor”) missiles,
with performance similar to those previously identified
with Iranian missiles adapted from North Korean designs.

•

The Israeli reports indicated that the Shihab 3 was a liquid
fueled missile with a range of 810 miles (1,200-1,500
kilometers) and a payload of 1550 pounds (700 kilometers).

•

Israel has also reported that Iran is developing the Shihab
4, with a range of 1,250 miles (some reports say up to 4,000
kilometers) and a payload in excess of one ton. It indicates
that this system could be operational in 2-5 years. U.S.
Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs testified on July
28, 1998, that the U.S. estimated that the system still
needed added foreign assistance to improve its motors and
guidance system.

•

Israeli reports indicated that Iran might have two other
missile programs including longer-range systems with a
maximum range of up to 4,500-55,000 and 10,000
kilometers.

Iran tested the Shihab 3 on July 21, 1998, claiming that it was a
defensive action to deal with potential threats from Israel.

•

The missile flew for a distance of up to 620 miles, before its
exploded about 100 seconds after launch. U.S. intelligence
sources could not confirm whether the explosion was
deliberate, but indicated that the final system might have a
range of 800-940 miles (a maximum of 1,240 kilometers),
depending on its payload. The test confirmed the fact the
missile was a liquid fueled system.

•

Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, head of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps’ air wing, publicly reported on
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August 2, 1998 that the Shahab-3 is a 53-foot-long ballistic
missile that can travel at 4,300 mph and carry a one-ton
warhead at an altitude of nearly 820,000 feet. He claimed
that the weapon was guided by an Iranian-made system
that gives it great accuracy: “The final test of every weapon
is in a real war situation but, given its warhead and size, the
Shahab-3 is a very accurate weapon.”

•

•

Other Iranian sources reported that the missile had a range
of 800 miles. President Mohammad Khatami on August 1,
1998 said that Iran was determined to continue to
strengthen its armed forces, regardless of international
concerns: “Iran will not seek permission from anyone for
strengthening its defense capability.”

•

Martin Indyck, the U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near East
Affairs testified on July 28, that the U.S. estimated that the
system needed further refinement but might be deployed in
its initial operational form between September 1998 and
March 1999.

•

There have been other reports that Iran might be using
Russian technology to develop very long-range missiles
with ranges of 3,500 to 6,250 kilometers.

•

It seems clear that Iran has obtained some of the technology
and design details of the Russian SS-4. The SS-4 (also
known as the R-12 or “Sandal”) is an aging Russian liquid
fuel design that first went into service in 1959, and which
was supposedly destroyed as part of the IRBM Treaty. It is a
very large missile, with technology dating back to the early
1950s, although it was evidently updated at least twice
during the period between 1959 and 1980. It has a CEP of
2-4 kilometers and a maximum range 2,000 kilometers,
which means it can only be lethal with a nuclear warhead or
a biological weapon with near-nuclear lethality.

•

At the same time, the SS-4’s overall technology is relatively
simple and it has a throwweight of nearly 1,400 kilograms
(3,000 pounds). It is one of the few missile designs that a
nation with a limited technology base could hope to
manufacture or adapt, and its throwweight and range
would allow Iran to use a relatively unsophisticated nuclear
device or biological warhead. As a result, an updated
version of the SS-4 might be a suitable design for a
developing country.

Russia has been a key supplier of missile technology.
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•

Some sources have indicated that Russian military
industries have signed contracts with Iran to help produce
liquid fueled missiles and provide specialized wind tunnels,
manufacture model missiles, and develop specialized
computer software. For example, these reports indicate
that the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute is
cooperating with Iran’s Defense Industries Organization
(DIO) and the DIO’s Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
(SHIG). The Russian State Corporation for Export and
Import or Armament and Military Equipment
(Rosvoorouzhenie) and Infor are also reported to be involved
in deals with the SHIG. These deals are also said to include
specialized laser equipment, mirrors, tungsten-coast
graphite material, and maraging steel for missile
development and production. They could play a major role
in helping Iran develop long range versions of the Scud B
and C, and more accurate variations of a missile similar to
the No-Dong.

•

The Israeli press reported in August 1997 that Israel had
evidence that Iran was receiving Russian support. In
September 1997, Israel urged the U.S. to step up its
pressure on Iran, and leaked reports indicating that private
and state-owned Russian firms had provided gyroscopes,
electronic components, wind tunnels, guidance and
propulsion systems, and the components needed to build
such systems to Iran.

•

President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry
initially categorically denied that such charges were true.
Following a meeting with Vice President Gore, President
Yeltsin stated on September 26, 1997 that, “We are being
accused of supplying Iran with nuclear or ballistic missile
technologies. There is nothing further from the truth. I
again and again categorically deny such rumors.”

•

Russia agreed, however, that Ambassador Wisner and Yuri
Koptyev, the head of the Russian space program, should
jointly examine the U.S. intelligence and draft a report on
Russian transfers to Iran. This report reached a very
different conclusion from President Yeltsin and concluded
that Russia had provided such aid to Iran. Further, on
October 1, 1997—roughly a week after Yeltsin issued his
denial—the Russian security service issued a statement
that it had “thwarted” an Iranian attempt to have parts for
liquid fuel rocket motors manufactured in Russia, disguised
as gas compressors and pumps.
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•

Russian firms said to be helping Iran included the Russian
Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute which developed a
special wind tunnel; Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian
arms-export agency; Kutznetzov (formerly NPO Trud) a
rocket motor manufacturer in Samara; a leading research
center called the Bauman National Technical University in
Moscow, involved in developing rocket propulsion systems;
the Tsagi Research Institute for rocket propulsion
development; and the Polyus (Northstar) Research
Institute in Moscow, a major laser test and manufacturing
equipment firm. Iranians were also found to be studying
rocket engineering at the Baltic State University in St.
Petersburg and the Bauman State University.

•

Russia was also found to have sold Iran high strength steel
and special foil for its long-range missile program. The
Russian Scientific and Production Center Inor concluded an
agreement as late as September 1997 to sell Iran a factory to
produce four special metal alloys used in long-range
missiles. Inor’s director, L. P Chromova, worked out a deal
with A. Asgharzadeh, the director of an Iranian factory, to
sell 620 kilograms of special alloy called 21HKMT, and
provide Iran with the capability to thermally treat the alloy
for missile bodies. Iran had previously bought 240
kilograms of the alloy. Inor was also selling alloy foils called
49K2F, CUBE2, and 50N in sheets 0.2-0.4 millimeters thick
for the outer body of missiles. The alloy 21HKMT was
particularly interesting because North Korea also uses it in
missile designs. Inor had previously brokered deals with the
Shahid Hemat Industrial Group in Iran to supply maraging
steel for missile cases, composite graphite-tungsten
material, laser equipment, and special mirrors used in
missile tests.

•

The result was a new and often tense set of conversations
between the U.S. and Russia in January 1998. The U.S.
again sent Ambassador Frank Wisner to Moscow, Vice
President Gore called Prime Minster Viktor Chernomyrdin,
and Secretary of State Madeline Albright made an indirect
threat that the Congress might apply sanctions. Sergi
Yastrzhembsky, a Kremlin spokesman, initially responded
by denying that any transfer of technology had taken place.

•

This Russian denial was too categorical to have much
credibility. Russia had previously announced the arrest of
an Iranian diplomat on November 14, 1997,who it caught
attempting to buy missile technology. The Iranian was
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seeking to buy blueprints and recruit Russian scientists to
go to Iran. Yuri Koptev, the head of the Russian Space
Agency, explained this, however, by stating that that,
“There have been several cases where some Russian
organizations, desperately struggling to make ends meet
and lacking responsibility, have embarked on some
ambiguous projects...they were stopped long before they got
to the point where any technology got out.”

•

The end result of these talks was an agreement by Gore and
Chernomyrdin to strengthen controls over transfer
technology, but it was scarcely clear that it put an end to the
problem. As Koptev has said, “There have been several
cases where some Russian organizations, desperately
struggling to make ends meet and lacking responsibility,
have embarked on some ambiguous projects.” Conditions in
Russia are getting worse, not better, and the desperation
that drives sales has scarcely diminished.

•

Prime Minister Chernomyrdin again promised to
strengthen his efforts to restrict technology transfer to Iran
in a meeting with Gore on March 12, 1998. The U.S.
informed Russia of 13 cases of possible Russian aid to Iran
at the meeting and offered to increase the number of
Russian commercial satellite launches it would license for
U.S. firms as an incentive.

•

New arrests of smugglers took place on April 9, 1998. The
smugglers had attempted to ship 22 tons of specialized steel
to Iran via Azerbaijan, using several Russia shell
corporations as a cover.

•

On April 16, 1998, the State Department declared 20
Russian agencies and research facilities were ineligible to
receive U.S. aid because of their role in transferring missile
technology to Iran.

•

A U.S. examination of Iran’s dispersal, sheltering, and
hardening programs for its anti-ship missiles and other missile
systems indicates that Iran has developed effective programs to
ensure that they would survive a limited number of air strikes
and that Iran had reason to believe that the limited number of
preemptive strikes Israel could conduct against targets in the
lower Gulf could not be effective in denying Iran the capability to
deploy its missiles.

•

Iran has shorter missile range systems:
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•

•

In 1990, Iran bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles
(converted SA-2s) from China with ranges of 130-150
kilometers.

•

Has Chinese sea and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles.
Iran fired 10 such missiles at Kuwait during Iran-Iraq War,
hitting one U.S.-flagged tanker.

Iran has acquired much of the technology necessary build
long-range cruise missile systems from China:

•

Such missiles would cost only 10 percent to 25 percent as
much as ballistic missiles of similar range, and both the
HY-2 Seersucker and CS-802 could be modified relatively
quickly for land attacks against area targets.

•

Iran reported in December 1995 that it had already fired a
domestically built anti-ship missile called the Saeqe-4
(Thunderbolt) during exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and
Gulf of Oman. Other reports indicate that China is helping
Iran build copies of the Chinese CS-801/CS-802 and the
Chinese FL-2 or F-7 anti-ship cruise missiles. These
missiles have relatively limited range. The range of the
CS-801 is 8-40 kilometers, the range of the CS-802 is 15-120
kilometers, the maximum range of the F-7 is 30 kilometers,
and the maximum range of the FL-10 is 50 kilometers. Even
a range of 120 kilometers would barely cover targets in the
Southern Gulf from launch points on Iran’s Gulf coast.
These missiles also have relatively small high explosive
warheads. As a result, Iran may well be seeking anti-ship
capabilities, rather than platforms for delivering weapons
of mass destruction.

•

A platform like the CS-802 might, however, provide enough
design data to develop a scaled-up, longer-range cruise
missile for other purposes, and the Gulf is a relatively small
area where most urban areas and critical facilities are near
the coast. Aircraft or ships could launch cruise missiles with
chemical or biological warheads from outside the normal
defense perimeter of the Southern Gulf states, and it is at
least possible that Iran might modify anti-ship missiles
with chemical weapons to attack tankers—ships which are
too large for most regular anti-ship missiles to be highly
lethal.

•

Building an entire cruise missile would be more difficult.
The technology for fusing CBW and cluster warheads would
be within Iran’s grasp. Navigation systems and jet engines,
however, would still be a major potential problem. Current
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inertial navigation systems (INS) would introduce errors of
at least several kilometers at ranges of 1,000 kilometers
and would carry a severe risk of total guidance
failure—probably exceeding two-thirds of the missiles fired.
A differential global positioning system (GPS) integrated
with the inertial navigation system (INS) and a radar
altimeter, however, might produce an accuracy of 15
meters. Some existing remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs),
such as the South African Skua, claim such performance.
Commercial technology is becoming available for
differential global positioning system (GPS) guidance with
accuracies of 2 to 5 meters.

•

There are commercially available reciprocating and gas
turbine engines that Iran could adapt for use in a cruise
missile, although finding a reliable and efficient turbofan
engine for a specific design application might be difficult.
An extremely efficient engine would have to be matched to a
specific airframe. It is doubtful that Iran could design and
build such an engine, but there are over 20 other countries
with the necessary design and manufacturing skills.

•

While airframe-engine-warhead integration and testing
would present a challenge and might be beyond Iran’s
manufacturing skills, it is inherently easier to integrate
and test a cruise missile than a long-range ballistic missile.
Further, such developments would be far less detectable
than developing a ballistic system if the program used
coded or low altitude directional telemetry.

•

Iran could bypass much of the problems inherent in
developing its own cruise missile by modifying the HY-2
Seersucker for use as a land attack weapon and extending
its range beyond 80 kilometers, or by modifying and
improving the CS-801 (Ying Jai-1) anti-ship missile. There
are reports that the Revolutionary Guards are working on
such developments at a facility near Bandar Abbas.

•

Su-24 long-range strike fighters with range-payloads roughly
equivalent to U.S. F-111 and superior to older Soviet medium
bombers.

•

F-4D/E fighter bombers with capability to carry extensive
payloads to ranges of 450 miles.

•

Can modify HY-2 Silkworm missiles and SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

•

Iran has made several indigenous-long range rockets.
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•

•

The Iran-130, or Nazeat, since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.
The full details of this system remain unclear, but it seems
to use commercially available components, a solid fuel
rocket, and a simple inertial guidance system to reach
ranges of about 90-120 kilometers. It is 355 mm in diameter,
5.9 meters long, weighs 950 kilograms, and has a 150
kilogram warhead. It seems to have poor reliability and
accuracy, and its payload only seems to be several hundred
kilograms.

•

The Shahin 2. It too has a 355 mm diameter, but is only 3.87
meters long, and weighs only 580 kilograms. It evidently
can be equipped with three types of warheads: A 180
kilogram high explosive warhead, another warhead using
high explosive submunitions, and a warhead that uses
chemical weapons.

•
•

Iranian Oghab (Eagle) rocket with 40+ kilometers range.
New SSM with 125 mile range may be in production, but
could be modified FROG.

Large numbers of multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery
for short range delivery of chemical weapons.

Chemical Weapons

•

Iran purchased large amounts of chemical defense gear from the
mid-1980s onwards. Iran also obtained stocks of non-lethal CS
gas, although it quickly found such agents had very limited
military impact since they could only be used effectively in closed
areas or very small open areas.

•

Acquiring poisonous chemical agents was more difficult. Iran did
not have any internal capacity to manufacture poisonous
chemical agents when Iraq first launched its attacks with such
weapons. While Iran seems to have made limited use of chemical
mortar and artillery rounds as early as 1985—and possibly as
early as 1984—these rounds were almost certainly captured
from Iraq.

•

Iran had to covertly import the necessary equipment and
supplies, and it took several years to get substantial amounts of
production equipment, and the necessary feedstocks. Iran
sought aid from European firms like Lurgi to produce large
“pesticide” plants, and began to try to obtain the needed
feedstock from a wide range of sources, relying heavily on its
Embassy in Bonn to manage the necessary deals. While Lurgi
did not provide the pesticide plant Iran sought, Iran did obtain
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substantial support from other European firms and feedstocks
from many other Western sources.

•

By 1986-1987, Iran developed the capability to produce enough
lethal agents to load its own weapons. The Director of the CIA,
and informed observers in the Gulf, made it clear that Iran could
produce blood agents like hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas,
and/or chlorine gas. Iran was also able to weaponize limited
quantities of blister (sulfur mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents
beginning in 1987, and had some capability to weaponize
phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas. These chemical agents were
produced in small batches, and evidently under laboratory scale
conditions, which enabled Iran to load small numbers of weapons
before any of its new major production plants went into full
operation.

•

These gas agents were loaded into bombs and artillery shells,
and were used sporadically against Iraq in 1987 and 1988.

•

Reports regarding Iran’s production and research facilities are
highly uncertain:

•

Iran seems to have completed production of a major poison
gas plant at Qazvin, about 150 kilometers west of Tehran.
This plant is reported to have been completed between
November 1987 and January 1988. While supposedly a
pesticide plant, the facility’s true purpose seems to have
been poison gas production using organophosphorous
compounds.

•

It is impossible to trace all the sources of the major
components and technology Iran used in its chemical
weapons program during this period. Mujahideen sources
claim Iran also set up a chemical bomb and warhead plant
operated by the Zakaria Al-Razi chemical company near
Mahshar in southern Iran, but it is unclear whether these
reports are true.

•

Reports that Iran had chemical weapons plants at
Damghan and Parchin that began operation as early as
March 1988, and may have begun to test fire Scuds with
chemical warheads as early as 1988-1989, are equally
uncertain.

•

Iran established at least one large research and
development center under the control of the Engineering
Research Centre of the Construction Crusade (Jahad
e-Sazandegi), and had established a significant chemical
weapons production capability by mid-1989.
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•

Debates took place in the Iranian parliament or Majlis in late
1988 over the safety of Pasdaran gas plants located near Iranian
towns, and that Rafsanjani described chemical weapons as
follows: “Chemical and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic
bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider
them for our defense. Although the use of such weapons is
inhuman, the war taught us that international laws are only
scraps of paper.”

•

Post Iran-Iraq War estimates of Iran chemical weapons
production are extremely uncertain:

•

U.S. experts believe Iran was beginning to produce
significant mustard gas and nerve gas by the time of the
August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, although its
use of chemical weapons remained limited and had little
impact on the fighting

•

Iran’s efforts to equip plants to produce V-agent nerve gases
seem to have been delayed by U.S., British, and German
efforts to limit technology transfers to Iran, but Iran may
have acquired the capability to produce persistent nerve gas
during the mid 1990s.

•
•

Production of nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994.
Began to stockpile of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene,
and mustard gas weapons after 1985. Recent CIA testimony
indicates that production capacity may approach 1,000 tons
annually.

•

Weapons include bombs and artillery. Shells include 155 mm
artillery and mortar rounds. Iran also has chemical bombs and
mines. It may have developmental chemical warheads for its
Scuds, and may have a chemical package for its 22006 RPV
(doubtful).

•

There are reports that Iran has deployed chemical weapons on
some of its ships.

•

Iran has increased chemical defensive and offensive warfare
training since 1993.

•

Iran is seeking to buy more advanced chemical defense
equipment, and has sought to buy specialized equipment on the
world market to develop indigenous capability to produce
advanced feedstocks for nerve weapons.
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•

CIA sources indicated, in late 1996, that China might have
supplied Iran with up to 400 tons of chemicals for the
production of nerve gas.

•

One report indicated, in 1996, that Iran obtained 400 metric
tons of chemicals for use in nerve gas weapons from
China—including carbon sulfide.

•

Another report indicated that China supplied Iran with
roughly two tons of calcium- hypochlorate in 1996, and
loaded another 40,000 barrels in January or February of
1997. Calcium-hypochlorate is used for decontamina- tion
in chemical warfare.

•

Iran placed several significant orders from China that were
not delivered. Razak Industries in Tehran, and Chemical
and Pharmaceutical Industries in Tabriz ordered 49 metric
tons of alkyl dimethylamine, a chemical used in making
detergents, and 17 tons of sodium sulfide, a chemical used
in making mustard gas. The orders were never delivered,
but they were brokered by Iran’s International Movalled
Industries Corporation (Imaco) and China’s North
Chemical Industries Co. (Nocinco). Both brokers have been
linked to other transactions affecting Iran’s chemical
weapons program since early 1995, and Nocinco has
supplied Iran with several hundred tons of carbon disulfide,
a chemical used in nerve gas.

•

Another Chinese firm, only publicly identified as Q. Chen,
seems to have supplied glass vessels for chemical weapons.

•

The U.S. imposed sanctions on seven Chinese firms in May
1997 for selling precursors for nerve gas and equipment for
making nerve gas—although the U.S. made it clear that it
had, “no evidence that the Chinese government was
involved.” The Chinese firms were the Nanjing Chemical
Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical
Engineering and Import/Export Corporation. Cheong Yee
Ltd., a Hong Kong firm, was also involved. The precursors
included tionyl chloride, dimethylamine, and ethylene
chlorohydril. The equipment included special glass lined
vessels, and Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group
completed construction of a production plant to
manufacture such vessels in Iran in June 1997.

•

Iran sought to obtain impregnated Alumina, which is used
to make phosphorous-oxychloride— a major component of
VX and GB—from the U.S.
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•

•

It has obtained some equipment from Israelis. Nahum
Manbar, an Israeli national living in France, was convicted
in an Israeli court in May 1997 for providing Iran with $16
million worth of production equipment for mustard and
nerve gas during the period from 1990 to 1995.

•

CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new
chemical weapons equipment technology from China and
India in 1996.

•

India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at
Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous
pentasulfide, a major precursor for nerve gas. The plant is
fronted by Meli Agrochemicals, and the program was
negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief security
advisor to Rafsanjani.

•

A recent report by German intelligence indicates that Iran
has made major efforts to acquire the equipment necessary
to produce Sarin and Tabun, using the same cover of
purchasing equipment for pesticide plants that Iraq used
for its Sa’ad 16 plant in the 1980s. German sources note that
three Indian companies—Tata Consulting Engineering,
Transpek, and Rallis India—have approached German
pharmaceutical and engineering concerns for such
equipment and technology under conditions where German
intelligence was able to trace the end user to Iran.

Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in June 1997.

•

It submitted a statement in Farsi to the CWC secretariat in
1998, but this consisted only of questions in Farsi as to the
nature of the required compliance.

•

It has not provided the CWC with any data on its chemical
weapons program.

Biological Weapons

•
•

Extensive laboratory and research capability.

•

U.S. intelligence sources reported in August 1989 that Iran was
trying to buy two new strains of fungus from Canada and the
Netherlands that can be used to produce Mycotoxins. German

Weapons effort documented as early as 1982. Reports surfaced
that Iran had imported suitable type cultures from Europe and
was working on the production of Mycotoxins—a relatively
simple family of biological agents that require only limited
laboratory facilities for small scale production.
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sources indicated that Iran had successfully purchased such
cultures several years earlier.

•

The Imam Reza Medical Center at Mashhad Medical Sciences
University and the Iranian Research Organization for Science
and Technology were identified as the end users for this
purchasing effort, but it is likely that the true end user was an
Iranian government agency specializing in biological warfare.

•

Many experts believe that the Iranian biological weapons effort
was placed under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps, which is known to have tried to purchase suitable
production equipment for such weapons.

•

Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has conducted research on more
lethal active agents like Anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and
biotoxins. In addition, Iranian groups have repeatedly
approached various European firms for the equipment and
technology necessary to work with these diseases and toxins.

•

Unclassified sources of uncertain reliability have identified
a facility at Damghan as working on both biological and
chemical weapons research and production, and believe
that Iran may be producing biological weapons at a
pesticide facility near Tehran.

•

Some universities and research centers may be linked to
biological weapons program.

•

Reports surfaced in the spring of 1993 that Iran had
succeeded in obtaining advanced biological weapons
technology in Switzerland and containment equipment and
technology from Germany. According to these reports, this
led to serious damage to computer facilities in a Swiss
biological research facility by unidentified agents. Similar
reports indicated that agents had destroyed German
bio-containment equipment destined for Iran.

•

More credible reports by U.S. experts indicate that Iran has
begun to stockpile anthrax and botulinum in a facility near
Tabriz, can now mass manufacture such agents, and has
them in an aerosol form. None of these reports, however,
can be verified.

•

The CIA has reported that Iran has, “sought dual-use
biotech equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly for
civilian use.” It also reported in 1996 that Iran might be
ready to deploy biological weapons. Beyond this point, little
unclassified information exists regarding the details of
Iran’s effort to “weaponize” and produce biological weapons.
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•

Iran may have the production technology to make dry storable
and aerosol weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable
missile warheads and bombs and covert devices.

•

Iran may have begun active weapons production in 1996, but
probably only at limited scale suitable for advanced testing and
development.

•

CIA testimony indicates that Iran is believed to have weaponized
both live agents and toxins for artillery and bombs and may be
pursuing biological warheads for its missiles. The CIA reported
in 1996 that, “We believe that Iran holds some stocks of biological
agents and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both
toxins and live organisms as biological warfare agents. Iran has
the technical infrastructure to support a significant biological
weapons program with little foreign assistance.

•

CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new dual-use
technology from China and India during 1996.

•

Iran announced in June 1997 that it would not produce or employ
chemical weapons, including toxins.

Nuclear Weapons

•

The Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in
1974, and rapidly began to negotiate for nuclear power plants.

•

He concluded an extendible ten year nuclear fuel contract
with the U.S. in 1974, with Germany in 1976, and France in
1977.

•

In 1975, he purchased a 10 percent share in a Eurodif
uranium enrichment plant being built at Tricastin in
France that was part of a French, Belgian, Spanish, and
Italian consortium. Under the agreement the Shah signed,
Iran was to have full access to the enrichment technology
Eurodif developed, and agreed to buy a quota of enriched
uranium from the new plant.

•

He created an ambitious plan calling for a network of 23
power reactors throughout Iran that was to be operating by
the mid-1990s, and sought to buy nuclear power plants from
Germany and France.

•

By the time the Shah fell in January 1979, he had six
reactors under contract, and was attempting to purchase a
total of 12 nuclear power plants from Germany, France, and
the U.S.. Two 1,300 megawatt German nuclear power
plants at Bushehr were already 60 percent and 75 percent
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completed, and site preparation work had begun on the first
of two 935 megawatt French plants at Darkhouin that were
to be supplied by Framatome.

•

•

The Shah also started a nuclear weapons program in the early to
mid-1970s, building upon his major reactor projects, investment
in URENCO, and smuggling of nuclear enrichment and weapons
related technology from U.S. and Europe.

•

5 megawatt light-water research reactor operating in
Tehran.

•
•
•

27 kilowatt neutron-source reactor operating in Isfahan.
Started two massive 1300 megawatt reactor complexes.
The Shah attempted to covertly import controlled
technology from the U.S.

U.S. experts believe that the Shah began a low-level nuclear
weapons research program, centered at the Amirabad Nuclear
Research Center. This research effort included studies of
weapons designs and plutonium recovery from spent reactor
fuel.

•

It also involved a laser enrichment program which began in
1975, and led to a complex and highly illegal effort to obtain
laser separation technology from the U.S.. This latter effort,
which does not seem to have had any success, continued
from 1976 until the Shah‘s fall, and four lasers operating in
the critical 16 micron band were shipped to Iran in October
1978.

•

At the same time, Iran worked on other ways to obtain
plutonium, created a secret reprocessing research effort to
use enriched uranium, and set up a small nuclear weapons
design team.

•

In 1976, Iran signed a secret contract to buy $700 million
worth of yellow cake from South Africa, and appears to have
reached an agreement to buy up to 1,000 metric tons a year.
It is unclear how much of this ore South Africa shipped
before it agreed to adopt IAEA export restrictions in 1984,
and whether South Africa really honored such export
restrictions. Some sources indicate that South Africa still
made major deliveries as late as 1988-1989.

•

Iran also tried to purchase 26.2 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium; the application to the U.S. for this
purchase was pending when the Shah fell.
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•
•

The Shah did eventually accept full IAEA safeguards but
their value is uncertain.

In 1984, Khomeini revived nuclear weapons program begun
under Shah.

•

Received significant West German and Argentine corporate
support in some aspects of nuclear technology during the
Iran-Iraq War.

•

Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related
technology from PRC, possibly Pakistan.

•

It has a Chinese-supplied heavy-water, zero-power research
reactor at Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and
two-Chinese supplied sub-critical assemblies—a light
water and graphite design.

•

It has stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area. It may
have had a uranium-ore concentration facility at University
of Tehran, but status is unclear.

•

Some experts feel that the IRGC moved experts and
equipment from the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center to
a new nuclear weapons research facility near Isfahan in the
mid-1980s, and formed a new nuclear research center at the
University of Isfahan in 1984—with French assistance.
Unlike many Iranian facilities, the center at Isfahan was
not declared to the IAEA until February 1992, when the
IAEA was allowed to make a cursory inspection of six sites
that various reports had claimed were the location of Iran’s
nuclear weapons efforts.

•

Bushehr I and II, on the Gulf Coast just southwest of
Isfahan, were partially completed at the time of the Shah’s
fall. Iran attempted to revive the program and sought
German and Argentine support, but the reactors were
damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1987 and 1988.

•

Iran may also have opened a new uranium ore processing
plant close to its Shagand uranium mine in March 1990, and
it seems to have extended its search for uranium ore into
three additional areas. Iran may have also begun to exploit
stocks of yellow cake that the Shah had obtained from South
Africa in the late 1970s while obtaining uranium dioxide
from Argentina by purchasing it through Algeria.

•

Iran began to show a renewed interest in laser isotope
separation (LIS) in the mid-1980s, and held a conference on
LIS in September 1987.
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•

•

Iran opened a new nuclear research center in Isfahan in
1984, located about four kilometers outside the city and
between the villages of Shahrida and Fulashans. This
facility was built at a scale far beyond the needs of peaceful
research, and Iran sought French and Pakistani help for a
new research reactor for this center.

•

The Khomeini government may also have obtained several
thousand pounds of uranium dioxide from Argentina by
purchasing it through Algeria. Uranium dioxide is
considerably more refined than yellow cake, and is easier to
use in irradiating material in a reactor to produce
plutonium.

The status of Iran’s nuclear program since the Iran-Iraq War is
highly controversial, and Iran has denied the existence of such a
program.

•

On February 7, 1990, the speaker of the Majlis publicly
toured the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and opened
the new Jabir Ibn al Hayyan laboratory to train Iranian
nuclear technicians. Reports then surfaced that Iran had at
least 200 scientists and a work force of about 2,000 devoted
to nuclear research.

•

Iran’s Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani stated in
October 1991 that Iran should work with other Islamic
states to create an “Islamic bomb.”

•

The Iranian government has repeatedly made proposals to
create a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. For example,
President Rafsanjani was asked if Iran had a nuclear
weapons program in an interview in the CBS program 60
Minutes in February 1997. He replied, “Definitely not. I
hate this weapon.”

•

Other senior Iranian leaders, including President Khatami,
have made similar categorical denials. Iran’s new Foreign
Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, stated on October 5, 1997, that,
“We are certainly not developing an atomic bomb, because
we do not believe in nuclear weapons... We believe in and
promote the idea of the Middle East as a region free of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
But why are we interested to develop nuclear technology?
We need to diversify our energy sources. In a matter of a few
decades, our oil and gas reserves would be finished and
therefore, we need access to other sources of energy . . .
Furthermore, nuclear technology has many other utilities
in medicine and agriculture. The case of the United States
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in terms of oil reserve is not different from Iran’s. The
United States also has large oil resources, but at the same
time they have nuclear power plants. So there is nothing
wrong with having access to nuclear technology if it is for
peaceful purposes . . .”

•

•

The IAEA reports that Iran has fully complied with its present
requirements, and that it has found no indications of nuclear
weapons effort, but IAEA only inspects Iran’s small research
reactors.

•

The IAEA visits to other Iranian sites are not inspections,
and do not use instruments, cameras, seals, etc. The are
informal walkthroughs.

•

The IAEA visited five suspect Iranian facilities in 1992 and
1993 in this manner, but did not conduct full inspections.

•

Iran has not had any 93+2 inspections and its position on
improved inspections is that it will not be either the first or
the last to have them.

•

Iranian officials have repeatedly complained that the West
tolerated Iraqi use of chemical weapons and its nuclear and
biological build-up during the Iran-Iraq War, and has a dual
standard where it does not demand inspections of Israel or
that Israel sign the NPT.

These are reasons to assume that Iran still has a nuclear
program:

•

Iran attempted to buy highly enriched fissile material from
Khazakstan. The U.S. paid between $20 million and $30
million to buy 1,300 pounds of highly enriched uranium
from the Ust-Kamenogorsk facility in Khazakstan that Iran
may have sought to acquire in 1992. A total of 120 pounds of
the material—enough for two bombs—cannot be fully
accounted for.

•

Iran has imported maraging steel, sometimes used for
centrifuges, by smuggling it in through dummy fronts.
Britain intercepted 110 pound (50 kilo) shipment in August
1996. Seems to have centrifuge research program at Sharif
University of Technology in Tehran. IAEA “visit” did not
confirm.

•

Those aspects of Iran’s program that are visible indicate
that Iran has had only uncertain success. Argentina agreed
to train Iranian technicians at its Jose Balaseiro Nuclear
Institute, and sold Iran $5.5 million worth of uranium for its
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small Amirabad Nuclear Research Center reactor in May
1987. A CENA team visited Iran in late 1987 and early
1988, and seems to have discussed selling Iran the
technology necessary to operate its reactor with 20 percent
enriched uranium as a substitute for the highly enriched
core provided by the U.S., and possibly uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing technology as well. Changes in
Argentina’s government, however, made it much less
willing to support proliferation. The Argentine government
announced in February 1992 that it was canceling an $18
million nuclear technology sale to Iran because it had not
signed a nuclear safeguards arrangement. Argentine press
sources suggested, however, that Argentina was reacting to
U.S. pressure.

•

In February 1990, a Spanish paper reported that
Associated Enterprises of Spain was negotiating the
completion of the two nuclear power plants at Bushehr.
Another Spanish firm called ENUSA (National Uranium
Enterprises) was to provide the fuel, and Kraftwerke Union
(KWU) would be involved. Later reports indicated that a 10
man delegation from Iran’s Ministry of Industry was in
Madrid negotiating with the Director of Associated
Enterprises, Adolofo Garcia Rodriguez.

•

Iran negotiated with Kraftwerke Union and CENA of
Germany in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran attempted
to import reactor parts from Siemens in Germany and
Skoda in Czechoslovakia. None of these efforts solved Iran’s
problems in rebuilding its reactor program, but all
demonstrate the depth of its interest.

•

Iran took other measures to strengthen its nuclear program
during the early 1990s. It installed a cyclotron from Ion
Beam Applications in Belgium at a facility in Karzaj in
1991.

•

Iran conducted experiments in uranium enrichment and
centrifuge technology at its Sharif University of Technology
in Tehran. Sharif University was also linked to efforts to
import cylinders of fluorine suitable for processing enriched
material, and attempts to import specialized magnets that
can be used for centrifuges, from Thyssen in Germany in
1991.

•

It is clear from Iran’s imports that it has sought centrifuge
technology ever since. Although many of Iran’s efforts
have never been made public, British customs officials
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seized 110 pounds of maraging steel being shipped to Iran in
July 1996.

•

Iran seems to have conducted research into plutonium
separation and Iranians published research on uses of
tritium that had applications to nuclear weapons boosting.
Iran also obtained a wide range of U.S. and other nuclear
literature with applications for weapons designs. Italian
inspectors seized eight steam condensers bound for Iran
that could be used in a covert reactor program in 1993, and
high technology ultrasound equipment suitable for reactor
testing at the port of Bari in January 1994.

•

Other aspects of Iran’s nuclear research effort had potential
weapons applications. Iran continued to operate an
Argentine-fueled five megawatt light water highly enriched
uranium reactor at the University of Tehran. It is operated
by a Chinese-supplied neutron source research reactor, and
subcritical assemblies with 900 grams of highly enriched
uranium, at its Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. This
Center has experimented with a heavy water zero-power
reactor, a light water sub-critical reactor, and a graphite
sub-critical reactor. In addition, it may have experimented
with some aspects of nuclear weapons design.

•

The German Ministry of Economics has circulated a wide
list of such Iranian fronts which are known to have imported
or attempted to import controlled items. These fronts
include the:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Bonyad e-Mostazafan;
Defense Industries Organization (Sazemane Sanaye
Defa);
Pars Garma Company, the Sadadja Industrial Group
(Sadadja Sanaye Daryaee);
Iran Telecommunications Industry (Sanaye
Mokhaberet Iran);
Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, the State Purchasing
Organization, Education Research Institute (ERI);
Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (IAI);
Iran Fair Deal Company, Iran Group of Surveyors;
Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (IHI);
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•
•
•

Iran Navy Technical Supply Center;
Iran Tehran Kohakd Daftar Nezarat, Industrial
Development Group;
Ministry of Defense (Vezerate Defa).

•

Iran claims it eventually needs to build enough nuclear reactors
to provide 20 percent of its electric power. This Iranian nuclear
power program presents serious problems in terms of
proliferation. Although the reactors are scarcely ideal for
irradiating material to produce Plutonium or cannibalizing the
core, they do provide Iran with the technology base to make its
own reactors, have involved other technology transfer helpful to
Iran in proliferating and can be used to produce weapons if Iran
rejects IAEA safeguards.

•

Russia has agreed to build up to four reactors, beginning with a
complex at Bushehr—with two 1,000-1,200 megawatt reactors
and two 465 megawatt reactors, and provide significant nuclear
technology.

•

Russia has consistently claimed the light water reactor
designs for Bushehr cannot be used to produce weapons
grade Plutonium and are similar to the reactors the U.S. is
providing to North Korea.

•

The U.S. has claimed, however, that Victor Mikhaliov, the
head of Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry, proposed the sale
of a centrifuge plant in April 1995. The U.S. also indicated
that it had persuaded Russia not to sell Iran centrifuge
technology as part of the reactor deal during the summit
meeting between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in May
1995.

•

It was only after U.S. pressure that Russia publicly stated
that it never planned to sell centrifuge and advanced
enrichment technology to Iran, and Iran denied that it had
ever been interested in such technology. For example, the
statement of Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi, Iran’s
representative to the IAEA, stated that, “We’ve had
contracts before for the Bushehr plant in which we agreed
that the spent fuel would go back to the supplier. For our
contract with the Russians and Chinese, it is the same.”
According to some reports, Russia was to reprocess the fuel
at its Mayak plant near Chelyabinsk in the Urals, and could
store it at an existing facility, at Krasnoyarsk-26 in
southern Siberia.
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•

The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new
nuclear technology from Russia during 1996.

•

A nuclear accident at the plant at Rasht, six miles north of
Gilan, exposed about 50 people to radiation in July 1996.

•

Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov and
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Bulgak visited in
March 1998, and Iran dismissed U.S. complaints about the
risk the reactors would be used to proliferate.

•
•

•
•

Russia indicated that it would go ahead with selling
two more reactors for construction at Bushehr within
the next five years.
The first 1,000 megawatt reactor at Bushehr has
experienced serious construction delays. In March
1998, Russia and Iran agreed to turn the construction
project into a turn key plant because the Iranian firms
working on infrastructure had fallen well behind
schedule. In February, Iran had agreed to fund
improved safety systems. The reactor is reported to be
on a 30 month completion cycle.

The U.S. persuaded the Ukraine not to sell Iran $45 million
worth of turbines for its nuclear plant in early March 1998,
and to strengthen its controls on Ukrainian missile
technology under the MTCR.

China is reported to have agreed to provide significant nuclear
technology transfer and possible sale of two 300 megawatt
pressurized water reactors in the early 1990s, but then to have
agreed to halt nuclear assistance to Iran after pressure from the
U.S..

•

Iran signed an agreement with China’s Commission on
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense on
January 21, 1991, to build a small 27-kilowatt research
reactor at Iran’s nuclear weapons research facility at
Isfahan. On November 4, 1991, China stated that it had
signed commercial cooperation agreements with Iran in
1989 and 1991, and that it would transfer an
electromagnetic isotope separator (Calutron) and a smaller
nuclear reactor, for “peaceful and commercial” purposes.

•

The Chinese reactor and Calutron were small
research-scale systems and had no direct value in producing
fissile material. They did, however, give Iran more
knowledge of reactor and enrichment technology, and U.S.
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experts believe that China provided Iran with additional
data on chemical separation, other enrichment technology,
the design for facilities to convert uranium to uranium
hexaflouride to make reactor fuel, and help in processing
yellowcake.

•

•

The U.S. put intense pressure on China to halt such
transfers. President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang
Zemin reached an agreement at an October 1997 summit.
China strengthened this pledge in negations with the U.S.
in February 1998.

•

In March 1998 the U.S. found that the China Nuclear
Energy Corporation was negotiating to sell Iran several
hundred tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) to
Isfahan Nuclear Research Corporation in central Iran, a
site where some experts believe Iran is working on the
development of nuclear weapons. AHF can be used to
separate plutonium, help refine yellow cake into uranium
hexaflouride to produce U-235, and as a feedstock for Sarin.
It is on two nuclear control lists. China agreed to halt the
sale.

•

Iran denied that China had halted nuclear cooperation on
March 15, 1998.

•

Even so, the U.S. acting Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Affairs stated that
China was keeping its pledge not to aid Iran on March 26,
1998.

U.S. estimates of Iran’s progress in acquiring nuclear weapons
have become more conservative with time.

•

In 1992, the CIA estimated that Iran would have the bomb
by the year 2000. In 1995, John Holum testified that Iran
could have the bomb by 2003.

•

In 1997, after two years in which Iran might have made
progress, he testified that Iran could have the bomb by
2005-2007.

•

U.S. experts increasingly refer to Iran’s efforts as “creeping
proliferation.” There is no way to tell when or if Iranian
current efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists
of potential facilities have little credibility.

•

Timing of weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether
Iran can buy fissile material—if so it has the design
capability and can produce weapons in 1-2 years—or must
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develop the capability to process Plutonium or enrich
Uranium—in which case, it is likely to be 5-10 years.

•

•

The control of fissile material in the FSU remains a major
problem:

•

U.S. estimates indicate the FSU left a legacy of some 1,485
tons of nuclear material. This includes 770 tons in some
27,000 weapons, including 816 strategic bombs, 5,434
missile warheads, and about 20,000 theater and tactical
weapons. In addition, there were 715 tons of fissile or
near-fissile material in eight countries of the FSU in over 50
sites: enough to make 35,000-40,000 bombs.

•

There are large numbers of experienced FSU technicians,
including those at the Russian weapons design center at
Arzamas, and at nuclear production complexes at
Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk.

•

These factors led the U.S. to conduct Operation Sapphire in
1994, where the U.S. removed 600 kilograms of highly
enriched uranium from the Ulba Metallurgy Plant in
Kazakhstan at a time Iran was negotiating for the material.

•

They also led to Britain and the U.S. cooperating in Auburn
Endeavor, and airlifting fissile material out of a nuclear
research facility in Tiblisi, Georgia. There were 10 pounds of
material at the institute, and 8.8 pounds were HEU. (It
takes about 35 pounds to make a bomb.) This operation was
reported in the New York Times on April 21, 1998. The
British government confirmed it took place, but would not
give the date.

The Jerusalem Post reported on April 9, 1998 that Iran had
purchased four tactical nuclear weapons from Russian
smugglers for $25 million in the early 1990s, that the weapons
had been obtained from Kazakhstan in 1991, and that Argentine
technicians were helping to activate the weapon.

•

It quoted what it claimed was an Iranian report, dated
December 26, 1991, of a meeting between Brigadier General
Rahim Safavi, the Deputy Commander of the Revolutionary
Guards and Reza Amrohalli, then head of the Iranian
atomic energy organization.

•

It also quoted a second document—dated January 2, 1992
—- saying the Iranians were awaiting the arrival of Russian
technicians to show them how to disarm the protection
systems that would otherwise inactivate the weapons if
anyone attempted to use them.
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•

The documents implied the weapons were flawed but did
not indicate whether Iran had succeeded in activating
them.

•

The U.S. intelligence community denied any evidence that
such a transfer had taken place.

•

The most detailed reports of Iran’s nuclear weapons
program are the least reliable and come from the People’s
Mujahideen, a violent, anti-regime, terrorist group. Its
claims are very doubtful, but the People’s Mujahideen has
reported that:

•

•
•
•
•
•

Iran’s facilities include a weapons site called Ma’allem
Kelayah, near Qazvin on the Caspian. This is said to be
an IRGC-run facility established in 1987, which has
involved an Iranian investment of $300 million.
Supposedly, the site was to house the 10 megawatt
reactor Iran tried to buy from India.
Two Soviet reactors were to be installed at a large site
at Gorgan on the Caspian, under the direction of
Russian physicists.
The People’s Republic of China provided uranium
enrichment equipment and technicians for the site at
Darkhouin, where Iran once planned to build a French
reactor.
A nuclear reactor was being constructed at Karaj; and
that another nuclear weapons facility exists in the
south central part of Iran, near the Iraqi border.
The ammonia and urea plant that the British firm M.
W. Kellog was building at Borujerd in Khorassan
province, near the border with Turkestan, might be
adapted to produce heavy water.
The Amir Kabar Technical University, the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) (also known as the
Organization for Atomic Energy of Iran or AEOI), Dor
Argham Ltd., the Education and Research Institute,
GAM Iranian Communications, Ghoods Research
Center, Iran Argham Co., Iran Electronic Industries,
Iranian Research Organization, Ministry of Sepah,
Research and Development Group, Sezemane Sanaye
Defa, the Sharif University of Technology, Taradis Iran
Computer Company, and Zakaria Al-Razi Chemical
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Company are all participants in the Iranian nuclear
weapons effort.

•

Other sources based on opposition data have listed the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Laser Research
Center and Ibn-e Heysam Research and Laboratory
Complex, the Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center (East
Azerbaijan), the Imam Hussein University of the
Revolutionary Guards, the Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory,
the Khoshomi uranium mine (Yazd), a possible site at
Moallem Kalayeh, the Nuclear Research Center at Tehran
University, the Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture
and Medicine (Karaj), the Nuclear Research Center of
Technology (Isfahan), the Saghand Uranium mine (Yazd),
the Sharif University (Tehran) and its Physics Research
Center.

Missile Defenses

•

Seeking Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system with
limited anti-tactical ballistic missile capability.

Iraq’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•

•

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had extensive delivery systems
incorporating long-range strike aircraft with refueling
capabilities and several hundred regular and improved,
longer-range Scud missiles, some with chemical warheads.
These systems included:

•
•
•
•
•

Tu-16 and Tu-22 bombers.

•

Developing Al-Abbas missiles (900 kilometer range), which
could reach targets in Iran, the Persian Gulf, Israel, Turkey,
and Cyprus.

•

Long-range super guns with ranges of up to 600 kilometers.

MiG-29 fighters.
Mirage F-1, MiG-23BM, and Su-22 fighter attack aircraft.
A Scud force with a minimum of 819 missiles.
Extended range Al Husayn Scud variants (600 kilometer
range) extensively deployed throughout Iraq, and at three
fixed sites in northern, western, and southern Iraq.

Iraq also engaged in efforts aimed at developing the Tamuz
liquid fueled missile with a range of over 2,000 kilometers, and a
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solid fueled missile with a similar range. Clear evidence
indicates that at least one design was to have a nuclear warhead.

•

Iraq attempted to conceal a plant making missile engines from
the U.N. inspectors. It only admitted this plant existed in 1995,
raising new questions about how many of its missiles have been
destroyed.

•

Iraq had design work underway for a nuclear warhead for its
long-range missiles.

•

The Gulf War deprived Iraq of some of its MiG-29s, Mirage F-1s,
MiG-23BMs, and Su-22s.

•

Since the end of the war, the U.N. inspection regime has also
destroyed many of Iraq’s long-range missiles:

•

•

UNSCOM has directly supervised the destruction of 48
Scud-type missiles.

•

It has verified the Iraqi unilateral destruction of 83 more
missiles and 9 mobile launchers.

The U.N. still estimates, however, that it is able to account for
817 of the 819 long-range missiles that Iraq imported in the
period ending in 1988:

•
•
•

Pre-1980 expenditures, such as training

8

Expenditures during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1981), including the war of the
cities in February-April 1988

516

Testing activities for the development of Iraq’s
modifications of imported missiles and
other experimentalactivities (1985-1990)

69

•

Expenditures during the Gulf War
(January-March 1991)

93

•
•

Destruction under the supervision of UNSCOM

48

Unilateral destruction by Iraq (mid-July and
October 1991)

83

•

UNSCOM’s analysis has shown that Iraq had destroyed 83
of the 85 missiles it had claimed were destroyed. At the
same time, it stated that Iraq had not given an adequate
account of its proscribed missile assets, including
launchers, warheads, and propellants.
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•
•

•

Iraq maintains a significant delivery capability consisting of:

•

HY-2, SS-N-2, and C-601 cruise missiles, which are
unaffected by U.N. cease-fire terms.

•

FROG-7 rockets with 70 kilometer ranges, also allowed
under U.N. resolutions.

•
•

Multiple rocket launchers and tube artillery.
Experimental conversions such as the SA-2.

Iraq claims to have manufactured only 80 missile assemblies, 53
of which were unusable. UNSCOM claims that 10 are
unaccounted for.

•
•

UNSCOM also reports that it supervised the destruction of
10 mobile launchers, 30 chemical warheads, and 18
conventional warheads.

U.S. experts believe Iraq may still have components for
several dozen extended-range Scud missiles.

In addition, Iraq has admitted to:

•
•

Hiding its capability to manufacture its own Scuds.

•

Experimenting with cruise missile technology and ballistic
missile designs with ranges up to 3,000 kilometers.

•

Flight testing Al Husayn missiles with chemical warheads
in April 1990.

•

Developing biological warheads for the Al Husayn
missile as part of Project 144 at Taji.

•

Initiating a research and development program
for a nuclear warhead missile delivery system.

•

Successfully developing and testing a warhead
separation system.

•

Indigenously developing, testing, and manufacturing
advanced rocket engines to include liquid-propellant
designs.

Developing an extended range variant of the FROG-7 called
the Laith. The U.N. claims to have tagged all existing
FROG-7s to prevent any extension of their range beyond the
U.N. imposed limit of 150 kilometers for Iraqi missiles.
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•

Conducting research into the development of Remotely
Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) for the dissemination of biological
agents.

•

Attempting to expand its Ababil-100 program designed to
build surface-to-surface missiles with ranges beyond the
permitted 100-150 kilometers.

•

Importing parts from Britain, Switzerland, and other
countries for a 350 mm “super gun,” as well as starting an
indigenous 600 mm supergun design effort.

•

Iraq initially claimed that it had 45 missile warheads filled with
chemical weapons in 1992. It then stated that it had 20 chemical
and 25 biological warheads in 1995. UNSCOM established that
it had a minimum of 75 operational warheads and 5 used for
trials. It has evidence of the existence of additional warheads. It
can only verify that 16 warheads were filled with Sarin, and 34
with chemical warfare binary components, and that 30 were
destroyed under its supervision—16 with Sarin and 14 with
binary components.

•

U.S. and U.N. officials conclude further that:

•

•

Iraq is trying to rebuild its ballistic missile program using a
clandestine network of front companies to obtain the
necessary materials and technology from European and
Russian firms.

•

This equipment is then concealed and stockpiled for
assembly concomitant with the end of the UN inspection
regime.

•

The equipment clandestinely sought by Iraq includes
advanced missile guidance components, such as
accelerometers and gyroscopes, specialty metals, special
machine tools, and a high-tech, French-made,
million-dollar furnace designed to fabricate engine parts for
missiles.

Recent major violations and smuggling efforts:

•

In November, 1995, Iraq was found to have concealed an
SS-21 missile it had smuggled in from Yemen.

•

Jordan found that Iraq was smuggling missile components
through Jordan in early December 1995. These included
115 gyroscopes in 10 crates, and material for making
chemical weapons. The shipment was worth an estimated
$25 million. Iraq claimed the gyroscopes were for oil
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exploration but they are similar to those used in the Soviet
SS-N-18 SLBM. UNSCOM also found some gyroscopes
dumped in the Tigris.

•

Iraq retains the technology it acquired before the war and
evidence clearly indicates an ongoing research and development
effort, in spite of the U.N. sanctions regime.

•

The fact the agreement allows Iraq to continue producing and
testing short-range missiles (less than 150 kilometers range)
means it can retain significant missile development effort.

•

•

The SA-2 is a possible test bed, but UNSCOM has tagged all
missiles and monitors all high apogee tests.

•

Iraq’s Al-Samoud and Ababil-100 programs are similar test
beds. The Al-Samoud is a scaled-down Scud which Iraq
seems to have tested.

•

Iraq continues to expand its missile production facility at
Ibn Al Haytham, which has two new buildings large enough
to make much longer-range missiles.

•

U.S. satellite photographs reveal that Iraq has rebuilt its
Al-Kindi missile research facility.

Ekeus reported on December 18, 1996 that Iraq retained
missiles, rocket launchers, fuel, and command system to “make a
missile force of significance.” UNSCOM reporting as of October
1997 is more optimistic, but notes that Iraq, “continued to
conceal documents describing its missile propellants, and the
material evidence relating to its claims to have destroyed its
indigenous missile production capabilities indicated it might
have destroyed less than a tenth of what it claimed.”

Chemical Weapons

•

Iraq is the only major recent user of weapons of mass destruction.
U.S. intelligence sources report the Iraqi uses of chemical
weapons shown at the top of the next page.

•

In revelations to the U.N., Iraq admitted that, prior to the Gulf
War, it:

•

Procured more than 1,000 key pieces of specialized
production and support equipment for its chemical warfare
program.

•

Maintained large stockpiles of mustard gas, and the nerve
agents Sarin and Tabun.
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Date

Area

Type
of Gas

Approximate
Casualties

Target

August 1983

Haij Umran

Mustard

Less
than 100

Iranians/Kurds

OctoberNovember 1983

Panjwin

Mustard

3,000

Iranians/Kurds

FebruaryMarch 1984

Majnoon
Island

Mustard

2,500

Iranians

March 1984

Al Basrah

Tabun

50-100

Iranians

March 1985

Hawizah Marsh

Mustard/Tabun

3,000

Iranians

February 1986

Al Faw

Mustard/Tabun

8,00010,000

Iranians

December 1986

Umm ar Rasas

Mustard

1,000s

Iranians

April 1987

Al Basrah

Mustard/Tabun

5,000

Iranians

October 1987

Sumar/Mehran

Mustard/Nerve
Agents

3,000

Iranians

March 1988

Halabjah

Mustard/Nerve
Agents

100s

Iranians/Kurds

Note: Iranians also used poison gas at Halabjah and may have caused some of the
casualties.

•

•

Produced binary Sarin-filled artillery shells, 122 mm
rockets, and aerial bombs.

•

Manufactured enough precursors to produce 70 tons
(70,000 kilograms) of the nerve agent VX. These precursors
included 65 tons of choline and 200 tons of phosphorous
pentasulfide and di-isopropylamine.

•

Tested Ricin, a deadly nerve agent, for use in artillery
shells.

•

Had three flight tests of long-range Scuds with chemical
warheads.

•

Had a large VX production effort underway at the time of
the Gulf War. The destruction of the related weapons and
feedstocks has been claimed by Iraq, but not verified by
UNSCOM. Iraq seems to have had at least 3,800 kilograms
of V-agents by the time of the Gulf War, and 12-16 missile
warheads.

The majority of Iraq’s chemical agents were manufactured at a
supposed pesticide plant located at Muthanna. Various other
production facilities were also used, including those at Salman
Pak, Samara, and Habbiniyah. Though severely damaged
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during the war, the physical plant for many of these facilities has
been rebuilt.

•

Iraq possessed the technology to produce a variety of other
persistent and non-persistent agents.

•

The Gulf War and the subsequent U.N. inspection regime may
have largely eliminated some of stockpiles and reduced
production capability.

•

During 1991-1994, UNSCOM supervised the destruction of:

•
•
•
•
•

•

38,537 filled and unfilled chemical munitions.
690 tons of chemical warfare agents.
More than 3,000 tons of precursor chemicals.
Over 100 pieces of remaining production equipment at the
Muthan State Establishment, Iraq’s primary CW research,
production, filling and storage site.

Since that time, UNSCOM has forced new disclosures from Iraq
that have led to:

•

The destruction of 325 newly identified production
equipment, 120 of which were only disclosed in August
1997.

•
•
•

The destruction of 275 tons of additional precursors.
The destruction of 125 analytic instruments.
The return of 91 analytic pieces of equipment to Kuwait.

As of February 1998, UNSCOM had supervised the destruction
of a total of:

•
•
•
•

40,000 munitions, 28,000 filled and 12,000 empty.
480,000 liters of chemical munitions.
1,800,000 liters of chemical precursors.
eight types of delivery systems including missile warheads.

•

U.S. and U.N. experts believe Iraq has concealed significant
stocks of precursors. Iraq also appears to retain significant
amounts of production equipment dispersed before, or during,
Desert Storm and not recovered by the U.N.

•

UNSCOM reports that Iraq has failed to account for:
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•

Special missile warheads intended for filling with chemical
or biological warfare agent.

•

The material balance of some 550 155 mm mustard gas
shells, the extent of VX programs, and the rationale for the
acquisition of various types of chemical weapons.

•
•

130 tons of chemical warfare agents.

•

The production of several hundred tons of additional
chemical warfare agents, and the consumption of chemical
precursors.

•
•

107,500 empty casings for chemical weapons.

•

The unilateral destruction of 15,620 weapons, and the fate
of 16,038 additional weapons Iraq claimed it had discarded.
“The margin of error” in the accounting presented by Iraq is
in the “neighborhood of 200 munitions.”

•

Iraq systematically lied about the existence of its
production facilities for VX gas until 1995, and made
“significant efforts” to conceal its production capabilities
after that date. Uncertainties affecting the destruction of its
VX gas still affect some 750 tons of imported precursor
chemicals, and 55 tons of domestically produced precursors.
Iraq has made unverifiable claims that 460 tons were
destroyed by Coalition air attacks, and that it unilaterally
destroyed 212 tons. UNSCOM has only been able to verify
the destruction of 155 tons and destroy a further 36 tons on
its own.

Some 4,000 tons of declared precursors for chemical
weapons.

Whether several thousand additional chemical weapons
were filled with agents.

•

Iraq has developed basic chemical warhead designs for Scud
missiles, rockets, bombs, and shells. Iraq also has spray
dispersal systems.

•
•

Iraq maintains extensive stocks of defensive equipment.
The U.N. feels that Iraq is not currently producing chemical
agents, but Iraq has offered no evidence that it has destroyed its
VX production capability and/or stockpile. Further, Iraq retains
the technology it acquired before the war and evidence clearly
indicates an ongoing research and development effort, in spite of
the U.N. sanctions regime.
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•

Recent UNSCOM work confirms that Iraq did deploy gas-filled
155 mm artillery and 122 mm multiple rocket rounds into the
rear areas of the KTO during the Gulf War.

•

Iraq’s chemical weapons had no special visible markings, and
were often stored in the same area as conventional weapons.

•

Iraq has the technology to produce stable, highly lethal VX gas
with long storage times.

•

May have developed improved binary and more stable weapons
since the Gulf War.

•

Since 1992, Iraq attempted to covertly import precursors and
production equipment for chemical weapons through Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan since the Gulf War.

•

The current status of the Iraqi program is as follows (according to
U.S. intelligence as of February 19, 1998):

Agent

Declared

Chemical Agents (Metric Tons)
VX Nerve Gas

Potential
Unaccounted
For

Comments

(Metric Tons)

3

300

Iraq lied about the
progam until 1995

G Agents (Sarin)

100-150

200

Figures include
weaponized
and bulk agents

Mustard Gas

500-600

200

Figures include
weaponized
and bulk agents

Delivery Systems

(Number)

Missile Warheads

(Number)

75-100

45-70

UNSCOM supervised
destruction of 30

100,000

15,000-25,000

UNSCOM supervised
destruction of
40,000, 28,000 of
which were filled.

Aerial Bombs

16,000

2,000

Artillery Shells

30,000

15,000

?

?

Rockets

Aerial Spray Tanks

158

Biological Weapons

•

Had highly compartmented “black” program with far tighter
security regulations than chemical program.

•

Had 18 major sites for some aspect of biological weapons effort
before the Gulf War. Most were nondescript and had no guards or
visible indications they were a military facility.

•

The U.S. targeted only one site during the Gulf War. It struck
two sites, one for other reasons. It also struck at least two targets
with no biological facilities that it misidentified.

•

Systematically lied about biological weapons effort until 1995.
First stated that had small defensive efforts, but no offensive
effort. In July 1995, admitted had a major defensive effort. In
October 1995, finally admitted major weaponization effort.

•

Iraq has continued to lie about its biological weapons effort since
October 1995. It has claimed the effort was headed by Dr. Taha, a
woman who only headed a subordinate effort. It has not admitted
to any help by foreign personnel or contractors. It has claimed to
have destroyed its weapons, but the one site UNSCOM
inspectors visited showed no signs of such destruction and was
later said to be the wrong site. It has claimed only 50 people were
employed full time, but the scale of the effort would have
required several hundred.

•

Since July 1995, Iraq has presented three versions of FFCDs and
four “drafts.”

•

•

The most recent FFCD was presented by Iraq on 11
September 1997. This submission followed the UNSCOM’s
rejection of the FFCD of June 1996. In the period since
receiving that report, UNSCOM conducted eight
inspections in an attempt to investigate critical areas of
Iraq’s proscribed activities such as warfare agent
production and destruction, biological munitions
manufacturing, filling and destruction, and military
involvement in and support to the proscribed program.
Those investigations, confirmed the assessment that the
June 1996 declaration was deeply deficient. The UNSCOM
concluded that the new FFCD it received on 11 September
1997 contains no significant changes from the June 1996
FFCD.

Iraq has not admitted to the production of 8,500 liters of anthrax,
19,000 liters of Botulinum toxin, 2,200 liters of Aflatoxin.
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•

Reports indicate that Iraq tested at least 7 principal biological
agents for use against humans.

•

Anthrax, Botulinum, and Aflatoxin are known to be
weaponized.

•

Looked at viruses, bacteria, and fungi. Examined the
possibility of weaponizing gas gangrene and Mycotoxins.
Some field trials were held of these agents.

•

Examined foot and mouth disease, haemorrhagic
conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox virus.

•

Conducted research on a “wheat pathogen” and a Mycotoxin
similar to “yellow rain” defoliant.

•

The “wheat smut” was first produced at Al Salman, and
then put in major production during 1987-1988 at a plant
near Mosul. Iraq claims the program was abandoned.

•

The August 1995 defection of Lieutenant General Husayn
Kamel Majid, formerly in charge of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction, revealed the extent of this biological weapons
program. Lt. General Kamel’s defection prompted Iraq to
admit that it:

•

•
•

•

Imported 39 tons of growth media (31,000 kilograms or
68,200 pounds) for biological agents obtained from
three European firms. According to UNSCOM, 3,500
kilograms (or 7,700 pounds) remains unaccounted for.
Some estimates go as high as 17 tons. Each ton can be
used to produce 10 tons of bacteriological weapons.
Imported type cultures from the U.S. which can be
modified to develop biological weapons.
Had a laboratory- and industrial-scale capability to
manufacture various biological agents including the
bacteria which cause Anthrax and botulism; Aflatoxin,
a naturally occurring carcinogen; clostridium
perfringens, a gangrene-causing agent; the protein
toxin Ricin; tricothecene Mycotoxins, such as T-2 and
DAS; and an anti-wheat fungus known as wheat cover
smut. Iraq also conducted research into the rotavirus,
the camel pox virus and the virus which causes
haemorrhagic conjunctivitis.
Created at least seven primary production facilities
including the Sepp Institute at Muthanna, the Ghazi
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Research Institute at Amaria, the Daura Foot and
Mouth Disease Institute, and facilities at Al-Hakim,
Salman Pak Taji, and Fudaliyah. According to
UNSCOM, weaponization occurred primarily at
Muthanna through May 1987 (largely Botulinum), and
then moved to Al Salman (Anthrax). In March 1988 a
plant was open at Al Hakim, and in 1989 an Aflatoxin
plant was set up at Fudaliyah.

•
•
•
•

Had test site about 200 kilometers west of Baghdad,
used animals in cages and tested artillery and rocket
rounds against live targets at ranges up to 16
kilometers.
Took fermenters and other equipment from Kuwait to
improve effort during the Gulf War.
Iraq had at least 79 civilian facilities capable of playing
some role in biological weapons production still in
existence in 1997.

The Iraqi program involving Aflatoxin leaves many
questions unanswered.

•
•

•
•

Iraqi research on Aflatoxin began in May 1988 at Al
Salman, where the toxin was produced by the growth of
fungus aspergilus in 5.3 quart flasks.
The motives behind Iraq’s research on Aflatoxin
remain one of the most speculative aspects of its
program. Aflatoxin is associated with fungalcontaminated food grains, and is considered
non-lethal. It normally can produce liver cancer, but
only after a period of months to years and in intense
concentrations. There is speculation, however, that a
weaponized form might cause death within days and
some speculation that it can be used as an
incapacitating agent.
Iraq moved its production of Aflatoxin to Fudaliyah in
1989, and produced 481 gallons of toxin in solution
between November 1988 and May 1990.
It developed 16 R-400 Aflatoxin bombs and two Scud
warheads. Conducted trials with Aflatoxin in 122 mm
rockets and R-400 bombs in November 1989 and May
and August 1990. Produced a total of 572 gallons of
toxin and loaded 410.8 gallons into munitions.
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•
•

Total Iraqi production of more orthodox biological weapons
reached at least 19,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum (10,000
liters filled into munitions); 8,500 liters of concentrated Anthrax
(6,500 liters filled into munitions); and 2,500 liters of
concentrated Aflatoxin (1,850 liters filled into munitions).

•

It manufactured 6,000 liters of concentrated Botulinum
toxin and 8,425 liters of Anthrax at Al-Hakim during 1990;
5400 liters of concentrated Botulinum toxin at the Daura
Foot and Mouth Disease Institute from November 1990 to
January 15, 1991; 400 liters of concentrated Botulinum
toxin at Taji; and 150 liters of concentrated Anthrax at
Salman Pak.

•

Iraq is also known to have produced at least:

•
•
•
•

1,850 liters of Aflatoxin in solution at Fudaliyah.
340 liters of concentrated clostridium perfringens, a
gangrene-causing biological agent, beginning in
August 1990.
10 liters of concentrated Ricin at Al Salam. Claim
abandoned work after tests failed.

Iraq weaponized at least three biological agents for use in the
Gulf War. The weaponization consisted of at least:

•
•

•

UNSCOM concluded in October, 1997, that Iraq’s
accounting for its Aflatoxin production was not
credible.

100 bombs and 16 missile warheads loaded with Botulinum.
50 R-400 air-delivered bombs and 5 missile warheads
loaded with anthrax; and

•

4 missile warheads and 7 R-400 bombs loaded with
Aflatoxin, a natural carcinogen.

•

The warheads were designed for operability with the Al
Husayn Scud variant.

Iraq had other weaponization activities:

•

Armed 155 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets with
biological agents.

•

Conducted field trials, weaponization tests, and live firings
of 122 mm rockets armed with Anthrax and Botulinum
toxin from March 1988 to May 1990.
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•

•

Tested Ricin, a deadly protein toxin, for use in artillery
shells.

•

Iraq produced at least 191 bombs and 25 missile warheads
with biological agents.

•

Developed and deployed 250 pound aluminum bombs
covered in fiberglass. Bombs were designed so they could be
mounted on both Soviet and French-made aircraft. They
were rigged with parachutes for low altitude drops to allow
efficient slow delivery and aircraft to fly under radar
coverage. Some debate over whether bombs had cluster
munitions or simply dispersed agent like LD-400 chemical
bomb.

•

Deployed at least 166 R-400 bombs with 85 liters of
biological agents each during the Gulf War. Deployed them
at two sites. One was near an abandoned runway where it
could fly in aircraft, arm them quickly, and disperse with no
prior indication of activity and no reason for the U.N. to
target the runway.

•

Filled at least 25 Scud missile warheads, and 157 bombs
and aerial dispensers, with biological agents during the
Gulf War.

Developed and stored drop tanks ready for use for three aircraft
or RPV s with the capability of dispersing 2,000 liters of anthrax.
Development took place in December 1990. Claimed later that
tests showed the systems were ineffective.

•

The U.N. found, however, that Iraq equipped crop spraying
helicopters for biological warfare and held exercises and
tests simulating the spraying of Anthrax spores.

•

Iraqi Mirages were given spray tanks to disperse biological
agents.

•
•
•

Held trials as late as January 13, 1991.
The Mirages were chosen because they have large
2,200 liter belly tanks and could be refueled by air,
giving them a longer endurance and greater strike
range.
The tanks had electric valves to allow the agent to be
released and the system was tested by releasing
simulated agent into desert areas with scattered petri
dishes to detect the biological agent. UNSCOM has
video tapes of the aircraft.
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•

Project 144 at Taji produced at least 25 operational Al Husayn
warheads. Ten of these were hidden deep in a railway tunnel,
and 15 in holes dug in an unmanned hide site along the Tigris.

•

Biological weapons were only distinguished from regular
weapons by a black stripe.

•

The U.N. claims that Iraq has offered no evidence to corroborate
its claims that it destroyed its stockpile of biological agents after
the Gulf War. Further, Iraq retains the technology it acquired
before the war and evidence clearly indicates an ongoing
research and development effort, in spite of the U.N. sanctions
regime.

•

UNSCOM reported in October 1997 that:

•

Iraq has never provided a clear picture of the role of its
military in its biological warfare program, and has claimed
it only played a token role.

•

It has never accounted for its disposal of growth media. The
unaccounted for media is sufficient, in quantity, for the
production of over three times more of the biological
agent—Anthrax—Iraq claims to have been produced.

•

Bulk warfare agent production appears to be vastly
understated by Iraq. Expert calculations of possible agent
production quantities, either by equipment capacity or
growth media amounts, far exceed Iraq’s stated results.

•

Significant periods when Iraq claims its fermenters were
not utilized are unexplained.

•

Biological warfare field trials are underreported and
inadequately described.

•

Claims regarding field trials of chemical and biological
weapons using R400 bombs are contradictory and indicate
that “more munitions were destroyed than were produced.”

•

The Commission is unable to verify that the “unilateral
destruction of the BW-filled Al Hussein warheads has taken
place.”

•

There is no way to confirm whether Iraq destroyed 157
bombs of the R400 type, some of which were filled with
Botulin or anthrax spores.

•

“The September 1997 FFCD fails to give a remotely credible
account of Iraq’s biological program. This opinion has been
endorsed by an international panel of experts.”
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•

The current status of the Iraqi program is as follows (according to
U.S. intelligence as of February 19, 1998):

•

UNSCOM cannot confirm the unilateral destruction of 25
warheads. It can confirm the destruction of 23 of at least 157
bombs. Iraq may have more aerosol tanks.
Declared
Concentrated
Amount

Declared
Total
Amount

Agent

Liters Gallons

Liters Gallons

Anthrax

8,500

85,000 22,457

Could be 3-4 times
declared amount

12,245

Uncertainty

Botulinum 19,400
toxin

NA

380,000

NA

Probably twice declared
amount. Some extremely
concentrated.

Gas
340
Gangrene
Clostridium
Perfingens
Aflatoxin
NA
Ricin
NA

90

3,400

900

Amounts could be higher

NA
NA

2,200
10

581
2.7

Major uncertainties
Major uncertainties

•

U.N. currently inspects 79 sites—5 used to make weapons before
war; 5 vaccine or pharmaceutical sites; 35 research and
university sites; 13 breweries, distilleries, and dairies with
dual-purpose capabilities; 8 diagnostic laboratories.

•

Iraq retains laboratory capability to manufacture various
biological agents including the bacteria which cause anthrax,
botulism, tularemia and typhoid.

•

Many additional civilian facilities are capable of playing some
role in biological weapons production.

Nuclear Weapons

•

Inspections by U.N. teams have found evidence of two successful
weapons designs, a neutron initiator, explosives and triggering
technology needed for production of bombs, plutonium
processing technology, centrifuge technology, Calutron
enrichment technology, and experiments with chemical
separation technology. Iraq had some expert technical support,
including at least one German scientist who provided the
technical plans for the URENCO TC-11 centrifuge.

•

Iraq’s main nuclear weapons related facilities were:
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•

•

Al Atheer—center of nuclear weapons program. Uranium
metallurgy; production of shaped charges for bombs, remote
controlled facilities for high explosives manufacture.

•

Al Tuwaitha—triggering systems, neutron initiators,
uranium metallurgy, and hot cells for plutonium
separation. Laboratory production of UO2, UCL4, UF6, and
fuel fabrication facility. Prototype-scale gas centrifuge,
prototype EMIS facility, and testing of laser isotope
separation technology.

•

Al Qa Qa—high explosives storage, testing of detonators for
high explosive component of implosion nuclear weapons.

•

Al Musaiyib/Al Hatteen—high explosive testing,
hydrodynamic studies of bombs.

•

Al Hadre—firing range for high explosive devices, including
FAE.

•

Ash Sharqat—designed for mass production of weapons
grade material using EMIS.

•

Al Furat—designed for mass production of weapons grade
material using centrifuge method.

•
•
•

Al Jesira (Mosul)—mass production of UCL4.
Al Qaim—phosphate plant for production of U308.
Akashat uranium mine.

Iraq had three reactor programs:

•

Osiraq/Tammuz I: 40 megawatt light-water reactor
destroyed by Israeli air attack in 1981.

•

Isis/Tammuz II: 800 kilowatt light water reactor destroyed
by Coalition air attack in 1991.

•

IRT-5000: 5 megawatt light water reactor damaged by
Coalition air attack in 1991.

•

Iraq used Calutron (EMIS), centrifuges, plutonium processing,
chemical defusion and foreign purchases to create new
production capability after Israel destroyed most of Osiraq.

•

Iraq established a centrifuge enrichment system in Rashidya
and conducted research into the nuclear fuel cycle to facilitate
development of a nuclear device.
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•

After invading Kuwait, Iraq attempted to accelerate its program
to develop a nuclear weapon by using radioactive fuel from
French and Russian-built reactors. It made a crash effort in
September 1990 to recover enriched fuel from its supposedly
safe-guarded French and Russian reactors, with the goal of
producing a nuclear weapon by April 1991. The program was
only halted after Coalition air raids destroyed key facilities on
January 17, 1991.

•

Iraq conducted research into the production of a radiological
weapon, which disperses lethal radioactive material without
initiating a nuclear explosion.

•

Orders were given in 1987 to explore the use of radiological
weapons for area denial in the Iran-Iraq War.

•

Three prototype bombs were detonated at test sites—one as
a ground level static test and two others were dropped from
aircraft.

•

Iraq claims the results were disappointing and the project
was shelved but has no records or evidence to prove this.

•

U.N. teams have found and destroyed, or secured, new stockpiles
of illegal enriched material, major production and R&D
facilities, and equipment—including Calutron enriching
equipment.

•

UNSCOM believes that Iraq’s nuclear program has been largely
disabled and remains incapacitated, but warns that Iraq retains
substantial technology and established a clandestine purchasing
system in 1990 that it has used to import forbidden components
since the Gulf War.

•

The major remaining uncertainties are:

•
•
•
•

Iraq still retains the technology developed before the
Gulf War and U.S. experts believe an ongoing research
and development effort continues, in spite of the U.N.
sanctions regime.
Did Iraq conceal an effective high speed centrifuge
program?
Are there elements for radiological weapons?
Is it actively seeking to clandestinely buy components
for nuclear weapons and examining the purchase of
fissile material from outside Iraq?
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•

Is it continuing with the development of a missile warhead
suited to the use of a nuclear device?

•

A substantial number of declared nuclear weapons
components and research equipment has never been
recovered. There is no reason to assume that Iraqi
declarations were comprehensive.

The Sudan’s Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Delivery Systems

•
•

No evidence of a program.
The Sudan does have F-5, MiG-21, and MiG-23 attack fighters.

Chemical Weapons

•

Khartoum served as the site of a VX nerve gas production facility
at the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant, which was linked to the
terrorist Osama Bin Laden. It was destroyed by U.S. cruise
missiles on August 20, 1998.

Biological Weapons

•
•

May be some early research activity related to terrorist groups.
No evidence of production capability.

Nuclear Weapons

•

No evidence of any program.

Source: Prepared by Anthony H. Cordesman, Co-Director, Middle East
Program, CSIS.
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APPENDIX C
IRAQI BREAK OUT CAPABILITIES

•

UNSCOM and the IAEA’s success have created new priorities for
Iraqi proliferation. The U.N.’s success in destroying the large
facilities Iraq needs to produce fissile materials already may well
have led Iraq to focus on covert cell-like activities to manufacture
highly lethal biological weapons as a substitute for nuclear
weapons.

•

All of the biological agents Iraq had at the time of the Gulf War
seem to have been “wet” agents with limited storage life and
limited operational lethality. Iraq may have clandestinely
carried out all of the research necessarily to develop a production
capability for dry-storage micro-power weapons which would be
far easier to clandestinely stockpile, and have much more
operational lethality.

•

Iraq did not have advanced binary chemical weapons and most of
its chemical weapons used unstable ingredients. Iraq has
illegally imported specialized glassware since the Gulf War, and
may well have developed advanced binary weapons and tested
them in small numbers. It may be able to use a wider range of
precursors and have developed plans to produce precursors in
Iraq. It may have improved its technology for the production of
VX gas.

•

Iraq is likely to covertly exploit Western analyses and critiques of
its pre-war proliferation efforts to correct many of the problems
in the organization of its proliferation efforts, its weapons
design, and its organization for their use.

•

Iraq bombs and warheads were relatively crude designs which
did not store chemical and biological agents well and which did a
poor job of dispersing them. Fusing and detonation systems did a
poor job of ensuring detonation at the right height and Iraq made
little use of remote sensors and weather models for long-range
targeting and strike planning. Iraq could clandestinely design
and test greatly improved shells, bombs, and warheads. The key
tests could be conducted using towers, simulated agents, and
even indoors. Improved targeting, weather sensors, and other
aids to strike planning are dual-use or civil technologies that are
not controlled by UNSCOM. The net impact would be weapons
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that could be 5-10 times more effective than the relatively crude
designs Iraq had rushed into service under the pressure of the
Iran-Iraq War.

•

UNSCOM and the IAEA’s success give Iraq an equally high
priority to explore ways of obtaining fissile material from the
FSU or any other potential supplier country and prepare for a
major purchase effort the moment sanctions and inspections are
lifted and Iraq has the hard currency to buy its way into the
nuclear club. Iraq could probably clandestinely assemble all of
the components of a large nuclear device except the fissile
material, hoping to find some illegal source of such material.

•

The components for cruise missiles are becoming steadily more
available on the commercial market, and Iraq has every
incentive to create a covert program to examine the possibility of
manufacturing or assembling cruise missiles in Iraq.

•

U.N. inspections and sanctions may also drive Iraq to adopt new
delivery methods ranging from clandestine delivery and the use
of proxies to sheltered launch-on-warning capabilities designed
to counter the U.S. advantage in airpower.

•

Iraq can legally maintain and test missiles with ranges up to 150
kilometers. This allows for exoatmospheric reentry testing and
some testing of improved guidance systems. Computer
simulation, wind tunnel models, and production engineering
tests can all be carried out clandestinely under the present
inspection regime. It is possible that Iraq could develop dummy
or operational high explosive warheads with shapes and weight
distribution of a kind that would allow it to test concepts for
improving its warheads for weapons of mass destruction. The
testing of improved bombs using simulated agents would be
almost impossible to detect as would the testing of improved
spray systems for biological warfare.

•

Iraq has had half a decade in which to improve its decoys,
dispersal concepts, dedicated command and control links,
targeting methods, and strike plans. This kind of passive
warfare planning is impossible to forbid and monitor, but
ultimately is as important and lethal as any improvement in
hardware.

•

There is no evidence that Iraq made an effort to develop
specialized chemical and biological devices for covert operations,
proxy warfare, or terrorist use. It would be simple to do so
clandestinely and they would be simple to manufacture.
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CHAPTER 7
TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

The most serious challenge the West may face from the
Middle East may be the risk of proliferation interacting
with terrorism. At present, this is only a possibility. No
Middle East state or faction has yet made any attempt to use
weapons of mass destruction in transregional attacks on the
West, although the United States launched cruise missiles
strikes against the Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in
Khartoum on August 20, 1998, in a preemptive attempt to
prevent the production and use of VX nerve gas by a leading
terrorist—Osama Bin Laden.
The basic problem for the West, and indeed for the
Middle Eastern states which are as likely to be terrorist
targets as the West, is that terrorist attacks using weapons
of mass destruction present a fundamentally different kind
of threat. They are a far more lethal kind of terrorist threat
than the West has yet faced, and they offer radical Middle
Eastern states and terrorist factions a relatively easy way to
bypass many of the defenses proposed as part of
counterproliferation.
Under many conditions, a single act of such terrorism
can kill thousands of people and/or induce levels of panic
and political reaction that governments cannot easily deal
with. Under some conditions, the use of weapons of mass
destruction can pose an existential threat to the existing
social and political structure of a small country—
particularly one where much of the population and
governing elite is concentrated in a single urban area. The
comparative seriousness of these risks is illustrated in
Table 7, which summarizes the potential casualties
resulting from the use of a weapon of mass destruction in an
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urban area similar to the capital or major urban center of
most Middle Eastern countries.
The data in Table 7 must be kept in careful perspective.
They are drawn from sources designed to estimate the
impact of efficient and well-designed military weapons, and
it is unclear how the effects of a terrorist attack using
improvised, nonmilitary weapons would compare with
those of such a military attack. On the one hand, a terrorist
weapon might be substantially less lethal. On the other
hand, a terrorist potentially could use a much larger device
than could be carried by a missile, and could chose the best
sunlight and weather conditions for an attack. They might
well be able to deliver biological agents covertly under
optimal “line source” or aerosol conditions.
Further complications exist because the lethality data
on the effects of biological and chemical weapons are
notoriously uncertain, and many such data are overstated
by the tendency of “technical experts” to exaggerate the
threat from the weapon that is in their area of expertise. At
the same time, losses could be worse if an attack involved a
highly persistent chemical agent like VX, or a more lethal
biological agent than anthrax. Further, the nuclear data
include only prompt casualties (within 48-96 hours), and
ignore the increase in the longer-term death rate from
radiation and fallout because no reliable system exists for
estimating such losses.1
Critical assumptions about medical and emergency
response capabilities and about warning and civil defense
are made in Table 7. The table may exaggerate estimated
casualties because it assumes that no warning and major
civil defense activities take place. These assumptions may
reduce estimated casualties, because they assume that
wounded and infected personal receive adequate medical
treatment from the facilities of an advanced industrialized
nation and large reserves of medical and emergency
response personnel from outside the area under direct
attack. This assumption is likely to sharply exaggerate the
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Using missile warheads: Assumes one Scud-sized warhead with a
maximum payload of 1,000 kilograms. The study assumes that the biological
agent would not make maximum use of this payload capability because this is
inefficient. It is unclear that this is realistic.
Area
Covered in
Square
Kilometers
Chemical: 300 kilograms of
Sarin nerve gas with a density
of 70 milligrams per cubic meter

0.22

Biological: 30 kilograms of
Anthrax spores with a density of
0.1 milligram per cubic meter

10

Nuclear: One 12.5 kiloton
nuclear device achieving 5
pounds per cubic inch
of over-pressure

7.8

One 1 megaton hydrogen bomb

190

Deaths Assuming
3,000-10,000 people
Per Square
Kilometer

60-200

30,000-100,000

23,000-80,000
570,000-1,900,000

Using one aircraft delivering 1,000 kilograms of Sarin nerve gas or
100 kilograms of anthrax spores: Assumes the aircraft flies in a straight
line over the target at optimal altitude and dispensing the agent as an aerosol.
The study assumes that the biological agent would not make maximum use of
this payload capability because this is inefficient. It is unclear that this is
realistic.
Area Covered
in Square
Kilometers

Deaths Assuming
3,000-10,000 people
Per Square
Kilometer

0.74
46

300-700
130,000-460,000

Clear sunny day, light breeze
Sarin Nerve Gas
Anthrax Spores
Overcast day or night, moderate wind
Sarin Nerve Gas
Anthrax Spores

0.8
140

400-800
420,000-1,400,000

Clear calm night
Sarin Nerve Gas
Anthrax Spores

7.8
300

3,000-8,000
1,000,000-3,000,000

Source: Adapted by the Anthony H. Cordesman from Office of Technology Assessment,
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Washington: U.S. Congress
OTA-ISC-559, August 1993, pp. 53-54.

Table 7. Comparative Effects of Biological,
Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Delivered
Against a Typical Urban Target.
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available medical resources in most Middle Eastern
countries.
The assumption of adequate medical and emergency
response personnel often heavily depends on medical and
emergency personnel fleeing the area under attack or
immediately recognizing the true character of the attack
and taking suitable precautions. Properly characterizing
the attack may be impossible even for the most advanced
countries, particularly if a new biological agent is used, if an
agent is used whose effects take several days to become
apparent, or if “cocktails” are used of different agents where
the agent whose effects initially become apparent may lead
to an emergency/medical response that exposes and kills
limited cadres of trained personnel. Further, untrained or
highly motivated medical and emergency personnel tend to
rush in to provide treatment, become exposed, and die.
What is clear is that Table 7 shows that a well-planned
act of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass
destruction could involve a “paradigm shift” in the nature of
terrorism and counterterrorism. Unlike other forms of
terrorism, Middle Eastern governments and societies might
not be able to ride out a new form of attack. A successful act
of mass terrorism could destroy a political elite, key
elements of an economy, a key elite or element of a Middle
Eastern society, or popular willingness to remain in a
threatened state. It could have a massive impact on
immigration/emigration in a nation like Israel, or the
foreign labor forces in a Gulf state. It could have a major
strategic impact on U.S. public support for the deployment
of U.S. power projection forces.
The Uncertainties Inherent in Terrorism Using
Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction
would also involve far more than physical or human
destruction. They would have political and strategic
motives that could radically alter the strategic situation. In
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a region like the Middle East, they could provoke a level of
political reaction and/or escalation that could lead to
massive retaliatory escalation or destroy the prospects of
conflict resolution for years. At a minimum, neither Middle
Eastern governments nor their peoples would have any
experience in dealing with such an attack, and they would
not have the time to adapt and learn provided by wartime
preparations or a series of more conventional terrorist
attacks.
These risks are illustrated in Appendix D, and it is
important to put them in perspective. Novels, movies, and
war games can assume that such attacks would lead to a
proportionate and carefully judged response by calculating
rational bargainers—particularly since most such scenarios
and games deal with the risk by preventing an attack,
minimizing the effect of an attack, or immediately
containing the situation. Novels and screen plays can
imagine a far-sighted or lucky hero for every “Abu
Moriarity” or “Dr. Ben No.”
However, human history does not inspire similar
confidence. Terrorists are not always “rational” or capable
of dealing with their enemies in terms of shared values or
restraint. Governments do not organize to deal with
unanticipated threats or organize well for new threats.
Heroes and heroines are rare, and the reactions of an
attacked Middle Eastern state or people could be extremely
dangerous and unpredictable. At some point, the survivors
might well lash out in a mix of panic, hatred, fear, and
revenge, and this seems to be particularly true if an attack is
perceived as posing an existential threat.
Consider, for a moment, the real world problems that
would be posed by a large-scale and successful terrorist use
of weapons of mass destruction:

•

Unlike military attacks in war, the source of the
attack might well be unknown. In the case of a
biological, chemical, or radiological attack, the victim
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might not detect the attack for a period of days or
weeks. This was certainly the case during the Gulf
War. The United States initially estimated that none
of its troops were exposed to chemical weapons, only
to reach an estimate that more than 15,000 might
have been exposed some 5 years later.

•

While no one can dismiss the possibility that the
attacker(s) would be too much of an egotist to remain
silent, the attacker(s) would have every possible
incentive to conduct such an attack covertly and to lay
the ground work for a covert follow-on attack
capability. There would also be a strong motive to lay
a false trail and blame another movement or
government for the attack, or to launch such an attack
at a moment of high tension between two
governments that the attacker(s) opposed.

•

It would often be impossible to distinguish the level of
support for such an attack by an enemy state. The use
of terrorist proxies might be impossible to distinguish
from loose ties between a hostile government and an
extremist movement. Some governments might also
support a range of terrorist groups, knowing that the
net result could be a serious attack with plausible
deniability. The problem of identifying the real enemy
could be critical.

•

The government of an attacked state may well not be
prepared to deal with the problem of escalation, and
might lack any structure and plans for dealing
simultaneously with the impact of terrorism and a
crisis in interstate relations. The use of such weapons
might be intended to destroy or prevent a peace
process, rather than exacerbate a conflict. At the same
time, such an attack might be so crippling that the
victim might feel it could not accept the resulting
losses without attacking an enemy state.

176

•

There would be no easy way for any one to
characterize losses and damage. It is virtually certain
that the attacker would lack any empirical basis for
estimating the end effect of a given attack, as would
any hostile government using a terrorist proxy. The
victim might find it extremely difficult to estimate
even prompt losses and damage effects, and would
face critical problems in estimating the impact of
biological weapons or long-term radiation. “Cocktails”
of different weapons could be used with different
effects and target mixes. Friendly and hostile
governments would have to rely on guesswork or on
the victim government. Media reporting would be
virtually certain to vastly exaggerate the effect of
such weapons and present a constant series of video
horror shows, and public opinion would probably pay
only limited attention to expert analysis.

•

Defense can be extremely difficult because it will
usually be impossible to predict the method of attack.
For example, the United States has decided to
immunize its troops against Anthrax because of
evidence that this agent has been weaponized in the
Middle East. A terrorist attack can chose from a wide
range of different agents. Similarly, a terrorist attack
may occur from within a defensive perimeter, bypass
any air and missile defenses, and/or be tailored to
defeat national holdings of NBC detection, protection,
and decontamination gear.

•

Medical services would be at high risk as the victims
of direct attack or because of efforts to treat initial
casualties that led to the death of medical and
emergency personnel, and outside emergency
response capability is likely to be extremely limited.
Few governments are likely to train medical teams to
flee the area under attack, and such training or
guidance is unlikely to have much practical impact
until medical and emergency response teams learn
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the hard way. Some biological weapons have no
treatment—a problem that could be greatly
complicated by a “cocktail” of different weapons and
the risk that a terrorist would use infectious agents.
No medical or emergency response team would have
any practical experience with the particular weapon
involved—if it could even be promptly identified.
There would be little or no basis for triage or assessing
the scale of the attack and future risks.

•

Police, intelligence, internal security, and military
forces could take serious casualties—including their
top leadership. At the same time, most such forces
would have little or no training to deal with such
attacks and the threat of further prompt attacks.
They would have no practical experience, and often
would lack enough understanding of the attack and
threat to properly respond.

•

All of the actors involved in preemption, retaliation,
and every aspect of the escalation ladder in the
transition from terrorism to an interstate conflict
would be operating under intense pressure and with
minimal understanding of the crisis. There might be a
strong rational case for the Middle Eastern state that
became the subject of such an attack to wait until it
could fully characterize the attack and know the
cause, but such an argument might prove irrelevant
in a crisis. Further, states might refuse to delay and
let an opponent gain a decisive edge, or feel that they
had to launch an immediate attack to prevent
follow-on attacks and/or restraint by outside
countries. Terrorism might catalyze a series of
attacks by hostile states like Israel and Syria—or Iran
and Iraq—in which the process of escalation rapidly
degenerated into near chaos.

•

Outside aid, however well-intentioned, could take
considerable time to mobilize and might have to enter
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a nation or major urban area in a state of crisis or
collapse. Efforts to negotiate some form of restraint or
conflict limitation would also be confused and might
lag badly behind the action-reaction cycle of states
with weapons of mass destruction.
Unlike relations and conflicts between governments,
where communication and experience tend to limit conflicts
and establish a structured basis of deterrence, terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction has no rules. Such
terrorism could instantly achieve higher levels of damage
than most regional conventional wars. It could attack
virtually any target set. It would have no clear level of
restraint, there might be little or no fear of retaliation, and
governments would have no way to evaluate the risk and
nature of follow-on attacks. The complex mix of political,
social, and military relations shaping and stabilizing most
state-to-state conflicts would be missing.
Scenarios for Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass
Destruction.
It should be stressed that the risks of terrorism using
weapons of mass destruction are now largely theoretical.
There are only token indicators of Middle Eastern terrorist
activity involving weapons of mass destruction. A few crude
devices have been detected using explosives and chemical
agents (grenades with a small canister of mustard gas). The
principal case of actual acts of terrorism consists of a limited
effort to poison Israeli agricultural exports, direct attempts
at poisoning such as lacing champagne with cyanide at a
Russian military New Year’s Day celebration in Tajikistan
in January 1995, and PKK attempts to poison Turkish
water supplies with cyanide.2 Such efforts make a sharp
contrast to the massive national efforts Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and Syria are making to acquire weapons of a mass
destruction.
The Iranian Republic Guards, which are a key source of
Iranian support to extremists, do operate many of Iran’s
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chemical and biological weapons and missiles. Highly
political elements of Iraq’s armed forces, intelligence
branches, and military procurement offices have purchased
dual-use items or managed missile and WMD programs.
There have been some scattered efforts by extremist
movements to examine biological technology, and some
crude efforts to modify insecticides, and poison fruit and
vegetable exports. However, there have been no “Dr. Ben
Nos” and “Professor Abu Moriarities," and there only have
been hints that states are considering direct or proxy
support of terrorism and unconventional warfare using
weapons of mass destruction.
At the same time, the question arises as to whether the
West can rely on effective strategic warning or a reactive
approach to this problem. Most new terrorist groups get at
least one “free ride” attack before their existence and/or true
character is detected. An effective “super-terrorist” would
also have a number of major advantages over any state or
conventional enemy. Virtually any means of delivery could
be used. The weapon would not have to be stable, reliable, or
safe. This would allow the use of chemical weapons that
would not be safe to militarize, and even infectious
biological agents. Damage effects could be highly
unpredictable since the objective would often be terror, and
not predictable tactical and/or strategic effects.
Delayed effects and prolonged contamination would
often be desirable. Martyrdom and/or lack of attribution
would sometimes be acceptable. States supporting proxy
efforts could afford to work slowly and indirectly—
potentially preserving a high degree of deniability. Massive
civilian casualties would often be desirable, and many
terrorist movements could act without fear of retaliation or
any retribution greater than for a minor act of conventional
terrorism that involved much more limited casualties.
Appendix E provides a more tangible illustration of this
point. It may seem to borrow from bad spy novels and
science fiction, but it lists a group of scenarios that are at
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least technically possible. These scenarios also illustrate
the fact that terrorists do not need sophisticated military
delivery systems, do not need highly lethal weapons, can
use terrorism to pose existential threats, can use complex
mixes of weapons of mass destruction, and can mix
terrorism with elements of covert action and deniability.
Much again depends on the human dimension and the
real-world difference between actual terrorist groups and
the super-terrorist that would have to execute such
scenarios. The danger of such scenarios is that they tend to
overstate the willingness of terrorists to turn to extreme
forms of terror, their willingness to risk dying, and their
ability to undetectably engage in complex scenarios. They
also depend heavily on the technical ability of terrorists to
obtain and control weapons of mass destruction.
There is nothing admirable about Middle Eastern
extremists of any persuasion, but an examination of the
groups so far described in U.S. reporting indicates that most
are likely to set clear limits to the scale of their actions and
how broadly they target them outside the Middle East.3
Regardless of how one may feel about Islamic extremists,
secular terrorists, and radical governments like Iran, Iraq
and Libya, most state sponsors of terrorism and most
extremist groups do not seem likely to turn to mass murder
without some provocation.4
While terrorists are often stereotyped as acting without
moral limits and as willing martyrs, few have actually
conformed with such stereotypes. These few exceptions
have included Omar Qadhafi in Libya, Osama Bin Laden,
the extremist elements of Hamas, the Islamic Jihad in
Egypt, and the GIA in Algeria.
Although some effort was made to use chemical
poisonings during the World Trade Center bombing, Bin
Laden is the only Middle Eastern terrorist who has so far
been identified with serious attempts to produce chemical
and nuclear weapons. There are strong indications that he
is associated with plants in the Sudan that may be
181

producing the precursors for VX nerve gas, and the U.S.
State Department has charged that Bin Laden attempted to
buy enriched Uranium for a nuclear bomb. Bin Laden’s
association with two plants in the Sudan was a major factor
that led the U.S. to launch cruise missiles against the Shifa
Pharmaceutical Plant in Khartoum on August 20, 1998. Bin
Laden is reported to have authorized his main organization,
al Qaida, to try to buy nuclear materials in 1993.5
Most “terrorists” are someone else’s “freedom fighters”
and operate within significant self or group-imposed
constraints. Similarly, it is far from clear that most regional
states are willing to take the kind of risks inherent in the
scenarios postulated in Appendix E.
At the same time, the steady escalation of car and truck
bombings is a clear demonstration of the willingness to
indulge in indiscriminate killing. The rhetoric and ideology
of a number of other terrorist movements like the Palestine
Islamic Jihad and Combatant Partisans of God scarcely
rules out mass murder. In fact, Sheik Yassin—the founder
of Hamas—praised the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. A total breakdown in the
Arab-Israeli peace process, and/or a new Intifada, might
lead to the creation of far more violent terrorist groups. Iraq
and Libya may end in seeking revenge once they break out
of sanctions. Moderation in Iran is uncertain, and Iranian
extremists may even see some massive act of terrorism as a
way of ending President Khatami’s efforts to move towards
improved Iranian relations with the West.
Most of the scenarios in Appendix E are only marginally
more complex than recent bombings, and only a few require
large numbers of people and complex technical activity. The
actions of Aum Shinrikyo in Japan illustrate the fact that it
can be extremely difficult to characterize the level of
extremism and capability for sophisticated action within a
group until it has committed at least one action of terror.
The cell structure used by the violent elements of most
Middle Eastern extremist groups also tends to encourage
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the creation of compartmented groups with different and
unpredictable commitments to violence while the loose and
informal chain of contacts between extremist movements,
known terrorist groups, and radical governments creates
the possibly of random or unpredictable transfers of
technology or weapons.
The institutionalization of state violence in the Middle
East also creates a cumulative risk that opposition elements
will be provoked into such forms of terrorism. The
interactions between secular governmental repression and
Islamic extremists, and the widespread repression of ethnic
and religious groups create a climate which may lead to new
forms of terrorism. Endemic conflicts like the Arab-Israeli
conflict and Iranian-Iraqi search for hegemony in the Gulf
breed growing technical sophistication as well as
extremism.
Terrorism and Chemical Weapons.
Much of the terrorist impact of chemical weapons is
based on myth. Regardless of the theoretical lethality of
given chemical agents, many cannot be weaponized in ways
that are vastly more lethal than conventional bombs and
explosions.6 Terrorists are not governments, and may well
spend more terrorist money and man-hours per casualty on
chemical weapons than if they concentrated on carefully
planning conventional attacks. Contrary to a considerable
amount of literature, chemical weapons also are not
uniquely horrifying in terms of their killing, wounding, or
incapacitating effects. Trauma from penetrating and
ripping projectiles is likely to be as agonizing as the
long-term effects of mustard gas. Nerve gases are relatively
humane killers with few lingering effects. Once one strips
away the rhetoric, gutted is gutted and dead is dead.
The problem is, however, that the myths surrounding
chemical weapons do exist and shape popular perceptions.
Regardless of actual casualties, terrorist attacks using
chemical weapons are likely to produce far more panic and
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fear than attacks using conventional weapons. Further,
chemical attacks can easily be combined with large scale
bombings and other terrorist “cocktails”—an option that is
described in detail in so much of the literature on
counterterrorism than only illiterate or truly stupid
terrorists can be unaware of it.
The psychological dimension of chemical terrorism can
also interact with the physiological dimension. The long
U.S. debates over Agent Orange and the Persian Gulf
Syndrome have already shown that there also is no clear
end game to an act of chemical terrorism. Even the threat of
exposure can create political and medical problems for
decades, and no government announcement that a given
area or facility is safe will ever fully convince public opinion.
The deliberate smuggling of trace amounts of persistent
chemical weapons like mustard gas, V-series agents, and
toxins into a wide range of target areas would be an ideal
strategy for a terrorist concerned with maximizing the
effect of terrorism, minimizing the risk of detection, and
avoiding the backlash from large numbers of real casualties.
Terrorists might also use a number of ordinary consumer
goods to produce small amounts of chemical poisons for such
localized attacks. One highly publicized option in
counterterrorist literature is to burn Teflon in a closed space
(the result is phosgene, hydrogen fluoride, and sub-micro
polymeric fumes).7
Much would depend on the agent used and how well it
was produced and deployed. For example, Aum
Shinrikyo—the Japanese cult that used Sarin in the Tokyo
subway attack—made a long series of mistakes. It produced
Sarin using the German salt process, its production plant
never functioned properly, and the agent was only 25
percent pure when first manufactured. One of its attacks
occurred only days after 500 Japanese police had taken a
chemical agent response course and under panicked,
unrehearsed conditions. The cult used a crude delivery
method. It placed punctured dual polyethylene bags on the
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subway rather than using the trucks it had modified to use
sprayers. The agent was extremely slow to evaporate, giving
many people time to leave the area. Even so, some 5,100
people had to be screened (4,073 the first day), 2,058 had to
be observed in clinics, 984 had clear symptoms, 54 were
hospitalized, 17 were critical, and 11 died.8
Useful descriptions of how to produce nerve weapons are
available on the Internet and in a number of extremist
handbooks. Most chemical weapons can be produced by a
sophisticated terrorist. The basic technologies for first
generation weapons are now more than 80 years old and
some—like mustard gas—have persistent effects that may
make them more attractive for terrorist purposes than more
lethal, but short lived, agents like Sarin. The production of
most chemical weapons is very similar to the production of
other chemical processes and compounds that are common
in the Middle East. Even Sarin is scarcely a complex
product. In broad terms, it is a combination of sodium
fluoride, isopropyl alcohol, and methyl phosphonic
dichloride.
Both weapons and commercial equipment can use the
same reactor vessels, distillation columns, heat exchangers,
pumps and valves, and filters. In fact, the greatest
similarities between weapons and commercial processes
exist between second generation nerve gases and
insecticides, because the compounds are so closely related.9
While the Australia Group has created a list of equipment
requiring special consideration—emphasizing corrosion
resistant equipment using Hastelloy and high nickel
alloys—the limited controls over such equipment are
designed largely to deal with military-scale production.
Further, the required equipment is available from a wide
range of countries.
A terrorist might also accept the risk of limited
production without such equipment on the grounds that
corrosion would not be quick enough to affect the production
of limited amounts of agent. Similarly, the list of 54

185

precursor chemicals now used by the Australia Group is not
exclusive—particularly if the terrorist accepts unstable
weapons with limited shelf lives and uncertain
lethalities—and often has no impact in restricting small
purchases and deliveries.10 There are also indicators that
experts from the FSU have been involved in schemes to sell
weapons technology and feedstocks. For example, the
Russian Federal Security Service has announced that
Anatloy Kuntsevich, a retired Soviet Lieutenant General,
arranged for the delivery of 1,800 pounds of chemical to an
unidentified Middle Eastern country in 1993.11
Terrorists might also use toxins, a category of weapons
that falls into a gray area between chemical and biological
weapons and which can be an order of magnitude more
lethal than nerve gas. Toxins are poisonous compounds
produced by living organisms like microbes, snakes,
spiders, sea creatures, and plants, and are usually proteins
that act upon specific receptors in the body. Most are
relatively unstable in the presence of heat and other severe
environmental factors. However, two toxins—Botulin and
Ricin—are comparatively easy to make. The manufacture of
Staphylococcal Enterotoxin may be within the capabilities
of Middle East terrorists. The production of lethal
mycotoxins and saxitoxin is more questionable.
Botulin is particularly lethal, although it still does not
compare in lethality with biological weapons. It takes 512
kilograms of Botulinium to produce 50 percent casualties in
a 1.5 square kilometer target versus only 0.09 kilograms of
Anthrax spores. It is also difficult to produce a dried
Botulinium toxin in a form that could be disseminated over
a large area in lethal concentrations, and such an attack is
probably beyond the capabilities of any Middle Eastern
terrorist without state support.
Nevertheless, wet Botulin agents can easily be produced
by altering food processing equipment and using milk
products and other foods and then spread through a closed
area using a standard commercial fogger. One simulation
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indicates that Botulin could be grown in garbage cans in a
large office building and dried for later dissemination
through its air system. Botulin poisoning is difficult to treat
effectively and its symptoms only begin to appear 24 hours
to several days after an attack. These symptoms can be
similar to those of nerve agents—leading to the wrong
treatment, particularly if a “cocktail” of different agents is
used.
Ricin is even more difficult to weaponize in a form with
area coverage than Botulin, but it can be produced using
ordinary kitchen equipment. In fact, the Fort Detrick patent
for producing Ricin from the Castor Bean has been a matter
of public record since 1962. Two members of an American
extremist group, a drug group, and a private individual
have already shown that a very small group of terrorists can
successfully produce Ricin, and that effective treatment is
even more difficult.
There are a number of other toxins that might be used.
For example, Staphylococcal Enterotoxin is more of an
incapacitating agent than a killing mechanism, but
terrorists could credibly manufacture and use it in some
scenarios. The possible manufacture of mycotoxins has also
been a subject of considerable controversy for years. For
example, the U.S. State Department has accused the Soviet
Union of using such agents in Afghanistan and Vietnam,
only to have many U.S. experts immediately state that the
evidence was lacking and that it would be almost impossible
to create mycotoxins with the required lethality and
dissemination characteristics.12
The range of potential chemical agents and their
uncertain lethality also interacts with the difficulty of
detection and defense. Even a Middle Eastern government
that sought to prepare a detection and reaction system
would face major problems. A terrorist who attacked inside
the target area, under conditions where major civil defense
measures had not been taken, would probably succeed in
achieving his goals before a government could detect the
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fact its population was under attack. Deploying detection
systems that can provide timely warning over a large urban
area, or which cover all area targets is costly—if not
impossible. Installing detection devices in all major
buildings and enclosed areas is almost certainly impossible.
Many current detection devices are false alarm prone,
and a terrorist could destroy the credibility of such warning
systems by releasing trace amounts of an agent near such
devices at intervals before an attack. Many devices only
work with a limited list of chemical weapons, and advanced
detection devices are only now becoming available. For
example, the United States is just beginning to field test the
Automatic Chemical Agent Detector and Mark 21 Remote
Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm in an effort to deploy
systems capable of real-time detection of chemical attacks
on at least point defense basis.13
Even an alerted population could remain vulnerable.
Many Middle Eastern governments simply cannot afford
civil defense, and the terrorist would have the advantage in
choosing the place and time of attack. In many cases,
governments cannot take civil defense measures without
making their strengths and weaknesses public. Slow acting
weapons like toxins would present major problems in terms
of protection. Agents like dusty mustard can defeat most of
the gear available for civil protection. A terrorist might also
“spoof” a government into taking civil defense measures
that would soon lose their credibility or into triggering the
mass use of antidotes which are themselves terrorizing and
debilitating, such as Atropine as an antidote for nerve gas.
All major Middle Eastern states are highly dependent on
a large volumes of imports, and many of the feedstocks
necessary for chemical agents are available as dual-use civil
goods. Small amounts of critical specialized feedstocks
would be relatively easy to smuggle in using containers or a
variety of credible covers. Other agents could be
manufactured in place. Drug smuggling is only one example
of how difficult it is to establish a perimeter defense of a
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country or populated area, and there are serious questions
as to whether most of the high technology devices on the
drawing board can ever handle the required volume of
search with any cost-effectiveness and reliability.14 In short,
it has yet to be demonstrated that any mix of potential
technologies would be a cost-effective defense system, and
Israel may be the only Middle Eastern state with the mix of
resources and technical training capability necessary to
credibly consider deploying such detection systems.
Terrorism and Biological Weapons.
Biological weapons represent the most dangerous risk of
a “paradigm shift” in Middle Eastern terrorism. They offer a
far more devastating option than chemical weapons at costs
far lower than those of both chemical and nuclear weapons.
The costs of biological weapons are much smaller per
casualty than those of any other form of terrorism. A U.N.
report estimated in 1969 that military-scale biological
weapons only cost $1 per square kilometer of coverage of a
civilian target versus $600 for chemical weapons, $800 for
nuclear, and $2,000 for advanced conventional weapons.
While terrorists can scarcely expect similar production
efficiencies and economies of scale, the savings would be
roughly proportionate.15
Once again, such risks must be kept in perspective.
Advanced biological weapons have never been used
successfully in combat, and most terrorist attempts to
develop and use such weapons have failed. While some
intelligence services have used biological weapons and
toxins as poisons, there are no confirmed cases in which this
had taken place in the Middle East. Similarly, a recent
survey of reports on terrorist possession or use of biological
weapons indicates that no significant incidents have
involved movements in the Middle East, and most such
charges that Middle Eastern terrorist groups were involved
in such activities were made for propaganda purposes.16
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At the same time, biological weapons are an extremely
serious potential threat. Advances in commercial chemical
and food processing equipment, and in biotechnology and
medical equipment, are making it steadily easier and
cheaper to produce effective weapons. Appendix B shows
that Middle Eastern states are steadily improving their
capability to help proxies or conduct state terrorism, and the
fact that at least some controls exist on chemical and
nuclear technologies will tend to push terrorists towards
biological weapons.17
The technology of biological weapons also presents
serious problems for detection and defense. One of the
greatest problems in dealing with biological terrorism is
that there is such a long list of possible weapons with so
many different characteristics and effects. Biological
weapons have radically different lethalities and area
effects, and the lethality of a weapon does not necessarily
correspond to its area coverage. For example, if one assumes
that a crop spraying helicopter, an RPV, or small aircraft
released 50 kilograms of a Rift Valley Fever agent along a
two-kilometer line upwind of a city of around 500,000, the
resulting agent would be heavy enough so that it would only
reach about one kilometer downwind. It also would
probably only kill 400, and incapacitate 35,000.18
In theory, a terrorist could credibly produce and use any
of these weapons—particularly if a state granted the
terrorist group sanctuary, a secure facility, and/or state
support. Doctors, laboratory technicians, and cultists in the
U.S., Britain, France, Japan, Haiti, and India have used
biological poisons, and Aum Shinrikyo carried extensive
work in developing Botulinum toxin and Anthrax.
U.S. studies and exercises have shown that the open
literature and commercial equipment are adequate for such
purposes—particularly if the agent does not have to be
stored in a stable form or weaponized. The terrorist would
also have the advantage that laboratory or pilot scale
production of 50-500 liters of agent would be adequate for
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many types of terrorist attacks, and would involve far less
detectable purchases of equipment and production efforts
than commercial scale production of weapons using
equipment with a capacity of over 500 liters. While there are
some guidelines for identifying dual-use biological
equipment and related technology, there also are literally
hundreds of suppliers scattered all over the world, and
existing guidelines emphasize large-scale or highly
specialized equipment that terrorists either would not need
or could buy with little fear of detection using different
covers and suppliers.19
The need for a special facility would vary sharply
according to the agent used. Anthrax and Botulin, for
example, could be produced safely in a comparatively
unsophisticated level 2 facility with only limited special
containment equipment. A terrorist might also use a
university or small company laboratory as a cover to
produce a more pathogenic agent, or accept the risk of
relatively low levels of protection against accident. Both
approaches would be less detectable than the level 3 or level
4 production in a secure military facility that a government
might insist upon.
A wide range of different fermentation equipment might
be used, and standard commercial fermenters could be
adapted for either batch or continuous fermentation.
Anthrax, for example, might be produced on a one batch
process from a commercial fermenter, and the facility might
then be abandoned. Some of the largest fermenters are used
for the production of microbial products for animal feeds.
Controls are only beginning to be applied to the
international sale of type cultures and most such controls
offer little real security. A number of organisms can also be
isolated from the environment in the Middle East, stolen or
traded, or obtained in exchanges from a variety of
laboratories other than type culture centers. The technology
and equipment for genetic engineering is becoming
commercially available, and a terrorist might lease such
facilities in Europe or the U.S.20
191

A terrorist might also steal a virus from a government
facility. Such facilities sometimes offer immediate access to
very dangerous agents. For example, an Ebola virus
incident occurred by accident in Reston, Virginia, in
December 1989. Fortunately, the Ebola turned out to be a
strain which was only fatal to monkeys. However, there is
no guarantee that a targeted attack on a medical research
facility would not give a terrorist access to a far more lethal
weapon. Ebola outbreaks involving human beings have a
history of 53 percent to 92 percent mortality, and there are
at least five other viruses with similar lethality that might
be stolen or cultured to produce a weapon.21
Once again, however, such potential threats must be
placed in a real-world context. It must be stressed that there
are few cases where biological terrorist activity has been
attempted, and none which have conclusively demonstrated
that a terrorist can actually achieve high lethalities. There
are also significant technical difficulties in weaponizing
biological agents to achieve high casualties. It is difficult for
terrorists to develop dry agents that can be scattered in the
air, kill through inhalation, and which have just the right
size and weight to ensure both proper concentration and
proper lethality. Effective weapons use droplets smaller
than 10 microns, and the effectiveness of most weapons is
measured in terms of the number of infectious units that
can be released of 1-5 micron size. The production of lethal
agents also usually requires a significant amount of
equipment and time, although the processing equipment
involved is becoming steadily cheaper. The only way to be
certain of lethality is through experimentation with live
subjects—although this might be done with limited risk of
detection by “mini-attacks” on selected individuals.
One thing is clear. If terrorists are successful in
producing or obtaining a highly lethal biological agent, the
payload involved could be so small that it would be easy to
deliver much larger amounts than the 50 kilograms
discussed in Table 7, or to deliver a mix of agents with
radically different effects and treatments and do so in a
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relatively small delivery system. Many agents listed would
be equally effective if scattered from a ship, from a truck, or
off the top of several tall buildings. The U.S. Army, for
example, has tested the scattering of Anthrax-like particles
from a ship off the coast of Atlantic City, on commuters in
Grand Central station, from the back of trains, and in a
covert attack on Egland Air Base. All four simulated attacks
were conducted without any questions or challenges, and
gathering of particles from test subjects showed that they
would have had high lethality.
Line source delivery does not require an aircraft or
platform detectable by radar, and the urban sprawl of cities
means that sufficient high rise buildings exist so that a
terrorist could select three or four buildings, take a suitcase
or trunk to the roof, release the agent an optimal distance
from the main area of attack and leave. Alternatively, a wet
agent and nebulizer/fogger could be moved to the roof
disguised as cleaning equipment or some other service
device. Further, security against this form of attack would
not affect using a truck or vehicle in a more open area and no
current detection device could prevent exposure. Even the
new U.S. Interim Biological Agent Detector (IBAD), for
example, takes at least 45 minutes to detect and analyze an
agent—provided it is set to recognize the agent used. The
first real field tests of this system are underway in South
Korea.22
Terrorists could also use much less ambitious forms of
biological warfare. One American in Fairfax, Virginia, for
example, exploited the fear of biological weapons by
spraying liquid over his neighbors and telling them they
had been infected with anthrax. While this case borders on
the absurd, a terrorist could cause a great deal more fear by
using an actual agent in nonlethal amounts or inserting
detectable amounts of agents into a water system and
making the action public. While most agents are ineffective
once sent through water purification systems, this fact is
not known to most physicians and the announcement could
cause considerable disruption. Similarly, agricultural
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exports can be disrupted by contamination of food with
toxins or pathogenic agents (this was done with Chilean
grape exports to the U.S.). Medical and other widely used
consumer goods could also be tampered with in the target
country (done with Tylenol in the U.S., and threatened
against Pepsi Cola).23
In short, the problems of detection, defense, and
response would be even more difficult than in dealing with
chemical weapons, and the risk of a breakdown or collapse of
national emergency and medical services would be much
greater. Effective surveillance of known potential facilities
would be extremely difficult for all of the Middle Eastern
states with modern research and food processing facilities,
and tracking all relevant imports would be almost
impossible. Detection and warning systems would be even
more prone to false alarms, the use of “cocktails,” and gaps
in coverage. Even effective systems would at best provide
medical and emergency response teams with warning of the
protection methods they should use and the need for
immediate treatment. As a result, more might depend on
the willingness of the terrorist to kill than on a Middle
Eastern government’s effort to detect and defend.
Terrorism and Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear weapons are simultaneously the most
threatening weapon terrorists might use and the most
difficult weapon for terrorists to obtain. Most nuclear
weapons are extremely sophisticated devices requiring
extremely advanced machining, electronics, and safety
procedures during their manufacture and handling. They
are far more expensive, and much more difficult to
manufacture. They sometimes involve detectable levels of
radiation, and are much heavier than biological weapons.
Single gun devices are the least sophisticated nuclear
weapon that a Middle Eastern terrorist might assemble. It
is possible to use conventional ordnance technology in
assembling the mechanism and fabricating the explosive for
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such a weapon. Commercial industrial techniques can be
used to manufacture a tungsten or tungsten carbide
reflector, and a neutron initiator can be made if a modest
reactor is at hand for polonium production. A gun weapon
could do without such a device and could even use near
weapons grade levels of enrichment at the cost of lower
yields and increased risk of misfires and partial fission.24
At the same time, even single gun devices still require
relatively sophisticated neutron reflectors. They are
extremely heavy relative to implosion weapons, and are
wasteful of enriched material. For example, an efficient
implosion weapon with a 10-15 kiloton yield might use only
6-8 kilograms of plutonium, while even an efficient version
of a single gun device using weapons grade plutonium might
use 60 kilograms and require machining down from a total
of 70-90 kilograms. Further, an effective gun device must
use weapons grade U-235 or U-233 and cannot use
plutonium. Weapons grade plutonium is more common and
easier to process, and the fact that gun devices must use
uranium will restrict terrorist capability to actually
manufacture a weapon.25
Implosion weapons are more efficient, but are far more
complex to design and manufacture—even if weapons grade
uranium or plutonium is available. The two principal
problems are the development of an effective implosion
system and a suitable neutron initiator. The basic
techniques and designs necessary to solve both problems
are well-known, but actually designing a reliable weapon
and fabricating working components is still extremely
difficult and is likely to require either a large, hightechnology clandestine organization or a state-sized entity.
High efficiency implosion devices are even more
sophisticated and require the design to maximize the
compression of the fissile material by using a levitated core,
or flying plate design, with a sufficiently high HE/driver
mass ratio to achieve velocities approaching the theoretical
limit. This requires techniques such as the use of an efficient
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tamper and reflector (preferably nonmoderating); the use of
a composite core (if two different fissile materials are
isotopes); and fusion boosting.26
Building a weapon with minimal fissile material and no
testing also imposes serious constraints. Reducing the
amount of fissile material diminishes yield and further
increases the risk of failure without testing or types of
simulation that normally require a state-sized entity. The
mass of the implosion system, and the tamper/reflector
must be increased, which will result in greater overall mass
and volume, even though the fissile material weight is
reduced.
The only variation in weapons design that seems to offer
a terrorist the ability to use minimal amounts of fissile
material is an advanced flying plate design that would
compress a one kilogram plutonium mass sufficiently to
produce a yield in the 100 ton range. This design, however,
places important limits on the type of fissile material that
can be used. The high compression required implies fast
insertion times, and relatively pure weapons grade
plutonium.27
At the same time, one should not exaggerate the
difficulties. Several trials have shown that a number of
graduate physicists could design workable gun type
weapons that could be assembled using commercially
available parts, explosives, electronics, relatively small
facilities, and readily available tools. There are weapons
designs that can use a higher plutonium-240 content than
normal weapons grade plutonium without affecting
performance. In fact, ordinary reactor grade plutonium can
be as effective as weapon grade material in some very low
yield weapons. While it seems unlikely that terrorists can
ever hope to make such a weapon, fusion boosting would
allow low-enrichment weapons to produce yields exceeding
1 kiloton.
While it is also extremely unlikely that anything smaller
than a state-sized entity could produce weapons grade
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plutonium or uranium, massive amounts of fissile material
exist in the Former Soviet Union, as do thousands of
relatively small nuclear weapons. In late 1995, Russia had a
stockpile over 1,200 tons of highly enriched uranium and
150 tons of weapons grade plutonium, the Ukraine recently
had a stockpile of 100 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium, and Kazakhstan has a stockpile of 300 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium and 100 kilograms of weapons
grade plutonium. The FSU was also operating 46
commercial power reactors which produce plutonium-239
as a byproduct. While extracting this plutonium-239
requires complex and dangerous processing, no developing
nation that has ever attempted to acquire such technology
has failed, and a number of facilities in Russia could
perform the task.
Nations like China and Pakistan might also be the
source of such material, but the FSU stands out because it
already has a substantial nuclear black market. Work by
the CSIS Global Organized Crime Project indicates that
Russian law enforcement agencies dealt with 21 cases of
theft of fissile material (some enriched) between mid-1992
and mid-1995, and prosecuted 19 Russian citizens.
The Russian Ministry of the Interior reported 27 cases of
theft in 1993 and 27 in 1994—all by Russians inside the
apparatus for producing and securing such material. There
were five recoveries of small amounts of weapons usable (87
percent enriched) uranium in 1994, although the largest
recovery totaled only 2.7 kilograms. Germany investigated
158 cases of nuclear smuggling in 1992, 241 in 1993, and 267
in 1994, and German officials estimated that at least half of
these cases involved smugglers with some access to real
radioactive materials. In contrast, the United States has
had only one confirmed case of domestic nuclear smuggling
or extortion involving actual nuclear material out of the
100-odd cases it has investigated over the last 20 years.
Nuclear smuggling also involves far more serious risks
than the transfer of fissile material. The FSU recently had
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nearly 30,000 nuclear weapons, and the problem terrorists
face would be greatly eased if one or more nuclear weapons
which are already assembled became available. There
seems good reason to question whether the safety devices on
most FSU weapons—particularly tactical weapons—would
be as difficult to defeat as those on most U.S. weapons. In
any case, the safety devices on most nuclear weapons are
not intended to protect them against weeks or months of
dedicated effort by trained engineers and physicists. Access
to several weapons of the same type would allow the
terrorists to disassemble one to determine the exact nature
of the weapon’s safety and protection system and then
develop the best way of bypassing such protection in the
other weapons. In some cases, it might be possible to
substitute new components for protected components,
though possibly at the cost of reliability or yield.
Delivery of smuggled or stolen nuclear weapons would
not require a sophisticated military delivery system. Even a
large gun type device could be easily moved in a truck or
small ship, and a fully shielded Russian designed nuclear
weapon could be shipped in a relatively small container
weighing less than 500 kilograms. The terrorist would also
have several potential advantages in the delivery of a
weapon that are not available to a state making a military
attack. A sophisticated terrorist can chose the exact time
and place of attack, can chose the moment for maximum
political or escalatory provocation or when civil defense and
emergency response measures are unprepared.
Once again, one has to be careful about treating state
terrorism or nonstate terrorist groups as mass murderers.29
However, it is at least possible that a Middle Eastern
terrorist group might see the fallout from a ground burst as
a significant bonus from an attack. A terrorist could also
map a city or area target with great precision. Like
terrorists using chemical and biological weapons, terrorists
using nuclear weapons can now draw on sophisticated
weather and wind data to chose the optimal moment of
attack. Wind patterns can be confirmed or monitored very
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cheaply using remote devices linked to the Internet or
cellular phones. The vast uncertainties that military
planners face in dealing with collateral damage from the
long-term death rate from fallout and rain out (or
underwater/surface explosions) may have little meaning to
terrorists who may want massive casualties to die slowly
and agonizingly over a period of decades and wounded
societies which must endure the human consequences. A
terrorist willing to kill a hundred thousand people with the
prompt effects of nuclear weapons is unlikely to harbor
humanitarian niceties about longer term deaths.
A terrorist does not have to use high yields to deal with
uncertainties in accuracy, and it is important to understand
that the effects of even small nuclear weapons are extremely
severe. Table 7 shows that a 10 kiloton weapon has roughly
25 percent to 33 percent of the blast and thermal effects of a
100 kiloton weapon that is 10 times larger. While it is
impossible to quantify fallout effects in equally simple
terms, an urban ground burst from a 10 kiloton weapon
might well produce fallout equal to 40-50 percent of that of a
100 kiloton weapon. A well-designed exploitation of its
fallout pattern would probably produce a prompt and
long-term death rate in excess of 20-30 percent over the
greater Riyadh, Amman, Cairo, or Tel Aviv areas. It is also
possible that a terrorist might increase the radiological
fallout from such a weapon by packing it, or adapting its
tamper, to use a nonweapons grade fissile material like
uranium-238 or plutonium-240.
There are no precedents for knowing what would happen
to a Middle Eastern state whose major population center
took both devastating immediate losses and then would
have to deal with the longer-term medical consequences
over a period of 20 years or more. There is no way to know
how much of its ruling elite would be lost, how its people
would deal with the political and economic shock, what the
impact would be on immigration and emigration, and how it
would deal with decontamination and rebuilding.
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Work done by U.S. and British civil defense planners
during the 1950s and 1960s suggests that the technical
aspects of recovery could be dealt with relatively rapidly, and
the Japanese experience at Hiroshima and Nagasaki
indicates that human beings are relatively resilient in
dealing with the shock of nuclear attack. Both the civil
defense studies and Japanese experience, however, are based
on recovery by developed countries with careful planning for
recovery—or wartime readiness and preparations—and the
existence of a stable national political structure and a
relatively unified political system.
There also is a significant possibility that a terrorist
nuclear device could explode in ways that involved little
planning by the terrorists involved. Under some conditions
this could lead to a misfire or explosion in an area where the
weapon would do comparatively limited damage. Under
other conditions, it could vastly complicate the already
unpredictable political and strategic consequences of a
terrorist use of nuclear weapons. A nuclear device is
inherently unstable. It must bring fissile material into near
proximity for critical mass and be surrounded by high
explosives. A one-of-a-kind explosive device may detonate
by accident—as a have many terrorist bombs.
A stolen nuclear weapon whose safety devices are
bypassed by terrorists is scarcely a secure system for transit
or cargo purposes, and a stolen high efficiency design might
be vulnerable to sudden core collapse. Terrorists may ignore
or fail to understand fallout patterns which can easily reach
across borders, and explosions can produce skip effects
where winds and weather lift up fallout and deposit it in
lethal concentrations and up to several hundred kilometers
away. The impact of an explosion in Jerusalem that
terrorists had intended for Tel Aviv is just one of the
countless “wild card” cases that might occur.
Finally, terrorists can use nuclear materials in other
ways. Most radiological weapons do not offer the extreme
lethality of biological weapons and are closer to chemical
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weapons in lethality. It is also difficult to manufacture
weapons with wide area coverage, which present the same
general problems as manufacturing very small particles as
biological weapons, and the manufacture of such weapons
would be easier to detect at a distance. Highly sophisticated
plutonium particulates that could be delivered like Anthrax
spores would be an extraordinarily dangerous weapon to
manufacture and handle. However, the inhalation of even
trace amounts of plutonium would cause an agonizing
death, and plutonium-240—a nonfissile material—would
be as lethal as plutonium-239.
Terrorists might exploit their very possession of nuclear
materials. For example, terrorists may acquire a credible
capability to threaten the use of a nuclear device long before
they actually possess a working nuclear weapon—if they
ever acquire one. A nation that detects the transfer of a
large amount of fissile material or smuggled
weapon—and/or the acquisition of materials for making a
weapon—will be vulnerable to threats and blackmail and
will have to take Draconian security measures to have
credibility for dealing with the attack.
The mere existence of a credible threat could provide
terrorists with a high degree of leverage in some
contingencies and change the rules for dealing with such
groups and counterterrorist activity. Terrorists are as
capable of preemption, or “launch under attack,” as states.
As is the case with highly lethal biological agents, states
would be confronted with the risk that counterterrorist
activity could trigger an unacceptable act by the terrorist
group that the state was attempting to counter.
The final technical dimension shaping nuclear terrorism
is the risk of nuclear cocktails that mix radiological poisons
with biological and chemical weapons or very large
explosive devices. Terrorists seeking to complicate and/or
kill emergency response efforts might add radioactive
contaminants to other weapons knowing that—at a
minimum—even limited levels of radiation can cause panic
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and disrupt efforts to deal with other forms of damage.
Mixing types of weapons could also greatly complicate
decontamination, further weaken the credibility of
announcements that an area or facility is safe, and force
governments to deal with lingering after effects and
investigations that stretch out the public impact of an act of
terrorism for months or years. As has been discussed in
Appendix E, this could lead to attempts to use radiological
agents against military facilities with U.S. or local military
personnel as well as civil targets.
Once again, one cannot discount the resulting problems
of contamination and fear. Most radiological poisons may be
no more lethal than a host of other killing mechanisms, but
radiation inspires the same unique level of fear as an exotic
disease. Even trace amounts of radiation can inspire high
levels of fear and trigger massive security measures and
decontamination exercises. There is little authoritative
basis for deciding what level of exposure is or is not safe and
what level of decontamination is successful. Even when
Middle Eastern governments can declare that a radiation
level is safe, they are not likely to encounter trust and public
confidence. Combined with the long half-lives of many
radioactive agents, this could make even radiological
weapons that have little lethality potentially effective as
panic and facility/area denial weapons.
Detection, defense, and response would again present
problems. As has been discussed earlier, coastal facilities
can be attacked without a weapon formally entering
national territory and container shipments would have to be
inspected outside ports to prevent the shipment of
booby-trapped devices. While airport detectors, vehicle
monitoring detectors, and area search equipment are likely
to be more effective than the equipment available to deal
with chemical and biological weapons, it may be possible for
terrorists to effectively shield radioactive material, and
detection of a single weapon in maritime cargo would be
uncertain without on-ship inspection.
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Few Middle East countries can hope to acquire the
capabilities and technical support of the U.S. Nuclear
Emergency Situation Team (NEST). Even U.S. experts
would find it difficult to quickly characterize a given
radioactive contaminant and decide on a decontamination
strategy. A terrorist presumably would time an attack to
avoid any effective civil defense and evacuation
measures—which would differ in detail from the measures
required to defend against biological and chemical attack.
The treatment of nuclear weapons effects would require
massive medical capabilities to deal with direct physical
injury from blast, burns, and radiation poisoning and might
quickly saturate regional response capabilities. Triage, the
fear of further attacks, and the psychological/physiological
impacts of radiation would further expand the social and
political impact of nuclear weapons.
Terrorism and Counterproliferation in the Middle
East.
There is no way to put an analysis of truly horrifying
possibilities without clear probabilities into perspective.
There is no way to distinguish the “boy who cried wolf” from
“chicken little,” and either from a rational warning. It
should be obvious, however, that nations inside and outside
the Middle East must begin to consider terrorism and
unconventional warfare as potential means of delivery of
weapons of mass destruction and as independent causes of
proliferation.
The costs of a “paradigm shift” in terrorism to the use of
weapons of mass destruction are so high that any structure
of regional arms control and defense that ignores such risks
leaves gaping holes and vulnerabilities. There is no point,
for example, in creating a vastly expensive missile defense
system to deal with a vastly expensive missile threat and
then leave a nation vulnerable to terrorism and
unconventional warfare. The end result is simply to create a
major new incentive for such attacks and state-sponsored
terrorism.
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It requires regional states and their allies to consider
adapting a suitable mix of force improvements of the kind
listed in Appendixes F and G, which are adapted from the
U.S. counterproliferation program. These appendixes also
illustrate the practical challenges friendly Middle Eastern
states will face in dealing with the combined mix of threats
from the military forces of hostile states, state terrorism,
and independent terrorism. It is important to stress that
threatened states cannot afford to focus on one aspect of the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, any more than they
can afford to ignore the need to maintain and improve their
capability to deal with more conventional threats.
This list of policy and force improvements also
illustrates the real-world problems that Middle Eastern
governments are likely to have in dealing with a range of
problems that is an exercise in complexity or “chaos” theory.
Any review of the literature on the threat of terrorism from
weapons of mass destruction quickly reveals a wide range of
individually useful suggestions—in addition to a wide range
of “scare” suggestions and “sales pitches.”
The problem lies in determining how a developing
Middle Eastern state—even one as advanced as Israel—can
combine a suitable mix of measures to cover the unique
terrorist threat from all weapons of mass destruction along
with the need to respond to all other threats. Counterterrorist experts may be able to focus on their specialty and
avoid the kind of ruthless trade-offs discussed earlier, but
governments must use limited resources to deal with all the
risks they face.
There currently do not seem to be good or cost-effective
answers to dealing with this problem. In fact, one is
sometimes reminded of the Chinese proverb, “No solution.
No problem!” There are, however, several key starting
points:30

•

National and international intelligence and
counterterrorist experts, involved in concert with
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technical experts and emergency and medical
personnel, need to begin to fully study the risks. At a
minimum, intelligence efforts need to be refocused to
train personnel to recognize long-term and technical
indicators, and to provide strategic warning of a
paradigm shift in regional terrorist activity to focus on
weapons of mass destruction. This effort must break
down internal bureaucratic barriers to coordination,
over- compartmentation of security, and a tendency to
suboptimize around known terrorist groups and a
particular set or type of weapon of mass destruction.

•

Study is needed of existing medical and emergency
response capabilities—including civil defense and
public warning—to determine what low cost steps can
be taken. At the same time, some form of emergency
response team should be established that can begin to
improve detection and response capabilities and
which can coordinate efforts to deal with the combined
nuclear-biological-chemical threat. A clear concept of
emergency and medical response operations should
be developed to use existing resources effectively,
avoid the self-destruction of the medical and
emergency response effort, and establish priorities for
investment in a balanced overall response effort.

•

The United States and other states with advanced
counterproliferation programs and medical
capabilities need to begin planning for the transfer of
suitable intelligence, detection and warning systems,
and emergency response aid. The developing states of
the Middle East have little prospect of cost-effectively
evaluating all of the possible approaches and
technologies. Massive outside medical and emergency
response aid may often be the only way in which a
developing state can ever deal with an effective
terrorist attack using such weapons.
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•

Technology transfer control efforts outside the Middle
East need to be restructured to explicitly consider
terrorism, and not simply the creeping proliferation in
regional military forces.

•

Regional and outside states need to recognize that
arms control and counterproliferation efforts cannot
be divorced from counterterrorism, or focused on one
weapon of mass destruction. Any such arms control
efforts virtually create a vacuum or gap that serves as
an incentive for terrorist or unconventional attacks
that exploit the weaknesses or rigidity in the arms
control regime.

That said, it is difficult to dismiss the probability that
governments will only really begin to react after one or more
terrorists demonstrate that the possibility of such terrorism
is an actual fact. Governments do not do well with paradigm
shifts, and the sheer complexity of the potential threat
makes a response even more difficult. In practice, one can
only hope that Middle Eastern terrorists continue to have
mediocre competence, are slow to take advantage of such
options, are noisy enough to provide considerable strategic
warning, and that the price tag of their initial strikes is low
enough so that the resulting casualties and damage are an
acceptable form of the unacceptable.
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APPENDIX D
THE CHALLENGE TERRORISM
AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
POSE TO THE WEST

•

Existing and projected detection and control technologies, arms
control proposals, and concepts for missile defense assume that
the primary threats are organized states and that relatively
large efforts must be used.

•

Conventional structures of deterrence assume identifiable and
limited sets of opponents and similar values in dealing with
issues like mutual destruction. Terrorist movements may be
willing to take catastrophic risks, as may leaders who identify
themselves with the state and/or see martyrdom as a valid
alternative to victory.

•

War may not be between states or fought for limited strategic
objectives. It may be a war of proxies or terrorists. It may be
fought to destroy peoples or with minimal regard for collateral
damage and risks.

•

The target of unconventional uses of weapons of mass
destruction may not be military in the normal sense of the term.
It may be a peace process, U.S. commitment to the defense of a
given region, a peacekeeping force, an election or ruling elite, or
growing cooperation between formerly hostile groups.

•

Terrorist organizations have already attempted to use crude
chemical weapons. The development and use of chemical and
biological weapons are well within the capability of many
extremist and terrorist movements, and states can transfer
weapons or aid such movements indirectly or with plausible
deniability.

•

Covert or unconventional delivery means may be preferable to
both states and nonstate organizations. Cargo ships, passenger
aircraft, commercial vehicles, or commercial cargo shipments
can all be used, and routed through multiple destinations. A
well-established series of covert transport and smuggling
networks exist throughout the region. Biological weapons can be
manufactured in situ.
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•

The Marine Corps Barracks incident has already shown the
potential value of “mass terrorism,” as has the media impact of
the Oklahoma City bombing and the disruptive effect of far more
limited events like the suicide bombings by Hamas and the
assassination of Yitzak Rabin.

•

Biological and chemical weapons present special problems
because they can be used in so many ways. Chemical poisons
have been used to contaminate Israeli fruit and Chilean food
exports. Infectious biological agents could be used to mirror
image local diseases, as well as agents with long gestation times.
Persistent nerve agents could be used in subways, large
buildings, shopping malls/bazaars, etc., to create both
immediate casualties and long-term risks. Mixes of biological
and chemical agents could be used to defeat detection, protection
gear or vaccines.

•

Arms control efforts assume large state efforts with detectable
manufacturing and weaponization programs in peacetime. The
development of a capability to suddenly manufacture several
hundred biological and chemical weapons with little or no
warning is well within the state-of-the-art using nothing but
commercial supplies and equipment, and much of the Research
and Development effort could be conducted as civil or defensive
research.

•

Unconventional and terrorist uses of weapons can involve the
use of extremely high risk biological weapons transmitted by
human carriers, commercial cargoes, etc.

•

The incentives for the unconventional use of weapons of mass
destruction increase in proportion to the lack of parity in
conventional weapons, the feelings of hopelessness of alienated
or extremist groups, or the prospect of catastrophic defeat.

•

Similarly, the incentive for the unconventional use of weapons of
mass destruction will increase in direct proportion to the
perceived effectiveness of theater missile and other regular
military defense systems.

•

Rogue operations will be a constant temptation for state
intelligence groups, militant wings of extremist groups,
revolutionary forces, etc.
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APPENDIX E
ATTACK SCENARIOS: “DR. BEN NO”
AND “PROFESSOR ABU MORIARITY”
AT WORK IN THE MIDDLE EAST

•

A radiological powder is introduced into the air conditioning
systems of high-rise office buildings or hotels. Symptoms are
only detected over days or weeks, or public warning is given
several weeks later. The authorities detect the presence of such a
powder, but cannot estimate its long-term lethality and have no
precedents for decontamination.

•

Parts for a crude gun-type nuclear device are smuggled in. The
device is built in a medium sized commercial truck. The target
area is mapped to maximize fallout effects in an area filled with
buildings with heavy metals, and the terrorists wait for a wind
maximizing the fallout impact. The bomb explodes with a yield of
only 8 kilotons, but with an extremely high level of radiation.
Immediate casualties are limited but the long-term death rate
mounts steadily with time.

•

Several workers move drums labeled as cleaning agents into a
large shopping mall, large public facility, subway, train station,
or airport. They dress as cleaners and are wearing what appear
to be commercial dust filters or have taken the antidote for the
agent they will use. They mix the feedstocks for a persistent
chemical agent at the site during a peak traffic period. Large
scale casualties result, and draconian security measures become
necessary on a national level. A series of small attacks using
similar “binary” agents virtually paralyze the economy, and
detection is impossible except to identify all canisters of liquid.

•

Immunized terrorists penetrate a large Western cruise ship or
combat ship. They carry anthrax powder in bags designed to
make them appear slightly overweight. They slowly scatter the
powder as they walk through the ship visit. The immediate
result is 50 percent casualties among the ship’s crew, its marine
complement, and the visitors that follow. There is only uncertain
ability to decontaminate a large ship where anthrax has entered
the air system and is scattered throughout closed areas. After
long debates over methods and safety levels, the ship is
abandoned.
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•

A terrorist seeking to “cleanse” a Western nation of its secular
regime and corruption introduces a modified type culture of
Ebola or a similar virus into an urban area—trusting God to “sort
out” the resulting casualties. He scatters infectious cultures in
urban areas for which there is no effective treatment. By the time
the attack is detected, it has reached epidemic proportions.
Medical authorities rush into the infected area without proper
protection, causing the collapse of medical facilities and
emergency response capabilities. Other nations and regions
have no alternative other than to isolate the nation or center
under attack, letting the disease take its course.

•

A terrorist group modifies the valves on a Japanese
remote-controlled crop spraying helicopter which has been
imported legally for agricultural purposes. It uses this system at
night or near dawn to spray a chemical or biological agent at
altitudes below radar coverage in a line-source configuration.
Alternatively, it uses a large home-built RPV with simple GPS
guidance. The device eventually crashes undetected into the sea
or in the desert. Delivery of a chemical agent achieves far higher
casualties than any conventional military warhead. A biological
agent is equally effective, and the first symptoms appear days
after the actual attack—by which time treatment is difficult or
impossible.

•

A truck filled with what appears to be light gravel is driven
through the streets during rush hour or another maximum
traffic period. A visible powder does come out through the
tarpaulin covering the truck, but the spread of the power is so
light that no attention is paid to it. The driver and his assistant
are immunized against the modified form of Anthrax carried in
the truck which is being released from behind the gravel or sand
in the truck. The truck slowly quarters key areas of the city.
Unsuspected passersby and commuters not only are infected, but
carry dry spores home and into other areas. By the time the first
major symptoms of the attack occur some 3-5 days later, anthrax
pneumonia is epidemic, and some septicemic anthrax has
appeared. Some 40-65 percent of the exposed population dies,
and medical facilities collapse causing serious, lingering
secondary effects.

•

A terrorist group scatters high concentrations of a radiological,
chemical, or biological agent in various areas in a city, and trace
elements into the processing intakes to the local water supply.
When the symptoms appear, the terrorist group makes its attack
known, but claims that it has contaminated the local water
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supply. The authorities are forced to confirm that water is
contaminated, and mass panic ensues.

•

Immunized terrorists carry small amounts of anthrax or a
similar biological agent onto a passenger aircraft like a B-747,
quietly scatter the powder, and deplane at the regular scheduled
stop. No airport detection system or search detects the agent.
Some 70-80 percent of those on the aircraft die as a result of
symptoms that only appear days later.

•

Several identical nuclear devices are smuggled out of the FSU
through Afghanistan or Central Asia. They do not pass directly
through governments. One of the devices is disassembled to
determine the precise technology and coding system used in the
weapon’s PAL. This allows users to activate the remaining
weapons. The weapon is then disassembled to minimize
detection with the fissile core shipped covered in lead. The
weapon is successfully smuggled into the periphery of an urban
area outside any formal security perimeter. A 100-kiloton
ground burst destroys a critical area and blankets the region in
fallout.

•

The same device is shipped to a Western port in a modified
standard shipping container equipped with detection and
triggering devices that will set it off as a result of any security
checks. Its main “guidance” system is a GPS system that sets it
off automatically when it reaches the proper coordinates in the
port of destination. The direct explosive effect is significant, but
“rain out” contaminates a massive local area.

•

A freighter spreads anthrax along a coastal area in the Gulf. It is
several days before the attack is detected, and the attacking
group is never fully identified. The form of anthrax involved is
dry and time encapsulated to lead to both massive prompt
casualties and to force time consuming decontamination.

•

A terrorist group attempting to drive Western influence out of
Saudi Arabia smuggles a large nuclear device into Al Hufuf on
the edge of the Ghawar oil field. It develops a crude fallout model
using local weather data which it confirms by sending out scouts
with cellular phones. It waits for the ideal wind, detonates the
devices, shuts down the world’s largest exporting oil field, and
causes the near collapse of Saudi Arabia.

•

A terrorist group waits for the proper wind pattern and allows
the wind to carry a biological agent over an airfield or military
facility. Massive casualties occur, and there is no way to predict
the next attack.
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•

A freighter carrying fertilizer enters a port and docks. In fact, the
freighter has mixed the fertilizer with a catalyst to create a
massive explosion and also carries a large amount of a chemical,
radiological, and/or biological agent. The resulting explosion
destroys both the immediate target area and scatters the
chemical or biological weapon over the area.

•

A large terrorist device goes off in a populated, critical economic,
or military assembly area—scattering mustard or nerve gas.
Emergency teams rush in to deal with the chemical threat, and
the residents are evacuated. Only later does it become clear that
the device also included a biological agent, that the response to
this “cocktail” killed most emergency response personnel, and
the evacuation rushed the biological agent to a much wider area.
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APPENDIX F
COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY
OPTIONS

•

Dissuasion to convince nonweapons of mass destruction states
that their security interests are best served through not
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

•

Denial to curtail access to technology and materials for weapons
of mass destruction through export controls and other tools.

•

Arms control efforts to reinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, nuclear
free zones, conventional arms treaties that stabilize arms races,
confidence and security building measures, and Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty clarification efforts to allow U.S. deployment of
advanced theater ballistic missile defenses.

•

Region-wide arms control agreements backed by intelligence
sharing and ruthless, intrusive challenge inspections without
regard for the niceties of sovereignty.

•

International pressure to punish violators with trade sanctions
to publicize and expose companies and countries that assist
proliferators, and to share intelligence to heighten awareness of
the proliferation problem.

•

Defusing potentially dangerous situations by undertaking
actions to reduce the threat from weapons of mass destruction
already in the hands of selected countries—such as agreements
to destroy, inspect, convert, monitor, or even reverse their
capabilities.

•

Military capabilities to be prepared to seize, disable, or destroy
weapons of mass destruction in time of conflict.

•

Improve tracking and detection of sales, technology transfer,
research efforts, extremist groups.

•

Defensive capabilities, both active (theater missile defenses) and
passive (protective gear and vaccines) that will mitigate or
neutralize the effects of weapons of mass destruction and enable
U.S. forces to fight effectively even on a contaminated battlefield.

217

•

Declared and convincing counterstrike options ranging from
conventional strikes devastating a user nation’s economy,
political structure and military forces to the use of nuclear
weapons against the population centers of user nations and
groups.
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APPENDIX G
POSSIBLE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS
AFFECTING COUNTERPROLIFERATION
POLICY

•

Detection and characterization of biological and chemical agents.
This initiative is intended to accelerate the fielding of stand-off
and point detection and characterization systems by up to 6
years. It also addresses the integration of sensors into existing
and planned carrier platforms, emphasizing man-portability
and compatibility with UAVs.

•

Detection, characterization, and defeat of hard, underground
targets. The United States is seeking new sensors, enhanced
lethality, and penetrating weapons to increase the probability of
defeating the target while minimizing the risk of collateral
damage.

•

Detection, localization and neutralization of weapons of mass
destruction inside and outside the United States. The United
States is seeking to identify and evaluate systems, force
structures, and operational plans to protect key military
facilities and logistic nodes, and conduct joint exercises to
improve the capability to respond to potential biological and
chemical threats.

•

Development and deployment of additional passive defense
capabilities for U.S. forces, including development and
production of biological agent vaccines. This program will
develop and field improved protective suits, shelters, filter
systems, and equipment 2-5 years faster than previously
planned. It also restores funding to the development of improved
decontamination methods.

•

Support for weapons of mass destruction related armed control
measures include strengthening the NNPT, CTB, and BWC.
They include establishing a COCOM successor regime, and
improving controls on exports and technology by strengthening
the MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and Australia Group.

•

Missile defense capabilities, with primary emphasis on theater
ballistic missile defenses. This activity involves improvements in
active and passive defenses, attack operations, and
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improvements in BM/C4I as well as the deployment of theater
missile defenses. The primary focus, however, is on anti-ballistic
missile defenses, and in the near term, this involves the
development of the Patriot Advanced Capability Level-3
(PAC-3/ERINT), Navy area theater missile defense (Aegis), and
theater high altitude area defense (THAAD).

•

Publicized counterstrike options. Options ranging from a
convincing declared capability to conduct precision mass air and
missile strikes with conventional weapons that can devastate
user states to use of nuclear weapons escalating to the
destruction of population centers.

•

New force tailored to dealing with terrorist and unconventional
threats. New intelligence and tracking systems dedicated to the
prevention of mass terrorism, and tailored special forces to
detect and attack terrorist groups and deal with unconventional
uses of weapons of mass destruction.
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CHAPTER 8
ENERGY DEPENDENCE

There is another potential transnational threat that the
West must consider. The Middle East dominates world
energy exports. It has more than 65 percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves and 36 percent of its gas reserves.
According to estimates by the U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE), it exported an average of 17.7 million barrels of oil a
day (MMBD) in 1995. This was 47 percent of the world total
of 37.7 MMBD. The DOE projects that Middle Eastern oil
exports will reach 44.4 MMBD by 2020. This will be 63
percent of the estimated world total of 70.9 MMBD.1 Similar
estimates are not available for gas exports, but Algeria,
Libya, Iran, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE will play an
important role as world suppliers.
The critical geopolitical issue affecting the West is
whether the Middle East will be a stable supplier of oil and
gas exports at market driven prices. This is not easy to
predict in a region that has many intraregional and internal
conflicts, serious economic problems, and major
demographic problems. The Middle East is so heavily
dependent on the income from energy exports that few
nations will voluntarily limit their export revenues. War
has had a major impact on energy exports in the past,
however, and sanctions affect key exporters like Iran, Iraq,
and Libya. New questions are also beginning to arise as to
whether the Middle East can finance the energy
development it needs without more privatization and much
higher rates of foreign investment.
The Middle East has to undergo fundamental changes if
it is to be a stable source of energy exports. Most of its
leaders are aging, and the highly personal patriarchal
systems of government they have established are unlikely
to survive them. The region must either further reduce its
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population growth rate or breed itself into poverty.
Similarly, states must either improve the management of
their economies, diversify, and shift to far greater reliance
on free markets, or risk economic collapse.
A stable future depends on key political events like the
success of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the moderation of
the Iranian revolution, the creation of a stable and peaceful
Iraq, and an end to the civil war in Algeria. It depends on the
succession of stable and more progressive regimes in key
states like Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. It also depends,
however, on the willingness of the region to implement
sustained economic reform, and to come to grips with the
need to reduce population growth, and reduce dependence
on foreign labor.
One alternative is that the region will “muddle through,”
largely preserving the status quo. Political change will be
limited and economic growth will barely keep up with
population growth, if at all. Internal tensions will grow
worse, civil conflict will continue, and some low-level
fighting will take place between states.
The high-risk scenario involves a mix of different risks
which can be combined in very unpredictable ways. These
risks include a succession crisis or internal instability in
Saudi Arabia, instability in Iran and a transfer of power to
revolutionary extremists, and continued revanchism and
authoritarianism in Iraq. They include the collapse of the
Arab-Israeli peace process and continuing civil conflict in
Algeria and Libya.
In the end, it is the Gulf which will be critical to
determining whether the Middle East will pose a
transnational threat in terms of energy. While many
studies talk about the oil wealth of the Middle East,
virtually all of this energy wealth is concentrated in the
Gulf. The Middle East as a whole may have more than 65
percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 40 percent of
its gas reserves, but over 90 percent of these oil reserves are
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in the Gulf. Similarly, estimates of the DOE indicate that
the Gulf averaged 15.4 MMBD worth of exports in 1995, and
will reach 41.8 MMBD by 2020. This equaled 41 percent of
all world exports in 1995, versus 47 percent for the entire
Middle East. The Gulf is projected to produce 59 percent of
all world exports by 2020, versus 63 percent for the entire
Middle East.2
The Gulf also has major gas reserves and is becoming a
major exporter of liquid natural gas. While the Russian
Federation dominates the world’s reserves with 1,700
trillion cubic feet, or 33.4 percent of the world total, Iran
alone has 16 percent of the word’s gas reserves, and Qatar
and the UAE have another 10 percent. In total, the Gulf has
over 33 percent of the world’s reserves. The rest of the
Middle East adds less than another 3 percent.3
It seems unlikely that the West needs to plan for another
oil embargo, and Western power projection capabilities and
security arrangements with the Gulf seem capable of
ensuring that no major, sustained interruption will take
place in exports. The oil sharing arrangements run by the
International Energy Agency should be adequate to deal
with most low level emergencies. At the same time, other
threats remain:

•

Conventional wars in the region can affect energy
exports, as did the Iran-Iraq War.

•

The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
creates massive new threats to energy production and
export facilities.

•

Internal civil conflicts can lead to the destruction of
key facilities, or to the inability to develop key and
expanded energy production at the rates required to
keep prices low or moderate.
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•

Extremist governments may limit or halt production,
regardless of the economic pressures to maximize oil
revenues.

•

Internal political developments may lead nations to
demand that Western forces withdraw, and create a
power vacuum in the Gulf.

These threats do not seem imminent, but Tables 8
through 10 illustrate just how the West and the global
economy depend on the Middle East and on a handful of key
nations in the region.
CHAPTER 8 - ENDNOTES
1. Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook, 1998,
Washington, DOE/EIA-0484(98), April 1998, p. 36.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 51.
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Table 8. Proven Middle East Oil Reserves by
Country (in Billions of Barrels).

225

Table 9. Estimated Middle East Oil Production
Capacity (EIA Reference Gas in MMBD).
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

The most difficult problem in any risk analysis of
transnational threats from the Middle East remains one of
perspective. There are many possibilities but there is no
way to assign probabilities—there simply is no valid way to
distinguish between “crying wolf” and “crying havoc.” Drugs
and immigration problems do challenge both the Middle
East and the West. Middle Eastern terrorism is very real
and so is proliferation. If these two threats should be
combined into superterrorism, the result would create a
new form of asymmetric warfare for which the West is
singularly ill-prepared.
The previous analysis does not indicate that any of these
threats as yet require draconian action, and narcotics and
immigration seem to be realities that both the West and
Middle East will have to learn to live with. The analysis does
indicate, however, that the scale of terrorist attacks may be
rising, and that there are few prospects that terrorist
attacks will end. The West will almost certainly have to deal
with new bombings and large-scale attacks, it will remain
the target of extremist groups, and some of the struggle
between repressive regimes and violent opposition groups
will continue. It is not yet clear that such groups will use
weapons of mass destruction, but it is a possibility whose
consequences are so serious that it deserves serious
consideration.
Current Western power projection capabilities can deal
with the kind of conventional threats that Middle Eastern
states can pose to one another or Western interests. U.S.
power projection forces, supported by Britain and possibly
France, should be adequate to deal with even major regional
powers like Iran and Iraq. The key problem is what will
happen as Middle Eastern states acquire more weapons of
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mass destruction and some of them acquire long-range
missiles that can strike Europe or possibly the United
States.
The threat of state-sponsored terrorism using weapons
of mass destruction is becoming so serious that it at least
requires Western contingency planning. It is clear that the
West should take every possible step to reinforce its
counterterrorism capabilities to deal with conventional
terrorist threats, and every possible step to block or delay
proliferation. It seems premature to call for the immediate
deployment of extremely high cost measures like missile
defenses or the kind of counterproliferation program that
could provide meaningful defenses and recovery capability
against superterrorism. But, it seems foolish not to consider
the development of plans for missile defenses and to deal
with superterrorism, and to develop the technology,
weapons systems, and organizational plans and concepts to
be able to react in the future.
Energy exports are another critical issue. While market
forces can probably ensure adequate energy exports in the
absence of major conflicts, there are risks. These risks are
compounded by a slow probable decline in the margin of
surplus production capacity, and uncertainties as to
whether the region can fund all of the energy investment
required as long as it creates so many barriers to outside
investment and efficient internal investment.
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